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This book studies party leaders from selection to post-presidency. Based on data covering a large set of Western countries, and focusing on the trends of personalisation of politics, the volume is one of the first empirical investigations into how party leaders are elected, how long they stay in office, and whether they enter and guide democratic governments. It also provides novel data on how leaders end their career in a broad and diverse range of business activities. Topics covered include political leaders' increasing autonomy, their reinforcement of popular legitimation, often through the introduction of direct election by party rank and file, and their grip on party organization. The book will appeal to students and scholars interested in political parties, political leadership, the transformation of democracy, and comparative politics

International leadership failure by states is an underdeveloped concept in International Relations. Existing approaches commonly equate leadership with hegemony, arguing that leadership success and failure are contingent on primacy or shared material interests among states. In this article, we introduce a role theoretical approach, which defines international leadership as a social role that emerges from shared expectations among states pertaining to leadership purpose, group cohesion and time horizon. Accordingly, leadership failure occurs when role expectations between states diverge and states are unable to generate commensurate role-taking via alter-casting. Four leader-follower constellations can be distinguished: leadership enactment, denial, rejection and vacuum. The paper utilizes this theoretical heuristic to understand two cases of leadership failure. The first case involves Brazil's attempted leadership role in response to the Latin American migration crisis following the political crisis in Venezuela. The second case examines Indonesia's attempted leadership role in the South China Sea dispute. The empirical findings contribute to existing work on hegemony and leadership in international relations theory by showing that leadership failure comes in different variants and these variants are contingent on shared role expectations and alter-casting capacity of states involved.

In countries transitioning from military to democratic rule, authoritarian legacies often continue to influence politics. Whereas previous research has focused on the institutional causes of such deficiencies, there is a lack of studies examining the role ex-military leaders who re-emerge as civilian presidents have in sustaining authoritarian tendencies. In this article, we begin to fill this lacuna by investigating the question: how and under which conditions do ex-military leaders' political identity constructions affect their tendency to place themselves above politics (i.e. expressing the attitude and behaviour of being superior to democratic rules)? The literature on neo-patrimonialism and post-civil war politics points to the importance of the political identities of ex-militaries, and we propose a theory that highlights the role identity construction plays in shaping elites' decision-making processes. Based on a comparison of two Nigerian presidents, Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhammadu Buhari, we find that ex-generals' tendency to engage in politics from above is largely a function of to what extent they have diversified their political identities beyond their role as "militaries". In this process, the degree of democratic consolidation also seems to play a role; ex-militaries operating in newly established democracies appear to have more opportunities to place themselves above politics.

There is a strong scholarly consensus that domestic revolutions create conditions ripe for international conflict. Traditionally scholars have treated revolutions as events, after which there is a period of time during which international conflict is more likely. Yet some states experience significant international conflict only during and in the immediate aftermath of a revolution, whereas other states continue to engage in conflict for many years and even decades afterward. This article seeks to explain the persistence of conflict for some but not all revolutionary states by differentiating the concept of revolutionary leaders from that of revolutions as events, both theoretically and empirically. The author shows that existing theories linking revolution to international conflict underemphasize an important mechanism through which revolution leads to conflict: by selecting conflict-prone leaders through the dynamics of revolutionary politics. He argues that revolutionary politics allow leaders with certain characteristics, including high risk tolerance and strong political ambition to alter the status quo, to obtain executive office because individuals without these characteristics generally do not succeed in leading revolutions. Having obtained power, revolutionary leaders have aggressive preferences that make their states more likely than nonrevolutionary states to instigate international conflict. (World Politics / SWP)

"Politics in Manitoba is the first comprehensive look at the Manitoba party system. It combines political history with contemporary public opinion data to reveal the political and voter trends that have shaped the province of Manitoba over the past 130 years. Written by Christopher Adams, Politics in Manitoba details the histories of the Progressive Conservatives, the Liberals, and the New Democratic Party from 1870 to 2007. Adams looks in particular at the enduring influence of political geography and political culture, as well as the impact of leadership, campaign strategies, organizational resources, and the media on voter preferences." "Adams also presents here for the first time public opinion data based on more than 25,000 interviews with Manitobans, conducted between 1999 and 2007. He analyzes voter age, gender, income, education, and geographic location to determine how Manitobans vote. In the process Adams dispels some commonly held beliefs about party supporters and identifies recurring themes in voter behaviour."--Jacket.

