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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Series Editor's Preface -- Preface and Acknowledgements -- 1 What Is Metaethics? -- 1.1 Starting thoughts -- 1.2 The main questions and some standard positions -- 1.3 Moral psychology -- 1.4 Moral relativism again -- 1.5 Concluding remarks and a plan -- 2 Moral Realism: Mind-Independence -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Why realism? -- 2.3 Moral properties and humans -- 2.4 Objectivity and subjectivity -- 2.5 Why be an IMRealist? -- 2.6 Concluding remarks -- 3 Moral Realism: Naturalism and Reductionism -- 3.1 Introduction

Do moral facts exist? What would they be like if they did? What does it mean to say that a moral claim is true? What is the link between moral judgement and motivation? Can we know whether something is right and wrong? Is morality a fiction? Metaethics: An Introduction presents a very clear and engaging survey of the key concepts and positions in what has become one of the most exciting and influential fields of philosophy. Free from technicality and jargon, the book covers the main ideas that have shaped metaethics from the work of G. E. Moore to the latest thinking. Written specifically for

Cover -- Copyright and Use -- Title Page -- Contents -- A Note on the Author -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1. Introducing the Issues -- 1.1 Some Everyday Moral Utterances -- 1.2 What are they about? -- 1.3 The Attractions of a Popular Picture -- 1.4 Rules: A Patch on Morality's Surface? -- 1.5 From Angry Young Men and Women to …? -- 1.6 Metaethics and Normative Ethics Revisited -- 1.7 Summary and Reflection -- Chapter 2. Cognitivism and Noncognitivism -- 2.1 The Basic Distinction -- 2.2 Moral Realism and Moral Irrealism -- 2.3 Error and Success Theories -- 2.4 Moral Knowledge Again -- 2.5 The Truth Conditions of Moral Statements -- 2.6 Critical Reflections on the Proposed Truth Conditions of Moral Statements -- 2.7 Divine Command Theory of Morality -- 2.8 Kantianism -- Chapter 3. Objectivist Realism under Siege -- 3.1 A Philosophical Health Warning -- 3.2 David Hume -- 3.3 Hume's Arguments Considered -- 3.4 Mackie's Argument from Queerness -- 3.5 So Where are We? -- 3.6 Emotivism -- Chapter 4. Out on the Street -- 4.1 The Death of God -- 4.2 The Death of Deference -- 4.3 Moral Disagreement -- 4.4 Multiculturalism -- 4.5 Rejection of Specific Moral Beliefs -- 4.6 Seedy Underbelly of Conventional Morality -- 4.7 Decline in Communal and Symbolic Life -- 4.7 Reluctance to be Judgemental -- 4.8 Postmodern Irony -- Chapter 5 A Naturalist Objectivist Realism? -- 5.1 The Basic Features -- 5.2 Moore's Open Question Argument -- 5.3 Empirical Reasoning and Moral Facts -- 5.4 Morality and Objectivist Naturalism -- 5.5 Ethics and Natural Disciplines -- Bibliography.

This Element presents an interpretation and defence of Philippa Foot's ethical naturalism. It begins with the often neglected grammatical method that Foot derives from an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This method shapes her approach to understanding goodness as well as the role that she attributes to human nature in ethical judgment. Moral virtues understood as perfections of human powers are central to Foot's account of ethical judgment. The thrust of the interpretation offered here is that Foot's metaethics takes ethical judgment to be tied to our self-understanding as a sort of rational animal. Foot's metaethics thereby offers a compelling contemporary approach that preserves some of the best insights of the Aristotelian tradition in practical philosophy.

This book provides an interpretation of the late nineteenth-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche as holding a distinct and original metaethical position, which is to say a theory about our practice of ethics. Rowe uses this interpretation to provide some interesting and thought-provoking criticisms of themes in contemporary metaethics.

This new edition of Alexander Miller's highly readable introduction to contemporary metaethics provides a critical overview of the main arguments and themes in twentieth- and twenty-first-century contemporary metaethics. Miller traces the development of contemporary debates in metaethics from their beginnings in the work of G. E. Moore up to the most recent arguments between naturalism and non-naturalism, cognitivism and non-cognitivism. From Moore's attack on ethical naturalism, A. J. Ayer's emotivism and Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism to anti-realist and best opinion accounts of moral truth and the non-reductionist naturalism of the 'Cornell realists', this book addresses all the key theories and ideas in this field. As well as revisiting the whole terrain with revised and updated guides to further reading, Miller also introduces major new sections on the revolutionary fictionalism of Richard Joyce and the hermeneutic fictionalism of Mark Kalderon. The new edition will continue to be essential reading for students, teachers and professional philosophers with an interest in contemporary metaethics. Alexander Milleris Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago.