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Since the late 1970s, the Chinese judiciary has undergone a continuous reform process of professionalization and institutionalization. Despite the political constraints, there are sufficient opportunities and incentives to continue China's judicial reform so as to enhance judicial capacity and rebuild trust and credibility. It is undeniable that the Chinese judiciary has been improving itself noticeably through enhancing professionalism, institutionalization and autonomy. Judicial reform is possible because China's authoritarian system demands for a degree of the rule of law. First, rule of law legitimizes political powers and generations of party and, without exceptions, state leaders in the reform China have invariably embraced the concept of rule of law at certain stage of terms. Second, the central government may rely on the rule of law and an effective court in particular to rein in local governments. Third, the rule of law may have proved to be the most effective mechanism for dispute resolution in the long run. The primary function of the court from this perspective is to offer efficient dispute resolution for the vast majority of individual cases. To be effective for an institution that is politically weak, the judiciary must develop a sufficient degree of credibility that it is autonomous from political and social influences, neutral to the parties before it, and fair in applying rules. China is likely to develop a judiciary that is politically submissive, but professionally capable in offering effective and fair legal solution to disputes. ; preprint

The article investigates strategies of structural reform of the Judiciary. It starts from the identification of the causes of the Judiciary's inefficiency and discusses coherent and politically legitimated proposals for the access to, the debureaucratization and the efficiency of the judicial proceedings. It points out the reasons for the failure of the judicial reform policies in the nineties, which were stimulated by multilateral credit banks, and characterizes some incipient systems of judiciary management that are being successful. Finally, the article introduces some reform proposals starting from Carnelutti's tripartition (concerning human resources, procedural means and the procedural model). Key words: procedural efficiency, reforms of the Judiciary, management of the Judiciary. ; El texto investiga estrategias de reforma estructural del sistema de justicia, partiendo de la identificación de las causas de su ineficiencia y articulando propuestas coherentes, políticamente legítimas, y que buscan el acceso, la desburocratización y la eficiencia de los procedimientos jurisdiccionales. Señala las razones del fracaso de las políticas de reforma del sistema de justicia en los años 1990, estimuladas por bancos multilaterales de crédito, y caracteriza algunos sistemas incipientes de gestión judicial que vienen logrando éxito. Finalmente, introduce algunas propuestas de reforma, partiendo de la tripartición Carneluttiana (en lo que se refiere a los recursos humanos, a los medios procesales y al modelo procesal). Palabras claves: efectividad del proceso, reformas del sistema de justicia, gestión de los órganos jurisdiccionales.

The article is intended to analyze similarities and differences of the 1992Lithuanian Constitution and the 1997Polish Constitution regarding the constitutional status of the judiciary. The article consists of three parts: I. The place of judicial power in the Polish and Lithuanian constitutions, II. Lithuanian Constitutional Court and Polish Constitutional Tribunal and III. A special institution of judges under the Constitution of Lithuania and the National Judicial Council under the Constitution of Poland. At the end of the article following differences are to be distinguished: 1. The Polish Constitution mentions military courts, while in Lithuania they do not exist. In addition, the Polish Constitution provides for two types of judicial authorities: courts and tribunals, including the Constitutional Tribunal, meanwhile, the Lithuanian Constitution include only courts. 2. The Constitution of Lithuania provides for two methods of dismissal of judges of the Supreme Court, when they discredit the name of a judge: 1) by the resolution of the Seimas and 2) under impeachment proceedings. Meanwhile, the Polish Constitution does not mention the impeachment proceedings for dismissal of judges. 3. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania and the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland in broader sense belong to the judiciary, and the functions of these institutions are very similar, however, the main difference could be that there are more subjects to address the Polish Constitutional Tribunal than to the Lithuanian Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has no jurisdiction to rule on the actions of officials under impeachment and on violations of electoral laws. Finally, under ordinary law, at least one member of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ex officio is also a member of the Polish Central Electoral Commission. 4. Although the Polish Constitution pays considerably more attention to the National Judicial Council, currently the decisions of the Lithuanian Judicial Council have a greater constitutional weight (than the Polish National Judicial Council), as its negative advice on the appointment or dismissal obliges the President of the Republic. In addition, according to the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, only judges, the majority of whom are elected by the General Assembly of Judges, may be members of the Lithuanian Judicial Council, while some members of the Polish Judicial Council are not members of judiciary, including those, appointed by politicians.

