Suchergebnisse

The Jobs Act (L. 10 December 2014, n. 183) represents the last Italian labor market reform, aimed at creating new stable employment through the adoption of the new form of open-ended contracts ("contratto a tutele crescenti") as the privileged form of recruitment. This goal is based on the idea that the structural rigidities of the labor market, such as the employment protection systems, the high firing costs and the strong trade union powers, are the main source of the mismatching between labor demand and supply and the persistent unemployment registered since the 90's. For this reason, over the past 20 years, the implemented policy (Treu Law, Biagi Law and Fornero Reform) has been addressed to remove this kind of rigidities, following the guidelines outlined by the flexicurity regimes used in northern Europe. However, they have not achieved the goal for which they were designed, but they have rather produce a dualist labor market with an increasing share of precarious workers, without reducing the unemployment rate. Indeed, as shown by Blanchard et al., the success of the flexicurity model in the Nordic countries reflects underlying factors, like the degree of trust between firms and workers, that may not be easily replicable in other countries as Italy. The Jobs Act tries to stimulate the long-term employment by simplifying the procedure to establish a working relationship and redefine the dismissals regime through the reduction of the cases of reinstatement and the decrease of the firing costs for the firms. At the same time, the Italian government introduced with the Budget Law (Legge di Stabilità, L. 23 December 2014, n. 190) temporary incentives lasting three years targeting those firms hiring workers according to the new labor-market regime. Employing the data collected by Italian National Institute of Statistics in February 2015 and 2016, I estimate through the pscore matching method the average effect of the treatment on the treated, i.e. the average effect of the reform -the treatment- on those firms who have applied it -the treated-, by comparing with the untreated. Estimation results show that an increase in the probability of being hired with a fixed-term contract after the introduction of the Jobs Act reform. Particularly, the 31,1 % of firms who took advantage of the reform have hired a worker with a fixed-term contract. The reasons behind these results could be several. First of all, the reform has also introduced some measures (such as vouchers as a method of payment and the abrogation of some substantial requirements to use fixed-term contracts) which contribute having fewer constraints and fewer costs for the adoption of those contracts. Secondly, we have found a significant impact of the incentives from Budget Law on the new hires. Namely the result of the cross-firm evidence is that the incentives are associated with an increase, on average, of 43,4 percentage points in the probability of hiring. Indeed these monetary incentives are exploitable not only by the firms which hire workers with an open-ended contract, but also by the firms which hire with a fixed-term contract that has to be transformed in an open-ended one in the future, considering the possibility that after those three years the workers could be easily fired given the extremely cheap dismissal conditions. The evidence provided by this study casts some doubts about the effectiveness of the measures based on the flexibilization of the Italian labor market on the long-term employment, given that the precariousness emerged in the last 20 years after the first flexibility reforms seems not decreased at all after the Jobs Act. Nevertheless, given the limited information set provided by the dataset in use, one should take the results of the analysis as a sort of starting point for further research in different direction, both obtaining a more informative dataset and applying other treatment models.

Institutional reforms have long been a central focus of the European economic policy debate, and the labor market in particular has been subject to never definitive reforms in the past 20 years, mainly aimed at fostering wage moderation and flexible labor contracts. The employment effects of labor market institutions have been widely analyzed, but the focus on this aspect has overshadowed an equally important but scantily investigated element: their possible dynamic impact on innovation and productivity growth. This paper is a critical survey of the literature which may help shed light on this issue. Growth theory as well as the results of the empirical growth literature teach us that the main drivers of long run productivity growth in advanced countries are innovation, research and development, human capital accumulation. Reforms which enhance labor market flexibility can in principle affect these growth drivers through different channels, but the sign of the effects on productivity growth is ambiguous. Existing empirical evidence shows that wage and numerical flexibility have negative effects on research and development, innovation and firm sponsored training, suggesting that the dynamic effects of labor flexibility are negative. This suggests that the tradeoff between labor market flexibility and productivity growth which has been detected both within many European countries and across European countries is not just a temporary, static, short run effect linked to the employment effect of flexibility enhancing reforms, but may also reflect a more worrying permanent, dynamic, long run phenomenon. ; Quello delle riforme istituzionali è un tema da lungo tempo centrale nel dibattito Europeo di politica economica, e il mercato del lavoro in particolare è stato soggetto, negli ultimi 20 anni, a riforme mai definitive, principalmente rivolte a promuovere la moderazione salariale e la flessibilità dei contratti di lavoro. Gli effetti occupazionali delle istituzioni del mercato del lavoro sono stati ampiamente analizzati, ma la focalizzazione su questo punto ha messo in secondo piano un aspetto ugualmente importante ma scarsamente indagato: i loro possibili effetti dinamici sull'innovazione e sulla crescita della produttività. Il presente lavoro è una rassegna critica della letteratura che può aiutare a far luce su questo aspetto. La teoria della crescita, e i risultati della relativa letteratura empirica ci insegnano che i principali motori della crescita della produttività nel lungo periodo per le economie avanzate sono l'innovazione, la ricerca e sviluppo, l'accumulazione di capitale umano. Le riforme che aumentano la flessibilità del mercato del lavoro possono in linea di principio influenzare questi motori di crescita attraverso diversi canali, ma la direzione degli effetti sulla crescita della produttività è ambigua. L'evidenza empiria esistente mostra che la flessibilità salariale e numerica tendono ad avere effetti negativi sulla ricerca e sviluppo, sull'innovazione e sull'investimento in formazione da parte delle imprese, e dunque che gli effetti dinamici della flessibilità del lavoro sulla crescita tendono ad essere negativi. Questo suggerisce il trade off tra flessibilità del mercato del lavoro e crescita della produttività che è stata riscontrata sia all'interno di vari Paesi Europei che su dati longitudinali per vari paesi Europei non è solo un effetto statico di breve periodo legato all'impatto occupazionale delle riforme pro-flessibilità, ma potrebbe riflettere un più preoccupante fenomeno dinamico, permanente, di lungo periodo.

We propose an endogenous growth model with public capital and an imperfect labor market to account for the long run regional development of the Italian economy. A stylized model of a monopolistic Union characterized by heterogeneity in its members' reservation wage creates a spatially rigid wage. We then include the above mechanism in a growth model where public investment is subject to installation costs and analyze the effects of policy changes in the period 1951-2004 on the long run growth and unemployment rate of the macro areas of Italy: Center-Northern and Southern. The calibration exercise with parameters values grounded in the economic history literature is then performed. Our results indicate that two permanent institutional innovations deeply affected the long run dynamics of the Italian regional development, both in terms of growth and unemployment: the centralization of the wage bargaining and the decentralization of the governmental functions with the birth of the ordinary regions. ; Nel presente lavoro proponiamo un modello di crescita endogena con capitale pubblico e mercato del lavoro imperfetto per spiegare lo sviluppo di lungo periodo dell'economia italiana. Un modello stilizzato di Sindacato monopolistico caratterizzato da eterogeneità nei salari di riserva dei suoi membri determina un salario rigido in senso spaziale. Inseriamo poi tale meccanismo in un modello di crescita nel quale l'investimento pubblico è soggetto a costi di installazione e analizziamo gli effetti dei cambiamenti nelle politiche nel periodo 1951-2004 sulla crescita di lungo periodo e sul tasso di disoccupazione delle due macro aree d'Italia: il Centro-Nord e il Sud. Nel lavoro effettuiamo inoltre un esercizio di calibrazione del modello con i valori dei parametri determinati sulla base della letteratura esistente sulla storia economica italiana. I nostri risultati indicano che due innovazioni istituzionali di tipo permanente hanno avuto effetti profondi sulla dinamica di lungo periodo dello sviluppo regionale italiano, sia in termini di crescita che di disoccupazione: la centralizzazione della contrattazione sul salario e la decentralizzazione delle funzioni di governo con la nascita delle regioni ordinarie.

We study the Lemons Problem when workers have private information on both their skills and their intrinsic motivation for the job offered by firms in the labor market. We first show that, when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated. More interestingly, depending on the association between productivity and motivation, higher salaries affect the pool of candidates in three possible ways: they can attract (i) more skilled but less motivated applicants, as expected; (ii) more skilled and more motivated applicants; (iii) less skilled and less motivated applicants. The last two counterintuitive effects can only occur when a positive correlation exists between productivity and motivation. Our results are relevant in the policy debate on whether it is possible to improve the quality of workers in vocational markets by changing their wage rate and reconcile the different empirical evidence provided so far on motivated workers such as public servants, teachers, health professionals and, politicians.

The article investigates the employment conditions of young early school leavers in Italy in the aftermath of the economic crisis, a period which was marked by a process of occupational downgrading. The empirical analyses rely on the 2005 and 2014 waves of the ISFOL-PLUS survey and show that the employment opportunities of youth who dropped out of school have substantially deteriorated over time, both in absolute terms and compared to those who attained an upper-secondary level certificate. The article discusses possible determinants of this negative trend: on the one hand, the increased negative selection of the group of early school leavers; on the other hand, the process of "crowding out" of workers with intermediate qualification levels from well-matching jobs. The results also show considerable gender differences and in particular the existence of a multiplicative disadvantage for female early school leavers, especially in Southern Italy.

L'elaborato esamina il tema del concorso e del conflitto tra contratti collettivi di diverso livello nel settore privato. Partendo da un'impostazione complessiva del fenomeno della contrattazione collettiva, oltre che da una riflessione sulla natura e sul ruolo della contrattazione integrativa, il lavoro si propone di individuare un criterio di risoluzione del conflitto. In una prima parte della ricerca sono stati individuati e studiati i modelli di rapporti tra livelli definiti negli accordi interconfederali e nei contratti di categoria. Nello studio della regolamentazione interna al sistema sindacale si è considerato la natura delle relative clausole. Queste ultime hanno valenza obbligatoria e, per tale motivo, non sono idonee a risolvere l'eventuale conflitto tra livelli contrattuali. Si è reso quindi necessario considerare i criteri esterni di risoluzione del conflitto elaborati dalla dottrina e della giurisprudenza. Tra i vari criteri elaborati, ci si è soffermati sul criterio di specialità, sulla sua natura e sulla sua funzione. Più nello specifico, si è ritenuto il principio di specialità un principio generale dell'ordinamento giuridico, applicabile anche al conflitto tra contratti di diverso livello. Alla luce del principio di specialità, si è ricostruito il rapporto tra livelli, anche in ipotesi di contrattazione separata e di negoziazione operante su rinvio legislativo. Infine, nell'ultimo capitolo si è esaminato l'art. 8 della L. 148/2011. Ci si è interrogati sulla compatibilità di tale norma con l'impostazione complessiva del tema del rapporto tra contratti di diverso livello e sui suoi riflessi sulla questione del conflitto. ; The thesis examines concurring collective labor agreements in the private sector, in particular it analyzes the question of the conflict arising between two collective labor agreements of different levels. The research moves from a reflection about the nature and the role of company collective agreement to identify a conflict resolution criterion. In the first part of the work, intersectoral and sectoral collective agreements are studied in order to identify models for the relationship between collective labor agreements defined by trade unions and employers' associations. The research also focus on the nature (normative or not) of provisions of collective labor agreements with the scope to understand if the conflict arising between two different levels can be solved pursuant to these provisions. The negative answer leads to analyze external conflict resolution criteria identified by jurisprudence and by doctrine. Among these criteria, a particular reflection is carried out on the one expressed by the latin terms "lex specialis derogat lex generalis". More precisely, the latter is considered as a general principle of Italian law which is applicable not only in case of conflict arising between two laws, but also in case of conflict arising between two collective labor agreements of different levels. Moving on from this thesis, in the third chapter concurring collective labor agreements is reconstructed, pointing out the phenomenon of separate collective bargaining and the collective bargaining developed on legal provisions. In the end, the research deals with L. 14 september 2011, n. 148, art. 8 , investigating its effects on the question of conflict between two collective agreements.

Il presente scritto analizza alcune delle principali misure prese dal governo italiano nell'ambito dell'emergenza Covid-19, in particolare, quelle relative al smart working, al divieto dei licenziamenti e alla responsabilità del datore di lavoro in caso di contagi all'interno dell'azienda. ; This paper analyses the some of the main measures that the Italian Government has being taking in order to reorganize labor work activities according to Covid-19 emergency legislation, in particular, remote work, dismissal prohibition and responsibility of the employer in case of contamination at the workplace.