Metaphysics
In: Kant yearbook 2
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In: Kant yearbook 2
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 200, Heft 5
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractSince the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the use of metaphysics by philosophers when approaching conceptual problems in biology has increased. Some philosophers call this tendency in philosophy of biology 'Metaphysics of Biology' (Guay and Pradeu in Synthese 1–20, 2017). In this paper, I aim at characterizing Metaphysics of Biology by paying attention to the diverse ways philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual problems in biology. I will claim that there are two different modes of doing Metaphysics of Biology, namely MetaphysicsforBiology and MetaphysicsinBiology.
Metaphysics: An Introduction combines comprehensive coverage of the core elements of metaphysics with contemporary and lively debates within the subject. It provides a rigorous and yet accessible overview of a rich array of topics, connecting the abstract nature of metaphysics with the real world. Topics covered include: Basic logic for metaphysicsAn introduction to ontologyAbstract objectsMaterial objectsCritiques of metaphysicsFree willTimeModalityPersistenceCausationSocial ontology: the metaphysics of race This outstanding book not only equips the reader with a thorough knowledge of the fun
Matthew Stuart offers a fresh interpretation of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, arguing for the work's profound contribution to metaphysics. He presents new readings of Locke's accounts of personal identity and the primary/secondary quality distinction, and explores Locke's case against materialism and his philosophy of action.
The great German idealist philosopher G. W. F. Hegel has exerted an immense influence on the development of philosophy from the early 19th century to the present. But the metaphysical aspects of his thought are still under-appreciated. In a series of essays Robert Stern traces the development of a distinctively Hegelian approach to metaphysics and certain central metaphysical issues. The book begins with an introduction that considers this theme as a whole, followed by a section ofessays on Hegel himself. Stern then focuses on the way in which certain key metaphysical ideas in Hegel's system
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 201, Heft 6
ISSN: 1573-0964
AbstractNaturalized metaphysics aims to establish justified metaphysical claims, where metaphysics is meant to carry its usual significance, while avoiding the traditional methods of metaphysics—a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, intuitions, and common sense—which naturalized metaphysics argues are not epistemically probative. After offering an explication of what it means to do metaphysics, this paper argues that naturalized metaphysics, at the outset, is hospitable to doing metaphysics. The underdetermination of metaphysics by science, however, changes the picture. Naturalized metaphysics has to break this underdetermination, but the criticism of the traditional methods of metaphysics leaves no resources with which to do so. Naturalized metaphysics must therefore be more restrictive than originally intended to ensure that some metaphysical features avoid underdetermination. In this restrictive naturalized metaphysics, however, metaphysicians are only left the task of surveying the opinions of scientists which, it is argued, does not qualify as doing metaphysics. Thus, to fulfill its promise to save metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics displaces the metaphysician. Furthermore, the attempt to re-employ them via the principle of naturalistic closure is argued to fail. Metaphysicians should therefore not be happier with naturalized metaphysics than they are with the more explicitly eliminative trends in contemporary metametaphysics, such as neo-Carnapian deflationism, despite the promise of naturalized metaphysics, likely to Carnap's dismay, to deliver justified claims about ultimate reality.
In: Psychology library editions. Perception v. 33
In: Symposion: theoretical and applied inquiries in philosophy and social sciences, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 275-296
ISSN: 2392-6260
In this paper, I deal with Heidegger's evolving account of metaphysics, since Heidegger's persistent concern, the question of being, is a basic metaphysical question. To date, most Heidegger scholars have focused only on a particular stage of Heidegger's philosophy: either his early attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, or his efforts to overcome metaphysics in the 1930s, or his late embrace of 'releasement' from metaphysics. However, these limited approaches fail to address Heidegger's different understandings of metaphysics, which lie at the root of his changing approaches to the question of being. They also fail to explain whether there is any inner connection between the various approaches. Further, given Heidegger's unremittingly negative attitude towards metaphysics, some scholars have even maintained that Heidegger thought it both possible and desirable to leave metaphysics behind altogether. I address these issues first by arguing that metaphysics for Heidegger has three interconnected meanings: initially it is the representation of the totality of things that are present-at-hand, a view subsequently developed into subjective representational thinking, and finally radicalized into an expression of the will to power. At each stage, Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition but never claims that it can be fully eliminated, since it is a mode of Dasein's being and ultimately possiblized by being itself. For this reason, Heidegger's own philosophy of being remains inseparable from metaphysics.
In: Springer eBooks
In: Religion and Philosophy
Chapter 1: Why Metaphysics and Morality? -- Chapter 2: Ordinary Morality and Its Detractors -- Chapter 3: Propositions and the First-Order Moral -- Chapter 4: Truth, Facts, and Properties -- Chapter 5: Moral Properties -- Chapter 6: The Metaphysics of Moral Reality
In: Oxford scholarship online
In this collection of new and previously published essays, noted philosopher Eric Schliesser offers new interpretations of the signifance of Isaac Newton's metaphysics on his physics and the subsequent development of philosophy more broadly. In particular, he explores the rich resonances between Newton's and Spinoza's metaphysics. The volume includes a substantive introduction, new chapters on Newton's modal metaphysics and his theology, and two postscripts in which Schliesser responds to some of his most important critics, including Katherine Brading, Andrew Janiak, Hylarie Kochiras, Steffen Ducheyne, and Adwait Parker. The collection provides new and varied analyses on familiar focuses of Newton's work, adding important perspectives to the recent revival of interest in Spinoza's metaphysics.
In this book, Charles Larmore develops an account of morality, freedom, and reason that rejects the naturalistic metaphysics shaping much of modern thought. Reason, Larmore argues, is responsiveness to reasons, and reasons themselves are essentially normative in character, consisting in the way that physical and psychological facts - facts about the world of nature - count in favor of possibilities of thought and action that we can take up. Moral judgments are true or false in virtue of the moral reasons there are. We need therefore a more comprehensive metaphysics that recognizes a normative dimension to reality as well. Though taking its point of departure in the analysis of moral judgment, this book branches widely into related topics such as freedom and the causal order of the world, textual interpretation, the nature of the self, self-knowledge, and the concept of duties to ourselves.
In: Lonergan Studies
In: History of European ideas, Band 17, Heft 2-3, S. 360-362
ISSN: 0191-6599
In: The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, S. 107-126
In: Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Band 62, Heft 445, S. 1-4
ISSN: 1744-0378