Innovative leaders in international politics
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 324
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: Orbis: FPRI's journal of world affairs, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 324
ISSN: 0030-4387
In: SUNY series in leadership studies
World Affairs Online
In: Perspectives on political science, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 53
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 67, Heft 1
ISSN: 1468-2478
How does leader age affect international politics? Challenging the existing literature's focus on chronological age, we argue that leaders do not age the same in the eyes of their beholders. Combining insights from gerontology on age-related stereotypes and studies of face-to-face diplomacy, we show that judgments about age informed by high-level personal encounters have profound consequences for how elderly leaders are appraised and treated by their counterparts. A leader who betrays indicators of "senility" during face-to-face encounters will elicit harsh judgments by activating negative stereotypes about aging. Older leaders can also surprise their interlocutors: those long thought to be senile may show themselves as mentally and physically fit. Perceptions of age, in turn, shape how observers understand a leader's agency and shape decisions to "engage" or "bypass" the leader in the context of interstate cooperation. We draw on declassified primary documents to compare American views of three elderly leaders in Cold War Asia—Syngman Rhee, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai—and how such views informed Washington's approach to these leaders, finding powerful support for our arguments. Our findings suggest new insights for the IR research program on leaders as well as lessons for statecraft in an era of aging decision makers.
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 67, Heft 1
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
How does leader age affect international politics? Challenging the existing literature's focus on chronological age, we argue that leaders do not age the same in the eyes of their beholders. Combining insights from gerontology on age-related stereotypes and studies of face-to-face diplomacy, we show that judgments about age informed by high-level personal encounters have profound consequences for how elderly leaders are appraised and treated by their counterparts. A leader who betrays indicators of "senility" during face-to-face encounters will elicit harsh judgments by activating negative stereotypes about aging. Older leaders can also surprise their interlocutors: those long thought to be senile may show themselves as mentally and physically fit. Perceptions of age, in turn, shape how observers understand a leader's agency and shape decisions to "engage" or "bypass" the leader in the context of interstate cooperation. We draw on declassified primary documents to compare American views of three elderly leaders in Cold War Asia—Syngman Rhee, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai—and how such views informed Washington's approach to these leaders, finding powerful support for our arguments. Our findings suggest new insights for the IR research program on leaders as well as lessons for statecraft in an era of aging decision makers.
In: Études internationales, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 362
ISSN: 1703-7891
In: The Whitehead journal of diplomacy and international relations, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 7-21
ISSN: 1538-6589
In late summer 2013, commentary started to crackle over Syrian President Bashir al-Assad's use of Instagram, a social media tool owned by Facebook, to post pictures of himself and his family. The use of Instagram by a dictator-one waging a civil war and accused of using chemical weapons against civilians-prompted criticism of this old-fashioned propaganda digitized for the cyber age. But, Assad is not alone among authoritarian leaders embracing Instagram: Assad is the latest in what one news site has called 'the dictators of Instagram.' Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov has famously used the social-networking site as a platform to project his very Russian style of masculinity (photo montages of the impossibly barrel-chested despot weight-lifting and posing with wolves and wildcats.) The minions of Ayatollah Khamenei have posted several close-ups of Iran's septuagenarian Supreme Leader on his photo-sharing page. Adapted from the source document.
In Why Leaders Lie, Mearsheimer provides the first systematic analysis of lying as a tool of statecraft, identifying the varieties, the reasons, and the potential costs and benefits. Drawing on a wealth of examples, he argues that leaders often lie for good strategic reasons, so a blanket condemnation is unrealistic and unwise. Perhaps no distinction is more important than that between lying to another state and lying to one's own people. There has never been a sharp analysis of international lying. Now a leading expert provides a richly informed and powerfully argued work that will change our understanding of why leaders lie.
In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft: IPG = International politics and society, Heft 3, S. 148-151
ISSN: 0945-2419
In: Cornell studies in security affairs
In: Survival: global politics and strategy, Band 53, Heft 6, S. 218-219
ISSN: 0039-6338
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Leaders, Generals, Juntas: The Military in Politics and International Conflict Initiation" published on by Oxford University Press.
In: Perceptions: journal of international affairs, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 226-229
ISSN: 1300-8641
In: International journal / Canadian International Council: Canada's journal of global policy analysis, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 1072-1075
ISSN: 0020-7020
In: The Hague journal of diplomacy: HjD, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 189-190
ISSN: 1871-1901