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AbstractWe study loss aversion in elections by investigating a median voter model (full convergence in a two‐candidate election) and a model of partial divergence of policy proposals. First, we show a status quo bias, an endowment effect, and a moderating effect of policies. Second, we show the occurrence of "long‐term cycles" in policies with self‐supporting movements to the right or the left. Finally, we prove that younger societies should be more prone to change and less affected by the status quo bias than older ones.

We develop a political economy model where loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's preferences over trade policy. The policy implications of the augmented model differ in three ways: there is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained; protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent; and irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that favors loss-making industries. The augmented model explains protections of the US steel industry since 1980. (JEL F13, F14, L61)

We address the effect of expectation‐based consumer loss aversion on firm strategy in imperfect competition. Consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the moment of purchase. However, some consumers are initially uninformed about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and price distribution, whereas others are perfectly informed all the time. We show that if firms have symmetric costs, a larger share of informed consumers leads to a more competitive outcome. The reverse holds if cost asymmetry in duopoly is sufficiently large.

This article draws upon recent findings from the field of neuroscience to explore how loss aversion affects foreign policy resolve. We theorize that U.S. policy makers are more resolute in pursuing preventive policies that seek to avoid losses than they are in pursuing promotive policies that seek to acquire new gains. To test our theory, we conduct the first large‐n analysis of foreign policy hypotheses derived from the neuroscience of loss aversion using data from 100 cases of U.S.‐initiated Section 301 trade disputes. The results provide strong support for the loss‐aversion‐based theory, revealing that American policy makers are willing to fight harder and hold out longer in trade disputes with preventive objectives than they are in cases with promotive ones. Our study demonstrates that hypotheses derived from neuroscientific findings can be tested using large‐n techniques in study of foreign policy, revealing a new avenue of inquiry within the field.

Bidding challenges learning theories. Even with the same bid, experiences vary stochastically: the same choice can result in either a gain or a loss. In such an environment, the question arises of how the nearly universally documented phenomenon of loss aversion affects the adaptive dynamics. We analyse the impact of loss aversion in a simple auction using the experienced‐weighted attraction model of learning. Our experimental results suggest that individual learning dynamics are highly heterogeneous and affected by loss aversion to different degrees. Apart from that, the experiment shows that loss aversion is not specific to rare decision‐making.