Suchergebnisse

Shipping list no.: 2004-0082-P. ; Distributed to some depository libraries in microfiche. ; "Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations." ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Shipping list no.: 2004-0082-P. ; "Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations." ; Cover title. ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Mode of access: Internet.

What beliefs do citizens who perceive levels of corruption in their countries to be of significance hold? Do those beliefs arise from their exposure to corruption? Furthermore, do perceptual and experiential corruption decrease the reservoir of legitimacy of a democratic regime? We attempt to answer these questions using the 2012 Americas Barometer survey of 24 Latin American countries. We find that whereas "rational-choice corruptors," males and, to a lesser extent, individuals with resources are particularly exposed to corruption, perceived corruption originates from a sense of impunity derived from a negative evaluation of the state's ability to curb corruption. In addition, we show that perceived corruption significantly decreases citizen satisfaction with democracy, but exposure to corruption does not. AU in all, the policy implications of our study are straightforward: having an efficient and trusted judiciary is central to curbing both experiential and perceived corruption, even if it increases the latter in the short run. Adapted from the source document.

Analyzes the interaction between the growth of democratic politics in Brazil & the evolution of judicial politics in the context of democratic institution-building, 1988-1996, drawing on a variety of evidence, including public opinion polls & court records. It is found that, as democracy has expanded in Brazil, so has the role of the judicial courts. However, the performance of the Supreme Court during this period is described as ambivalent, as it has both practiced judicial restraint & been politically assertive. Its political activity has taken place in the context of an increased public awareness of the judiciary's power, greater resort to the courts by political parties, & calls for judiciary reform to make it a less-autonomous institution. In this context, the court's assertiveness has not been a regular or sustained feature of its activiites, as it has traded token decisions & declarations to preserve its institutional autonomy. It is suggested that the attainment of political autonomy by the Supreme Court may represent its marginalization. 4 Tables, 2 Photographs, 17 References. Adapted from the source document.

Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc. ; CIS Microfiche Accession Numbers: CIS 79 S401-14 ; Includes bibliographical references. ; Microfiche. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Анотація. Проаналізовано історико-правові й теоретико-правові джерела і систематизовано основні наукові праці за тематикою дослідження проблем неупередженості судової влади у забезпеченні прав людини. Визначено та узагальнено напрями вже здійснених досліджень з даної проблематики, а також визначено малодосліджені аспекти вказаної проблеми, що є підґрунтям для подальшого активного вивчення теоретичних засад неупередженості судової влади з урахуванням сучасного стану реформування судочинства в Україні. Теоретичні надбання за час незалежності української держави слугують важливим підтвердженням того, що політична ідеологія може змінювати напрями судової діяльності й чинити вплив на здійснення правосуддя й правозастосовчу практику. ; HISTORIOGRAPHY OF INVESTIGATIONS IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY IN SUPPORT OF HUMAN RIGHTS Abstract. The historical-legal, theoretical-legal sources are analyzed and systematized basic scientific works by theme of investigation impartiality of the judiciary in the provision of human rights. Directions of the already carried out researches on the given problem are identified and summarized, as well as the low-researched aspects of the mentioned problem, which are the basis for further active study of the theoretical principles of impartiality of the judiciary, taking into account the current state of judicial reform in Ukraine. The theoretical achievements during the independence of the Ukrainian state serve as an important confirmation that political ideology can change the direction of the judicial activity and influence the implementation of justice and law-enforcement practice. Key words: judiciary, judicial system, impartiality, neutrality, independence of the court, fair court, objective justice, reform of the judiciary, judicial reform.

