Suchergebnisse

PROSPECT THEORY OFFERS POWERFUL INSIGHTS AND PROPOSITIONS INTO POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING, ESPECIALLY IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT STATESMENT ARE INDEED RISK-ACCEPTANT FOR LOSSES. THIS WOULD HELP EXPLAIN OBSERVED PATTERNS IN BARGAINING, DETERRENCE, THE ORGINS OF WARS, AS WELL AS SUGGESTING WHY STATES ARE LESS LIKELY TO BEHAVE AGGRESSIVELY WHEN DOING SO WOULD PRODUCE GAINS THAN WHEN SUCH BEHAVIOR MIGHT PREVENT LOSSES.

The life-cycle theory of saving behavior (Modigliani, 1988) suggests that humans strive towards an equal intertemporal distribution of wealth. However, behavioral life-cycle theory (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988) proposes that people use self-control heuristics to postpone wealth until later in life. According to this theory, people use a system of cognitive budgeting known as mental accounting. In the present study it was found that mental accounts were used differently depending on if the income change was positive or negative. This was shown both in a representative nationwide sample of households and in a student sample. Respondents were more willing to cut down on their propensity to consume when faced with an income decrease than to raise it when the income increased. Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of behavioral life-cycle theory, it was found that the respondents adjusted their propensity to consume the most when the income increases or decreases took place immediately. Hence, it is suggested that theories of intertemporal choice (e.g., Loewenstein, 1988; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) provide a better account of the data than does the behavioral lifecycle theory.

Prospect theory deviates from expected-utility theory by positing that how people frame a problem around a reference point has a critical influence on their choices and that people tend to overweight losses with respect to comparable gains, to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses, and to respond to probabilities in a non-linear manner. This study examines these and related observed anomalies in expected-utility theory, summarizes how prospect theory integrates these anomalies into an alternative theory of risky choice, and explores some of the implications of prospect theory for international conflict and for bargaining and coercion in particular. One hypothesis is that political leaders of adversarial states behave differently when they are bargaining over gains than when they are bargaining over losses. Another is that crisis behavior may be more destabilizing than commonly predicted by rational choice theories because leaders are less willing to make concessions and more willing to risk large losses in the hope of eliminating small losses altogether.

AbstractThis paper examines the results of surveys of professional investment managers' risk perceptions and investment preferences. Managers are found to exhibit loss aversion, to be risk averse for gains and risk loving for loss; and to believe in time diversification. The results are consistent with the implications of the S‐shaped value function of Prospect Theory.

The effect of ambiguity is investigated with regard to the success of a venture on the initial choice of interpersonal conflict management strategy of the venture's initiator. In the experiments reported here, subjects were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation in which the decision‐maker, in a capacity as an organization member, seeks the use of an organizational resource in order to initiate the venture. The conflict arises as another member of the organization also lays claim to the same resource. Subjects, taking on the role of the decision‐maker, show more collaboration in managing the conflict when experts disagree about the probability of successful outcome of the venture. Similar inclinations are revealed when the possible long‐term adverse consequences of the conflict are made explicit. These findings support the interpretation of ambiguity effect in terms of increased loss aversion due to personal responsibility.

This book describes the progression and results of a decade-long program of experimental research on power in social exchange relations. Exchange theorists have traditionally excluded punishment and coercion from the scope of their analyses; but Molm examines whether exchange theory can be expanded to include reward and coercive power. Working within the framework of Emerson's power-dependence theory, but also drawing on the decision theory concepts of strategic action and loss aversion, Molm develops and tests a theory that emphasizes the interdependence of reward and coercive power. Her work shows that they are fundamentally different, not only in their effects on behavior, but also in the structural incentive to use power and the risks of power use. When exchanges are negotiated and secured by the 'shadow of the future,' rather than by binding agreements, dependence both encourages and constrains the use of coercion

Intro -- Praise -- Description -- About Richard H. Thaler -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Cooperation -- Chapter 3. The Ultimatum Game -- Chapter 4. Interindustry Wage Differentials -- Chapter 5. The Winner's Curse -- Chapter 6. The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias -- Chapter 7. Preference Reversals -- Chapter 8. Intertemporal Choice -- Chapter 9. Savings, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts -- Chapter 10. Pari-mutuel Betting Markets -- Chapter 11. Calendar Effects in the Stock Market -- Chapter 12. A Mean Reverting Walk Down Wall Street -- Chapter 13. Closed-End Mutual Funds -- Chapter 14. Foreign Exchange -- Chapter 15. Epilogue -- References -- Index -- Footnotes -- Chapter 1 Note 1 -- Chapter 2 Note 1 -- Chapter 3 Note 1 -- Chapter 4 Note 1 -- Chapter 5 Note 1 -- Chapter 6 Note 1 -- Chapter 7 Note 1 -- Chapter 8 Note 1 -- Chapter 9 Note 1 -- Chapter 10 Note 1 -- Chapter 11 Note 1 -- Chapter 12 Note 1 -- Chapter 13 Note 1 -- Chapter 14 Note 1.