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The article analyzes judicial activism, based on a pretext that is to comment on Lambert's work, which will exercise a powerful influence in France in terms of judicial review of the law, and which allows some "lessons from a classic" to be drawn; in the contemporary perspective, in light of the old dogma of the "separation of powers" and the fundamental decisions about the rule of law and democracy. ; El artículo analiza el activismo judicial, a partir de un pretexto que es comentar la obra de Lambert, que ejercerá en Francia una poderosa influencia en materia de revisión judicial de la ley, y que permite extraer algunas "lecciones de un clásico";, situadas en la perspectiva contemporánea, a la luz del viejo dogma de la "separación de poderes" y de las decisiones fundamentales acerca del Estado de Derecho y la democracia.

The modern principles of judiciary, being an integrative constitutional-theoretical category, are the object of scientific research from the point of view of a meaningful interpretation, as well as the specific nature of formalization, including its the comparative legal aspect. In this regard, the research subject of this article is represented by the norms of the constitutions of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The article presents the analysis results, which allowed us identifying the non-standard approaches to consolidate the constitutional principles of the judiciary in the focus group of acts. We associate these approaches with the compositional specific nature of principle reflection, as well as with the variably-substantive aspect, which quantitatively and qualitatively supplements the standard list of required fundamental ideas.

Uno de los ma?s dan?inos flagelos que azotan nuestras sociedades es la corrupcio?n vista desde diversos a?ngulos y acciones. Vargas solo ve al Poder Judicial como objeto de la corrupcio?n, como ente corruptible, mas no como una institucio?n encargada precisamente de controlar la corrupcio?n. La u?nica forma eficaz de superar los problemas ende?micos de corrupcio?n en nuestros sistemas judiciales es afrontar derechamente las profundas disfunciones que estos manifiestan que constituyen las reales causas de los serios problemas de corrupcio?n que los aquejan. Klitgaard formaliza el feno?meno de la corrupcio?n de la siguiente manera: Corrupcio?n = poder monopo?lico + arbitrio – responsabilidad. Villoria manifiesta que hay casos en que la judicatura no es un obsta?culo contra la corrupcio?n, sino un elemento esencial en su reproduccio?n y desarrollo, siendo un ejemplo de corrupcio?n que contribuye a la deslegitimacio?n del sistema poli?tico y corroe los cimientos de la gobernabilidad. Si se analizan, entonces, los problemas de los sistemas judiciales, con el objetivo de buscar soluciones a sus altos niveles de corrupcio?n administrativa, nos encontrari?amos con: una organizacio?n ineficaz, la precariedad del empleo, desprecio de la ley, amiguismo, delegaciones, abogados corruptores, silencio y jerarqui?a judicial cooptada. Palabras clave: Corrupcio?n, Rama Judicial, Monopolio, Amiguismo. One of the most damaging scourges afflicting our societies corruption is viewed from different angles and actions. Vargas only sees the judiciary as an object of corruption as a corruptible body, not as an institution to precisely control corruption. The only effective way to overcome the endemic problems of corruption in our judicial system is straight addressing the root dysfunctions they say they are the real causes of serious corruption problems that afflict them. Klitgaard formalizes the phenomenon of corruption as follows: Corruption = monopoly power + discretion - accountability. Villoria states that there are cases where the judiciary is not a barrier against corruption, but an essential element in its reproduction and development, an example of corruption that contributes to the legitimization of the political system and undermines the very foundations of governance. If analyzed, then, the problems of judicial systems, with the goal of finding solutions to their high levels of administrative corruption, we would find an ineffective organization, job insecurity, lawlessness, cronyism, offices, lawyers corrupters, silence and coopted judicial hierarchy. Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Monopoly, Cronyism. ; Uno de los ma?s dan?inos flagelos que azotan nuestras sociedades es la corrupcio?n vista desde diversos a?ngulos y acciones. Vargas solo ve al Poder Judicial como objeto de la corrupcio?n, como ente corruptible, mas no como una institucio?n encargada precisamente de controlar la corrupcio?n. La u?nica forma eficaz de superar los problemas ende?micos de corrupcio?n en nuestros sistemas judiciales es afrontar derechamente las profundas disfunciones que estos manifiestan que constituyen las reales causas de los serios problemas de corrupcio?n que los aquejan. Klitgaard formaliza el feno?meno de la corrupcio?n de la siguiente manera: Corrupcio?n = poder monopo?lico + arbitrio – responsabilidad. Villoria manifiesta que hay casos en que la judicatura no es un obsta?culo contra la corrupcio?n, sino un elemento esencial en su reproduccio?n y desarrollo, siendo un ejemplo de corrupcio?n que contribuye a la deslegitimacio?n del sistema poli?tico y corroe los cimientos de la gobernabilidad. Si se analizan, entonces, los problemas de los sistemas judiciales, con el objetivo de buscar soluciones a sus altos niveles de corrupcio?n administrativa, nos encontrari?amos con: una organizacio?n ineficaz, la precariedad del empleo, desprecio de la ley, amiguismo, delegaciones, abogados corruptores, silencio y jerarqui?a judicial cooptada. Palabras clave: Corrupcio?n, Rama Judicial, Monopolio, Amiguismo. One of the most damaging scourges afflicting our societies corruption is viewed from different angles and actions. Vargas only sees the judiciary as an object of corruption as a corruptible body, not as an institution to precisely control corruption. The only effective way to overcome the endemic problems of corruption in our judicial system is straight addressing the root dysfunctions they say they are the real causes of serious corruption problems that afflict them. Klitgaard formalizes the phenomenon of corruption as follows: Corruption = monopoly power + discretion - accountability. Villoria states that there are cases where the judiciary is not a barrier against corruption, but an essential element in its reproduction and development, an example of corruption that contributes to the legitimization of the political system and undermines the very foundations of governance. If analyzed, then, the problems of judicial systems, with the goal of finding solutions to their high levels of administrative corruption, we would find an ineffective organization, job insecurity, lawlessness, cronyism, offices, lawyers corrupters, silence and coopted judicial hierarchy. Keywords: Corruption, Judiciary, Monopoly, Cronyism.

The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as a consequence of the reinforcement of its president's powers and transfers a substantial part of its former competences to the Executive power. It is a deliberate setback to the pre-constitutional way of governing the judiciary: a genuine Counter-Reform. ; El Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha sido ineficaz en su misión constitucional de ayudar a defender la independencia de jueces y tribunales frente a presiones de los demás poderes, dignificados o eficientes. La forma en que se designa a sus integrantes y el modo en que éstos eligen luego a los principales cargos judiciales ha puesto de manifiesto su dependencia de los partidos políticos. Pero la reforma de 2013 no resuelve estos problemas, incumple previsiones constitucionales de pluralismo en su composición y de colegialidad y añade otros nuevos como consecuencia de su presidencialismo y transfiere una parte sustancial de sus poderes al Ejecutivo. Supone un retroceso deliberado hacia el sistema de gobierno preconstitucional: una genuina Contrarreforma.The Judiciary Council has been ineffective in its constitutional mission: helping to sustain the judges' independence against the other — dignified or efficient — Powers' pressures. The way its members are appointed and how they in turn elect the holders of the main judicial positions has shown their dependency on the political parties. But the 2013 reform does not resolve this problems, does not fulfil the constitutional provisions on pluralism in its composition and collegiality, creates some new ones as ...

The perception of the Judicial Council is, throughout its existence, too often associated to partisan or corporative interests. This has caused the image of the judiciary to suffer as a whole. One way to avoid dependence on outside interests is the procedure to appoint its members. Until now, three systems were tested, but none proved to be effective for the intended aims. This essay formulates a new appointment system proposal for the Council's members, involving the direct participation of judges and the legislature. It pursues the following objectives: to observe the democratic principle, and to facilitate and promote the participation of all judges and magistrates in the election of its governing body —thus ensuring a plural and inclusive body—. Additionally, other measures are formulated in order to limit outside influences and pressure on the Council, to promote the election of its members based primarily on merit and ability, and to steer the Council back to its strict mandate of defending judicial independence and Justice interests. ; La imagen del Consejo General del Poder Judicial ha estado vinculada en demasiadas ocasiones a intereses partidistas o asociativos a lo largo de su existencia, dañándose con ello la propia imagen del Poder Judicial en su conjunto. Uno de los mecanismos para evitar esa dependencia de intereses externos lo constituye el modo en que se eligen sus vocales. Hasta la fecha se han ensayado tres modelos, pero ninguno ha resultado eficaz a los efectos señalados. Este trabajo propone un nuevo mecanismo de elección de los miembros del Consejo, con participación directa de jueces y de nuestros representantes en el Parlamento, que persigue los siguientes objetivos: respetar el principio democrático, y facilitar y promover la participación de todos los jueces y magistrados en la elección de su órgano de gobierno —asegurando un órgano plural e integrador—. Igualmente, se proponen medidas para limitar las influencias y presiones externas sobre el Consejo, para propiciar que la elección de ...

Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. ; Resumen:La Constitución española de 1978 consagró el Consejo General del Poder Judicial, como órgano de gobierno del Poder Judicial. Desde su creación en 1980, este órgano ha estado sometido a constantes reformas, en un proceso de continuas modificaciones que han derivado en un órgano que no parece haber encontrado su lugar en el sistema institucional, y no ha podido consolidarse. La última reforma más importante, la Ley Orgánica 4/2013, de reforma del CGPJ, ha introducido una nueva reformulación del modo de elección, la estructura y las funciones del CGPJ. El presente trabajo expone la evolución y los cambios habidos en el Consejo en estos cuarenta años de vigencia constitucional, y analiza el régimen establecido por la reforma de 2013, la nueva posición del Consejo y de sus órganos de funcionamiento, la dudas sobre el funcionamiento que plantea y las cuestiones que aún siguen abiertas.Abstract:The Spanish Constitution of 1978 established the General Council of the Judiciary, as an organ for the Judiciary government. Since of its creaction on 1980,this organ has been objet of a constant process of reforming that shows how the Conuncil hasn't achieved to find its place in institutional system and how this organ couldn't consolidate itself under a stable model. The last most important reform, the Organic Law 4/2013, reforming the CGPJ, has introduced in a reformulation of the structure and functions of the Council, and a new way of election of its members, thus constituting. This paper presents the evolution and the changes about of Council in forty years of constitutional vigence and analyzes the reform, the new position and place of Council and its organs, the doubts on the functioning of the Council, and the questions that today remain open. Summary:I. The reception of the Judiciary government in the Spanish Constitution: forty years about the General Council of the Judiciary.II. Regulation present and open questions. 1. About the Organic Law 4/2013, for reforming the CGPJ. 2. Elections system, status of its members and restaffinf of the organ.3. Organic Structure of the General Council of the Judiciary and questions about the functioning of its organs.4. Powers of the General Council of the Judiciary. 5. Relationship between the General Council of the Judiciary and the Spanish Parlament: the Appearance of the President anf the members of Council before the House of Representatives.III. Ultimate considerations.

El Consejo General del Poder Judicial en España se reconoce en el art. 122 de la CE como el órgano de gobierno de la judicatura, y se inscribe en la tendencia del constitucionalismo moderno dirigida a introducir una garantía institucional de la independencia judicial corporeizada en consejos de la magistratura que, a la vez que garantizan en sí mismos la independencia judicial, garantizan tendencialmente mejor la independencia judicial de los jueces individuales al detraer la gestión del estatuto judicial de las manos del Poder Ejecutivo. En este trabajo se desarrolla de manera crítica la configuración del mismo en nuestra Constitución. ; The General Council of the Judiciary in Spain is being recognized in the art. 122 of the CE as the organ of government of the judiciary, and may be included in the tendency of the modern constitutionalism headed to enter an institutional guarantee of the judicial independence embodied in councils of Magistrates that, at the same time that they guarantee the judicial independence, they ensure the independence of the individual judges eliminating the management of the judicial statute of the hands of the Executive Power. In this work we develops, critical way, the configuration of the General Council of the Judiciary in our Constitution.