The article is intended to analyze similarities and differences of the 1992Lithuanian Constitution and the 1997Polish Constitution regarding the constitutional status of the judiciary. The article consists of three parts: I. The place of judicial power in the Polish and Lithuanian constitutions, II. Lithuanian Constitutional Court and Polish Constitutional Tribunal and III. A special institution of judges under the Constitution of Lithuania and the National Judicial Council under the Constitution of Poland. At the end of the article following differences are to be distinguished: 1. The Polish Constitution mentions military courts, while in Lithuania they do not exist. In addition, the Polish Constitution provides for two types of judicial authorities: courts and tribunals, including the Constitutional Tribunal, meanwhile, the Lithuanian Constitution include only courts. 2. The Constitution of Lithuania provides for two methods of dismissal of judges of the Supreme Court, when they discredit the name of a judge: 1) by the resolution of the Seimas and 2) under impeachment proceedings. Meanwhile, the Polish Constitution does not mention the impeachment proceedings for dismissal of judges. 3. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania and the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland in broader sense belong to the judiciary, and the functions of these institutions are very similar, however, the main difference could be that there are more subjects to address the Polish Constitutional Tribunal than to the Lithuanian Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has no jurisdiction to rule on the actions of officials under impeachment and on violations of electoral laws. Finally, under ordinary law, at least one member of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ex officio is also a member of the Polish Central Electoral Commission. 4. Although the Polish Constitution pays considerably more attention to the National Judicial Council, currently the decisions of the Lithuanian Judicial Council have a greater constitutional weight (than the Polish National Judicial Council), as its negative advice on the appointment or dismissal obliges the President of the Republic. In addition, according to the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, only judges, the majority of whom are elected by the General Assembly of Judges, may be members of the Lithuanian Judicial Council, while some members of the Polish Judicial Council are not members of judiciary, including those, appointed by politicians.

The article is intended to analyze similarities and differences of the 1992Lithuanian Constitution and the 1997Polish Constitution regarding the constitutional status of the judiciary. The article consists of three parts: I. The place of judicial power in the Polish and Lithuanian constitutions, II. Lithuanian Constitutional Court and Polish Constitutional Tribunal and III. A special institution of judges under the Constitution of Lithuania and the National Judicial Council under the Constitution of Poland. At the end of the article following differences are to be distinguished: 1. The Polish Constitution mentions military courts, while in Lithuania they do not exist. In addition, the Polish Constitution provides for two types of judicial authorities: courts and tribunals, including the Constitutional Tribunal, meanwhile, the Lithuanian Constitution include only courts. 2. The Constitution of Lithuania provides for two methods of dismissal of judges of the Supreme Court, when they discredit the name of a judge: 1) by the resolution of the Seimas and 2) under impeachment proceedings. Meanwhile, the Polish Constitution does not mention the impeachment proceedings for dismissal of judges. 3. The Constitutional Court of Lithuania and the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland in broader sense belong to the judiciary, and the functions of these institutions are very similar, however, the main difference could be that there are more subjects to address the Polish Constitutional Tribunal than to the Lithuanian Constitutional Court. On the other hand, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has no jurisdiction to rule on the actions of officials under impeachment and on violations of electoral laws. Finally, under ordinary law, at least one member of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ex officio is also a member of the Polish Central Electoral Commission. 4. Although the Polish Constitution pays considerably more attention to the National Judicial Council, currently the decisions of the Lithuanian Judicial Council have a greater constitutional weight (than the Polish National Judicial Council), as its negative advice on the appointment or dismissal obliges the President of the Republic. In addition, according to the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, only judges, the majority of whom are elected by the General Assembly of Judges, may be members of the Lithuanian Judicial Council, while some members of the Polish Judicial Council are not members of judiciary, including those, appointed by politicians.

While it is generally accepted that intentional racial discrimination by schools is unconstitutional, there is no such acceptance of mandatory busing as a means of desegregation. A case study of Los Angeles over the years 1976-1981 illustrates the result of busing: massive white flight & increases in attendance of white children at private schools. Thus, busing does not end or reduce segregation. Several reviews have found the effects of desegregation on academic achievement & racial attitudes to be small or even negative. Mandatory busing is not a feasible or equitable policy. Of the various possible approaches to this problem, the best appears to be restriction of the Supreme Court's power to impose remedies of certain kinds, & definition of remedies other than busing for racial imbalance. 2 Figures. W. H. Stoddard.

The use of foreign law by national courts when deciding cases that concern fundamental rights has provoked a debate on the legitimacy of the judiciary to resort to this practice. Indeed, many arguments have been made by legal scholars to support the proposition that judges should not take account of unincorporated international human rights instruments or the decisions of foreign courts when they decide cases that concern fundamental rights. This article puts these arguments to scrutiny, and discusses whether this judicial practice should be resorted to. Adapted from the source document.

