The media policy of a country is a part of its overall policy and depends on the totality of socio-historical circumstances, the level of cultural and economic development, as well as the possible social consensus on the necessity for acceptance and implementation of experiences and standards from the democratic world in this field. Unlike other areas for which local/state politics is defined, the media field has only recently become interesting from this point of view and, as it is often the case in transition countries, it is still not recognized as a clearly defined position of the ruling circles. This paper analyzes the process of major changes in the media system of Serbia after the democratic changes and government actions, which in the long run cannot be considered a precisely constituted media policy, but whose consequences have an impact on the state of the public sphere and of the media, and thus receive political significance. The most important indicator of the will of political circles is undoubtedly the regulatory level, which is why this paper deals particularly with the preparation, adoption, and practical implementation of media legislation enacted from 2000 onward. Considering the official Serbian aspirations to join the European Union, the issue of state media policy is also seen through the prism of European media policy.
By reporting on some conflicts but not on others, and by representing conflicts they report on in particular ways, the media strongly influence the dynamics and outcomes of democratisation conflicts, and thus also shape the prospects of success of conflict parties. This paper explores the literature on media and conflict by focusing on the ways in which media frame inter-state and civil wars, institutionalised conflicts and social movements in western democracies, and conflicts in nondemocratic and democratising states. Much of the literature discusses the ways in which western media frame foreign conflicts and domestic election campaigns and policy debates, while there is considerably less focus on domestic conflicts in nonwestern settings, such as those that arise during and after transitions from nondemocratic rule. There are only limited attempts to draw parallels between the media coverage of disparate conflicts. In contrast, this study builds upon research findings in these related areas to draw lessons for empirical research of media framing of the contentious dimension of contemporary democratisation. This study concludes that the political context is the main factor that shapes the media framing of various forms of political conflict. Several dimensions of the political context matter in this respect, such as regime type, international (foreign) or domestic perspective, elite consensus or conflict, policy consensus or uncertainty, policy area, more or less institutionalised nature of the political conflict at stake, and the stage of democratisation. Also, the literature suggests that media framing strongly influences political outcomes and thus fosters or undermines democratic institutions in new democracies. .
У овом раду дискутује се o позиционирању кључних друштвено-политичких актера у савременој Србији у контексту прихватања скупа симбола јавног наратива дефинисаног као "европске вредности". На примеру одржавања тзв. "Параде поноса", разматра се однос медија и елита према једном догађају који се перципира као суштински услов за "европске интеграције", али према коме истовремено постоји амбивалентан однос, проистекао из етаблираног традиционалистичког политичког дискурса, који подразумева отпор према прихватању сексуалних различитости. Циљ овог рада је да укаже на комплексну природу идентификовања основних симболичких вредности друштва у савременој Србији, која се испољава, пре свега, у виду хегемонијских борби које се воде на линији промоције конзервативних вредности, насупрот ономе што се доживљава као "опасни" уплив либералних "европских" идеја, попут промоције права сексуалних мањина. У раду се анализирају медијски наративи везани за одржавање "Параде поноса" 2010. и 2014. године, са циљем утврђивања промене наратива у склопу декларисаног "европског пута" Србије, и то, пре свега, кроз деловање и позиционирање кључних актера, од политичких елита до припадника екстремно десних организација и навијачких група. ; This paper discusses the position of the key social and political actors in contemporary Serbia, referring to the broadly accepted concept defined as "European values". The article focuses on the so-called "Belgrade Pride Parade", a highly contested event in the Serbian public, which is at the same time considered as the essential part of the EU accession process. Through the analysis of the media discourses related to the "Pride" events in 2010 and 2014, the paper shows the complex relation between the officially proclaimed politics of "European integration" and still very strong nationalist discourses, inherited from the 1990s. The aim of the article is to analyse the present hegemonic struggles between the political forces defending "traditional", conservative values and the political agents that promote "dangerous", liberal "European" ideas, such as protecting the rights of sexual minorities. The comparative analysis of the media representation of two events in 2010 and 2014 shows the changes in the public narrative. I argue that the violent clashes that occurred in 2010 Belgrade Pride Parade between the police and the members of right wing organisations were mostly the result of the lack of the political will among the Serbian elites, followed by ambivalent media representations, promoting at the same time the necessity of accepting "European values" and justification of violence. On the other hand, the absence of violent events in 2014 shows the will of the state apparatus to secure the "Pride". However, the media reports on the event, as well as the public statements made by Serbian officials, still remain ambivalent towards the very nature of the "Pride", justifying it only by the pressure made by the EU and the protection of constitutional rights. Moreover, the presence of new narratives in the media, discussing the high price of organizing such event, shows the shift in the public discourse from common nationalist arguments to the new, neoliberal rhetoric. This change doesn't indicate the radical shift of the social climate in Serbia from conservative to liberal, but, more likely, establishes Serbia as just one of the many states on the European periphery, operating within wider framework of neoliberal agendas. ; Тема броја – Конфликт и помирење на Балкану (ур. Александар Крел) / Topic of the Issue - Conflict and Reconciliation in the Balkans (ed. Aleksandar Krel)
The Kosovo crisis once again brought the powerful, unscrupulous and destructive Milosevic media apparatus into the spotlight. This is nothing new nor surprising for all those who have been covering his political ascent from the very beginning, but this time he used his heaviest artillery, never mincing words nor flinching from using all possible means to achieve his ends: to justify the genocidal policy and rallying Serbs once again around the well-known platform of national unity and Greater Serbia rhetoric. On one side, we had a well-oiled media machine that mercilessly rolled over everything on its way, not respecting any basic journalistic principles, not to mention ethics. On the other side, there were the most powerful world media, aggressive, assertive, equipped with the state-of-the-art technology, but with one major flaw: these are mass media, not a propaganda machinery. Two completely different structures clashed head-on. Thus, the media in war turned into the war of the media, a totally unfair war between a powerful propaganda machine and democratic media. (SOI : S. 113)
Electronic media in many countries have from their inception been linked and defined with commercial content. However, together with the development of the system of commercial radio, democratic countries very soon began to build and/or revamp the alternative systems of public and/or uncommercial radio. The 1994 Croatian Law on telecommunications again allowed private owner-ship of electronic media and consequently the number of radic-stations doubled. There are 114 of them today (excluding Croatian Radio stations). However, the expected democratization of the media resulted only in an increase of commercial and entertaining broadcasts. The true role of the radio as a public media whose purpose is public dissemination of information has been replaced by a new (and profitable) role of public entertainer. Should radio be left there? (SOI : PM: S. 244)
The current trends in media industry (in the text referred to as concentration trend, diversification, globalization, and deregulation) bring up the question of the scope of classical liberal theory when .faced with the challenges of new communication technologies. The convergence of the market and the capital, the interests from the point of view of ownership and the commercialisation of mass media make up the contextual framework of the debate about certain limitations of the principles of classical liberal theory concerning freedom of the press and media in general. (SOI : PM: S. 176)
This article deals with an analysis of the relations among communicology, novitology, and journalism as the practice of public communication. Communicoloy is defined as a general science on public communication (philosophy of communication), novitology as a specific science dealing with all the singularities of mass communication by means of the mass media (radio, newspapers, television, and the new media), while journalism as practice is defined by means of the methodology of direct journalistic activities. This leads to the introduction of epistemiological order into a number of sciences Also, misunderstandings and overlappings are avoided, as well as totally erroneous attitudes pernicious for the theory of public communication and journalism as the practice of public polylogue in the media. (SOI : PM: S. 214)