El presente artículo participa de la discusión en torno al lawfare en América Latina, situación que es centro de intensos debates que exceden lo normativo, posicionándose como un tema complejo que atraviesa principalmente la geopolítica en la región. El trabajo toma el caso de Argentina en los últimos cinco años, para verificar la existencia del lawfare como una herramienta real en la disputa política en el país. Se analizan particularmente los cruces entre el poder judicial, los medios de comunicación y la política, en Argentina, que es en definitiva un eslabón de una situación histórica continental. Por último, se reflexiona sobre un posible momento refundacional en cuanto a la organización y construcción del Estado a partir de la pandemia del COVID - 19. Palabras clave: lawfare, Poder Judicial, comunicación, Estado, política Argentina. Abstract This article aims to participate in the discussion around lawfare in Latin America, a situation that is the center of intense debates that go beyond the normative, positioning itself as a complex issue that mainly crosses geopolitics in our region. The work takes the case of Argentina in the last five years, to verify the existence of lawfare as a real tool in the political dispute in the country. The intersections between the judiciary, the media and politics in Argentina, which is ultimately a link in a continental historical situation, are particularly analyzed. Finally, it is reflected whether or not we are in a refundational moment regarding the organization and construction of the State from the COVID - 19 pandemia. Keywords: lawfare, Judiciary, communication, State, Argentina politics.

The paper departs from the analytical premise that the current regulation of the judiciary in Chile establishes conditions that subject judges to the commanding power of the Supreme Court and to lesser extent of the appeal courts. Particularly important at the time of appointments and promotions, this affects the independence of judges in their judicial work. It is suggested that the government on the judiciary must be modified. It is proposed to incorporate into the Constitution a body with the characteristics of a Council of the Judiciary to administer the basic issues of the courts. With this purpose it is critically discussed how this kind of body has worked in different countries, namely Italy, Spain and Colombia. ; En el trabajo se establecen como premisas de análisis entre otras el que en Chile la regulación orgánica de la judicatura crea las condiciones para que en la designación o en la carrera judicial los jueces se vean sometidos a un poder de mando de la Corte Suprema y en menor medida de las Cortes de Apelaciones y del Ejecutivo. Esta situación afecta la independencia de los jueces en su trabajo jurisdiccional. Se postula de esta manera que el gobierno sobre la judicatura debe ser modificado. Se propone incorporar a la Constitución un órgano del tipo Consejo de la Judicatura para que administre las cuestiones básicas de los tribunales de justicia. Para ello se analiza críticamente cómo ha funcionado este órgano en distintos países: Italia, España y Colombia.

Brazil has embarked on many of the judicial reforms taking place in other Latin American countries. Since 1985 there have been ovo waves of reform. The first centred on the issue of judicial independence, leaving aside other aspects such as duration of cases, access to justice, or resources which lead to an overloading of the system of justice administration. The second wave of reforms was aimed at addressing these other problems. The article seeks to assess the problems of the justice system in Brazil, paying particular attention to structural constraints, levels of politicization and uneven application of the law, as well as to the successes and failures of the reform processes. ; Brasil se introduce en la dinámica de las reformas judiciales que se producen en América Latina. Desde 1985 se pueden percibir dos olas de reformas. La primera de ellas centrada en conseguir la independencia judicial, olvidándose de aspectos como la celeridad del proceso, el acceso a la justicia o los recursos, lo cual provocó el congestionamiento del sistema de justicia brasileño. Es por ello que la segunda ola de reformas se centrará en intentar corregir estos problemas. El objetivo del artículo es analizar la situación de la Administración de justicia brasileña, prestando una atención especial a las limitaciones, la politización y el trato desigual que presenta el Poder Judicial, así como a los resultados y consecuencias de los intentos de reforma.