Corruption is a fact of public life in Brazil. Since the country's transition to democracy, corruption has been a challenge for each presidential administration. The Brazilian judiciary has not escaped the corrupting influences in the region. One country whose challenges with judicial corruption are arguably even greater than Brazil's is Albania, a country for which we were appointed to act as Consultants to the Special Parliamentary Committee on the Reform of the Judicial System responsible for introducing major constitutional reforms aimed at curbing judicial corruption. Those reforms to the Albanian Constitution entered into force in 2016. Too little time has elapsed since then to evaluate whether these reforms will fulfill their purposes. And certainly much too little time has passed for us to know whether the reforms in Albania can be applied with any confidence elsewhere in the world where similar problems with judicial corruption continue to undermine democratic norms of transparency and accountability, namely in Brazil. We nonetheless believe it is useful to explain the Albanian constitutional reforms and to introduce them to readers in Brazil as available options for combating judicial corruption.

This paper analyses EULEX mission in Kosovo (hereafter EULEX) as an exporter of rule of law. From the deployment of the mission, two mainstream discourses have coined the effectiveness of EULEX establishing the rule of law in Kosovo. From the Brussels point of view, EULEX has marked a lot of progress in promoting the rule of law in Kosovo. On the other hand, based on international indexes and other secondary sources, EULEX has been harshly criticised to deliver its promises in strengthening the rule of law institutions, fighting organised crime, war crimes and reducing corruption. Beyond these discourses, the paper tries to explore whether, how and to what extent, EULEX has promoted rule of law in Kosovo. The paper argues that EULEX has failed to promote rule of law in Kosovo due to 1) the costs of adaptation or compliance as function of the misfit between EULEX institutional approach on rule of law and domestic conditions and 2) incapacity of Kosovo rule of law institutions to interact with EULEX in strengthening the rule of law as a result of political interference on judiciary and police sector.

AbstractAlthough women's representation in Haiti is generally very low, the number of women judges has increased since the demise of authoritarianism and violent conflict in the 1990s. This case study explores why. I find that "gender-neutral" judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the judiciary have done more for women's judicial representation than explicitly gender-targeted policies, which still lack implementation. Donor-supported reforms have introduced more merit-based and transparent appointment procedures for magistrates (judges and public prosecutors) based on competitive examinations. This has helped women circumvent the largely male power networks that previously excluded them from the judiciary. The judiciary remains understudied in the scholarship on women's access to decision-making in fragile and conflict-affected societies; this article contributes to this emerging literature.

Basically the law enforcement authority granted to juridical constitutional judiciary and its parts. The parts in question here include, police, prosecutors, and the Judiciary, and in addition there are also other parts like, Lawyer (Advocate), Community Organization in the field of law, such as the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), and others. Therefore, in addition to the judiciary and its parts are one of the agencies that have functions in the field of law enforcement, but the agency today has a function in the field of law enforcement. This empirical fact is an institution that meant the President, which is constitutionally known that the President is a state agency that has the "authority in the field of government" expressed in Article 4 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution.Keyword: Power, President, State Agency

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "The judiciary pays over $900 million in rent annually to GSA for court-related space, representing a growing proportion of the judiciary's budget. The judiciary's rent payments are deposited into GSA's Federal Buildings Fund (FBF), a revolving fund used to finance GSA's real property services, including the construction and repair of federal facilities under GSA control. In December 2004, the judiciary requested a $483 million dollar permanent, annual rent exemption which GSA denied, saying that it undermined the intent of FBF and that GSA was unlikely to obtain appropriations to replace lost FBF income. GAO reviewed (1) recent trends in the judiciary's rent and space occupied and (2) challenges that the judiciary faces in managing its rent costs."

Constitutional authority for the development and implementation of the rules of court lies with both the legislature, by its statutory power, and the judiciary, by the constitutional principles of judicial independence. The court rules in question here are those that govern court accessibility as well as the roles and responsibilities of parties in civil litigation. The three existing models of rule-making are court-led, where a majority of government officials, and collaborative, which lacks an evident majority of either. These rule-making bodies do not control court fees, the executive does, but in a system with any model, the judiciary always has the final say in interpreting and implementing the rules or fees of the court. This creates an unavoidable conflict between the government and the judiciary.