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Suggests that the 7 legislatures under scrutiny will continue to display the resilience that has marked them out in recent years. However, nothing is certain. For legislatures of Western Europe, the best way to maintain their policy affect and their support is for them to assume that they will not. (SJK)

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

We construct a stochastic model of a legislature with an endogenously determined seniority system. We model the behavior of the legislators as well as their constituents as an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar game. The game has a stationary equilibrium with the property that the legislature imposes on itself a non-trivial seniority system, and that incumbent legislators are always reelected.

"Legislatures in Evolution presents a series of essays on evolution and change in the legislative context. They cover a wide range of topics, including both proposed and implemented reforms. The contributions included here discuss parliamentarians' attitude toward party discipline; the specific challenges associated with implementing sexual harassment policies within legislatures; the consequences of the Supreme Court's ruling in Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada on the government's duty to consult Indigenous Peoples when drafting legislation; parliamentarians' engagement in budgetary control issues; the reform of the rules governing prayers in the Legislature of British Columbia; and time management reforms in the Legislative Assembly of Yukon. Charles Feldman, Geneviève Tellier, David Groves, and their contributors bring together both practical and academic experience and perspectives. They conclude with an analysis of parliamentary reforms, paying particular attention to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the functioning of legislatures."

p. 262 ; column 3 ; 2 col. in. ; The Utah Legislature has met recently. A paragraph from a record of their proceedings shows that the body is subservient to the Mormon leaders.

In the year 1910, M. M. Rice, better known as " Mike " Rice, to his numerous Arizona friends, wrote the following account of the Session of the Thirteenth Legislature and incidents connected therewith. Rice was a brilliant newspaper man, and during the session was a reporter for the Prescott Courier. The results attained by what was afterwards designated as the "Bloody Thirteenth" and the "Thieving Thirteenth," brought rebuke from many in Arizona, because of its extravagance, but it must be said that this session did much which has since proved as greatly beneficial to Arizona. The Thirteenth Legislature passed the bill appropriating the first money for the Arizona University, at Tucson, and for the Arizona Insane Asylum. ; This item is part of the Arizona Agriculture and Rural Life, 1820-1945 collection. For more information about this collection, email repository@u.library.arizona.edu.