This article is based on an analysis of the principles that the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States (CPEUM) establishes as guidelines for the judicial career, these principles are considered guiding the ethical behavior of all judicial servants. A comparative study is approached between the Code of Ethics of the Judicial Power of Tabasco (CET) with other main positive legislations, of the tools that judicial officials have. Strategies implemented to achieve the consolidation of a true institutional renewal, as well as what are the tools available to each judicial servant that they have to carry out their work. It should be noted that these normative and institutional instruments have been developed and are aimed at generating awareness in all judicial officials at the levels of the administration and administration of justice, not only of those who exercise the function of judge, but also of the server who performs the slightest activity at the service of the judiciary, as well as of the Tabasco society that demands greater credibility and certainty in its actions. ; El presente artículo se basa en un análisis a los principios que la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (CPEUM) establece como directrices de la carrera judicial, dichos principios se consideran rectores del comportamiento ético de todo servidor judicial. Se aborda un estudio comparativo entre el Código de Ética del Poder Judicial de Tabasco (CET) con otras principales legislaciones positivas, de las herramientas con la que los funcionarios judiciales cuentan. Estrategias implementadas para lograr la consolidación de una verdadera renovación institucional, así como cuáles son las herramientas al alcance de cada servidor judicial con las que cuenta para desempeñar su labor. Cabe resaltar que dichos instrumentos normativos e institucionales han sido elaborados y están dirigidos a generar consciencia en todos los funcionarios judiciales de los niveles de la administración e impartición de justicia, no solo de quien ejerce la función de juzgador, sino también de aquel servidor que realiza la más mínima actividad al servicio del poder judicial, así como de la sociedad tabasqueña que reclama mayor credibilidad y certeza en sus actuaciones.

An investigation is carried out on the election of the members of the General Council of the Judiciary at two levels: 1. International, comparing it with the position of different European institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe, the Consultative Council of European Judges, the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, the Venice Commission even the Court of Justice of the European Union itself; 2. At an internal or national level, analyzing the position of the Constitutional Court, the different parliamentary groups, legal professionals and academic doctrine. SummaryI. INTRODUCTION. II. INTERNATIONAL SCOPE: 1. Brief comparative note of countries in our environment. 2. Assessment of the ECtHR. 3. Council of Europe: 3.1. Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 12. 3.2. GRECO: a) Report year 2017. b) Report year 2019. c) Report year 2021. 4. Magna Carta of European Judges. 5. European Network of Councils of the Judiciary. 6. Venice Commission. 7. Court of Justice of the European Union. III. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: 1. Constitutional Court. 2. Parliamentary Groups: 2.1. Socialist. 2.2. Popular. 2.3. Ciudadanos. 2.4. Other Parliamentary Groups. 2.5. By way of conclusion. 3. Justice Professionals: 3.1. Associations of judges: a) APM. b) JJpD.c) AJFV. d) IGF. 3.2. General Council of the Legal Profession. 4. Positioning of the doctrine. IV. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSAL. ; Se realiza una investigación sobre la elección de los vocales del Consejo General del Poder Judicial a dos niveles: 1. Internacional, comparándola con la postura de diferentes instituciones europeas como el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Consejo de Europa, el Consejo Consultivo de jueces europeos, la Red europea de consejos del Poder Judicial, la Comisión de Venecia incluso el propio Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea; 2. A nivel interno o nacional, analizando el posicionamiento del Tribunal Constitucional, los diferentes grupos parlamentarios, los profesionales de la justicia y la doctrina académica.

This work identifies, from the bibliographic point of view, the different contributions, proposals, approaches and studies around the reform of the administration of justice in Peru, also called modernization, restructuring or refounding of the Judiciary. Notwithstanding the wide bibliography on this important subject, an interesting nucleus of publications corresponding to the 20th century and the beginning of the present century is reported. A first bibliographical review to promote research on the Peruvian judiciary and understand its historical evolution precedes a timely analysis of the author on the need for a change from the Judiciary itself, circumscribed to a democratic theory for judicial governance, and involves the participation of the different actors of the justice system and civil society, by a solid and predictable Judiciary as a support for constitutional democracy. ; El presente trabajo identifica, desde el ángulo bibliográfico, los diferentes aportes, propuestas, enfoques y estudios en torno a la reforma de la impartición de justicia en el Perú o llamada también modernización, reestructuración o refundación del Poder Judicial. No obstante la numerosa bibliografía sobre tan importante tema, se da cuenta de un núcleo interesante de publicaciones correspondientes al siglo XX e inicios de la presente centuria. Un primer repaso bibliográfico para promover la investigación sobre la judicatura peruana y entender su devenir histórico antecede a un oportuno análisis del autor sobre la necesidad de un cambio desde el mismo Poder Judicial, circunscrito a una teoría democrática para la gobernabilidad judicial, y que involucra la participación de los diferentes actores del sistema de justicia y de la sociedad civil, por un Poder Judicial sólido y predecible como sustento de la democracia constitucional.