There is a strong scholarly consensus that domestic revolutions create conditions ripe for international conflict. Traditionally scholars have treated revolutions as events, after which there is a period of time during which international conflict is more likely. Yet some states experience significant international conflict only during and in the immediate aftermath of a revolution, whereas other states continue to engage in conflict for many years and even decades afterward. This article seeks to explain the persistence of conflict for some but not all revolutionary states by differentiating the concept of revolutionary leaders from that of revolutions as events, both theoretically and empirically. The author shows that existing theories linking revolution to international conflict underemphasize an important mechanism through which revolution leads to conflict: by selecting conflict-prone leaders through the dynamics of revolutionary politics. He argues that revolutionary politics allow leaders with certain characteristics, including high risk tolerance and strong political ambition to alter the status quo, to obtain executive office because individuals without these characteristics generally do not succeed in leading revolutions. Having obtained power, revolutionary leaders have aggressive preferences that make their states more likely than nonrevolutionary states to instigate international conflict.

A. Introduction Given recent developments in relation to the prosecution of international crimes, it might be thought that one of the last bastions of sovereignty has been breached, and international criminal law has not only entrenched itself in international law. Indeed further to this, it has assumed a supranational position that stands entirely above States, promising justice for all and as a trump card over depredations committed in the name of State sovereignty. After all, Charles Taylor from Liberia is standing trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Slobodan Milošević only escaped judgment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by dying before the end of his trial, Saddam Hussein was prosecuted and sentenced to death before the Iraqi High Tribunal, and Omar al-Bashir has recently been the subject of a request for an arrest warrant from the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Surely international criminal law reaches its iconographic apogee with the prosecution of such leaders, brought down to size by the majesty of the law (if not the grandeur of the often aseptic courtrooms)? Of course, in fact, the picture is far more complicated. Although it is too early to come to any judgment on the Taylor case, his appearance before the Special Court was as much a function of States tiring of him continuing to meddle in Liberian politics than a commitment to seeing him stand trial. Milošević was for many years apparently kept beyond the reach of the ICTY for reasons of ensuring peace in former Yugoslavia, then domestic political reasons, and his trial was itself one from which we might admit, lessons can be learned. The trial and punishment of Saddam Hussein is largely seen as having been mishandled, and inconsistent with the relevanthuman rights norms,5 and possible proceedings against al-Bashir have led to considerable controversy, with the African Union requesting deferral of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) processes relating to him, and the Security Council finding itself somewhat torn on the matter. As such we must be careful not to present what Georg Schwarzenberger described as the chocolate box version of international law and society. Some of the difficulties are referable to the nature of the international legal order, some of which are referable, on the other hand, to insalubrious forms of politics. It remains the case that the international legal order is torn between two imperatives, what Hedley Bull would have described as the pluralist and the solidarist views, and the difference between an international society and an international community. Nonetheless, some are simply problems of political will, and others are overstated, and the simple fact that it is possible to speak of the problems attending bringing leaders to justice rather than dismissing its possibility is in itself a development from the position soon enough ago that most international criminal lawyers can still remember it. This piece will seek to explain some of those problems involved in prosecuting leaders (including those of States) and those who, if we agree that we will see it as the general thrust of international criminal law, bear the greatest responsibility for international crimes, those at the apex of the command structure, in particular, heads of government. In doing so, though, it will do so with an eye to remembering that while international criminal law cannot live up to all its promises, it still keeps at least as many as most leaders do, and they are not the only international criminals deserving of punishment. ; peerReviewed

This report is an attempt to give an overview of the opinion-leaders' attitudes regarding some key issues in the process of democratisation in South Africa. Issues such as political tolerance, economic restructuring, environmental policy and women's rights are touched on. The data for the survey were collected during May-August 1992, i.e. in the period just after the deadlock occurred in Codesa. (DÜI-Hff)