Suchergebnisse

This paper illustrates how delayed debt stabilizations can arise in a society without any emerging conflict of interests among its members. We argue that, under a majority voting rule, the economy may generate excessive levels of government spending and larger debts over time, and that this delay is increasing in income inequality. The intuition for this result is simple: a majority of citizens may find in delaying stabilizations a way to increase government expenditures, transferring in this way resources from the richest to the poorest citizens in the economy. This process may explain the upward trend and the difficulty to reduce public expenditures, the so called "ratchet effect."

A puzzling feature of self‐governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly nonmajoritarian, procedures (e.g., chairs and committees). This article provides a theory of self‐enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (1) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (2) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (3) with what policy consequences. In the model, a risk‐averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency (i.e., reduce the procedural uncertainty of free‐for‐all bargaining). An equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive, generating nonmajoritarian policy bias. Still, a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty.

We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a proposal which is accepted without delay. Laboratory experiments show various deviations from this equilibrium, where different offers are typically made and delay may occur before acceptance. We address the issue to what extent these findings are compatible with subgame perfect equilibrium and characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for any value of the discount factor. We show that for any proposal in the interior of the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that the proposal is made and accepted. We characterize the values of the discount factor for which equilibria with one-period delay exist. We show that any amount of equilibrium delay is possible and we construct subgame perfect equilibria such that arbitrary long delay occurs with probability one. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expectations, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels.

I propose and test an informational theory of endogenous election timing. I assume leaders have more accurate estimates of future outcomes than citizens. The prospect of declining future performance spurs leaders to call early elections. Since leaders condition their timing decisions on their expectations of future performance, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, I test hypotheses relating the timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. As predicted, leaders who call elections early, relative to expections, experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)