Prosecutors and Their Legislatures, Legislatures and Their Prosecutors
In: Oxford Handbook of Prosecutors and Prosecution (2020 Forthcoming)
In: Oxford Handbook of Prosecutors and Prosecution (2020 Forthcoming)
SSRN
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 425-426
ISSN: 1744-9324
Legislatures, David C. Docherty, The Canadian Democratic
Audit Series; Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005, pp. 224.David Docherty's book, Legislatures, is ambitious both
in terms of its comparative perspective and the territory it reviews. The
book deals with virtually all important aspects of the Canadian Parliament
and provincial legislatures. The main focus, however, is on the House of
Commons.
In: Canadian journal of political science: CJPS = Revue canadienne de science politique : RCSP, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 425-426
ISSN: 0008-4239
In: Comparative Government and Politics, S. 275-297
In: Comparative Government and Politics, S. 127-144
In: SAGE library of political science
In: Rational choice politics Vol. 3
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy relevant information. The paper also shows a di .erence in the opportunity to a .ect policy through lobbying between a parliamentary legislature and a legislature with low voting cohesion,such as the U.S.Congress.We show that the incentives to lobby a parliamentary legislature are much lower than to lobby Congress.The results provide a rationale for why lobby groups are more active n the U.S.Congress. The key institutional feature to explain the di .erent behavior of lobby groups is the vote of con .dence procedure,which creates voting cohesion in a parlia- mentary system across policy issues.We show that the .exibility of creating majorities in the Congress creates an incentive for interest groups to play an active role in the design of policy in the congressional system,while the voting cohesion in the parliamentary system dissuades interest group 's incentive to engage in information provision.
BASE
In: Government & opposition: an international journal of comparative politics, Band 26, Heft 2, S. 274
ISSN: 0017-257X
SSRN
Working paper
In: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.c003134082
Chairman: Senator Anthony C. Beilenson. ; "March 17, 1972." ; Mode of access: Internet.
BASE
In: State Government: journal of state affairs, Band 59, S. 1-51
ISSN: 0039-0097
In: The African review: a journal of African politics, development and international affairs, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 33-58
ISSN: 0002-0117, 0856-0056
Fallstudie über die Tätigkeit des Parlaments im Bundesstaat Imo unter der Verfassung der Zweiten Republik zwischen 1979 und 1983. Parteipolitische und berufliche Zusammensetzung des Parlaments sowie Führungsstruktur und Machtbefugnisse werden dargestellt, ebenso die eingebrachten Gesetze, Probleme der Kontrolle der Exekutive und der Haushaltsposten. Frage nach dem Verhältnis des Parlaments zu den Bedürfnissen der Wähler. (DÜI-Wsl)
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