Agenda. - (6 S.).; Wehmhoerner, Arnold: Welcome address. - (9 S.).; Dias, Maximo: O papel dos partidos politicos. - 8 S.; Dias, Maximo: The role of political parties. (Unofficial translation). - 7 S.; Friedman, Steven: From freedom fighters to the seats of power. - 16 S.; Kauluma, Peter: The role of traditional leaders. - 5 S.; Lundin, Irae Baptista: The role of traditional leaders. - 19 S.; Lungu, Edgar Chagwa: The judiciary: fearless and independent?; Makumbe, John Mw: From freedom fighters to the seats of power: the case of Zimbabwe. - 19 S.; Manyarara, John Oliver: The judiciary: fearless and independent?; Mayani, Morgan: The media in a democratic society: the Malawi case. - 5 S.; M'Membe, Fred: The media in a democratic society. - 5 S.; Mogotsi, Vance: Is the centre willing to share power? - 11 S.; Mulato, Ernesto: Building democracy at grassroot levels. (Unofficial translation). - 3 S.; Munyenyembe, R. T. C.: The parliament: making democracy work. - 14 S.; Rukoro, R. V.: The judiciary: fearless and independent? 8 S

"The Judiciary and Congress not only do not communicate on their most basic concerns; they do not know how they may properly do so," writes Frank M. Coffin, a federal appeals court judge and former representative, in Judges and Legislators. "The condition is that of a chronic, debilitating fever." Though the Senate lavishes it's attention from time to time on particular judicial nominees, Congress remains largely oblivious of the wellbeing of the federal judiciary as an institution. And the judiciary seems often unaware of the critical nuances of the legislative process. This state of affairs has had an adverse effect not only on relations between the two branches, but also on public policy more generally. Some forty-five people--including a Supreme Court justice, federal and state court judges, legislators and legislative staffers, scholars, and members of the private bar--gathered for a series of discussion to identify fundamental issues affecting judicial-congressional relations. The articles published in this volume are an outgrowth of those discussions.

The purpose of the article is to present the fundamental rules and regulations constituting the position of the judge in Poland, which finds its basis first of all in the regulations of the basic law interpreted over the years by the Constitutional Court, but now – in the norms of international law. Moreover, the author included his thoughts on the issues of the legitimization of judicial power and its relationship with the legislative and the executive. He also referred to the ongoing discussions on the status of the National Council of the Judiciary as a constitutionally-established body, whose task is to guarantee the independence of courts and the independence of judges in Poland. Furthermore, the article discusses the procedure and criteria of appointing a candidate to the position of a judge to different levels of the judiciary. It also deals with the basic elements guaranteeing the effectiveness of the principles of the independence of the judiciary such as neutrality, irremovability, incompatibility, immunity and the judge's material status.

When we speak of judges who judge for Utopia, we speak about judges today who pursue a better world through their judging. In this contribution, it is argued that a judiciary that is actively engaged in making the world a better place is good for society, also from a legal point of view. Since the most urgent call for utopian law and utopian judging today is on the issue of climate change, litigation in this field forms the main case for discussion. Controversial issues of utopian judging arise when there is disagreement in society over the direction the judiciary is taking, or when the judiciary is taking a separate way from the legislator or the executive power. In such situations, utopian judges may come under criticism for judicial activism or excessive judicial review. It is submitted here that disagreements and differences are, however, not something that should be avoided; they drive the system forward in the exercise of checks and balances. Climate change litigation is an example where there is a need for this today.

The article highlights topical problems of the formation of the judiciary in the Ukraine. It considers the influence of political and other factors on the effectiveness of the procedure on forming the judiciary by electing. It reveals current problems, disadvantages and benefits of forming the judiciary by electing judges. On this basis, it outlines primary areas of new initiatives in reforming of the judicial branch. ; В статье освещаются актуальные проблемы формирования судейского корпуса в Украине. Рассматривается вопрос о влиянии политических и других факторов на эффективность порядка формирования судейского корпуса путем выборности. Раскрыты проблемные вопросы, недостатки и преимущества формирования судейского корпуса путем выборности судей. На этой основе очерчены основные направления новых инициатив в области реформирования судебной ветви власти. ; У статті висвітлюються актуальні проблеми формування суддівського корпусу в Україні. Розглядається питання щодо впливу політичних та інших факторів на ефективність формування суддівського корпусу шляхом виборності. Розкрито проблемні питання, недоліки та переваги формування суддівського корпусу шляхом виборності. На цій основі окреслено основні напрями нових ініціатив у сфері реформування судової гілки влади.

The Constitution of Lesotho has a supremacy clause which ordinarily empowers the judiciary to review the actions of other branches of government. However, the judiciary in Lesotho seems to treat the legislative process with deference. This deference seems to be based on the old common law notion of the non-intervention of the judiciary in the legislative process. The notion has its roots in the British constitutional system. The Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 has even protected this doctrine through a constitutional ouster clause in section 80(5). The main question which this paper seeks to answer is whether indeed the common law notion of non-intervention in the legislative process is part of the constitutional law of Lesotho. In the end, the paper uses South African jurisprudence on the review of the legislative process to make a case that Lesotho can use the supremacy clause in the constitution and other constitutional doctrines such as the rule of law and legality to break with the common law notion of non-interventionism.