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This thesis does not present a supplementary approach about the death of God and its effects but a study of nihilism, a disqualified way of thought, which could renew a diagnosis on the crisis of modernity. Nihilsm becomes really a threat as soon as scepticism takes shape in Ancient Greece. It is worth questioning stetting nihilism and scepticism as equivalent when considered through the history of metaphysics and rising of totalitarian regimes. This could be accepted only if one considers the ancient and modern forms of scepticism as proceeding from nihilism, and, on the other hand, if the crisis putting an end to modernity can be interpreted from a sceptical point of view. A dynamic approach to metaphysics (as tension and link between dogmatism and scepticism) casts a doubt upon a nihilist interpretation of scepticism. Suspensive thought in its ancient ways, carrying indecision in modern times, scepticism separates from nihilism. The latest eliminates all differences ; by itself, it is the abolition of the common ground between dogmatism and scepticism. Whatever the creative potential of nihilism from a speculative point of view, in the foundation of totalitarian politics, only its destructive aspect stands out. Indeed, modernity opens on a challenge of a sceptic type : which basis for one's belief ? Yet, after the death of God, this question witnesses no longer a state of indecision but truly as the permanent loss of foundation. While it leads to a crisis of the goal from a metaphysical scope, the institutionalization of nihilism provides a crisis of meaning. Contemporary scepticism, caught in the turmoil, appears as discredited because of its presumed involvement with nihilist politics. Could it still be a resource in our time when forced to pratice an original self-examination ? ; Cette thèse ne propose pas une variation sur la thématique de la mort de Dieu et ses retombées, mais une enquête sur un mode de penser disqualifié, le nihilisme, susceptible de renouveler un diagnostic sur la crise de la ...

This thesis does not present a supplementary approach about the death of God and its effects but a study of nihilism, a disqualified way of thought, which could renew a diagnosis on the crisis of modernity. Nihilsm becomes really a threat as soon as scepticism takes shape in Ancient Greece. It is worth questioning stetting nihilism and scepticism as equivalent when considered through the history of metaphysics and rising of totalitarian regimes. This could be accepted only if one considers the ancient and modern forms of scepticism as proceeding from nihilism, and, on the other hand, if the crisis putting an end to modernity can be interpreted from a sceptical point of view. A dynamic approach to metaphysics (as tension and link between dogmatism and scepticism) casts a doubt upon a nihilist interpretation of scepticism. Suspensive thought in its ancient ways, carrying indecision in modern times, scepticism separates from nihilism. The latest eliminates all differences ; by itself, it is the abolition of the common ground between dogmatism and scepticism. Whatever the creative potential of nihilism from a speculative point of view, in the foundation of totalitarian politics, only its destructive aspect stands out. Indeed, modernity opens on a challenge of a sceptic type : which basis for one's belief ? Yet, after the death of God, this question witnesses no longer a state of indecision but truly as the permanent loss of foundation. While it leads to a crisis of the goal from a metaphysical scope, the institutionalization of nihilism provides a crisis of meaning. Contemporary scepticism, caught in the turmoil, appears as discredited because of its presumed involvement with nihilist politics. Could it still be a resource in our time when forced to pratice an original self-examination ? ; Cette thèse ne propose pas une variation sur la thématique de la mort de Dieu et ses retombées, mais une enquête sur un mode de penser disqualifié, le nihilisme, susceptible de renouveler un diagnostic sur la crise de la modernité. La menace du nihilisme prend consistance dès l'émergence du scepticisme en Grèce ancienne. Passée au crible de l'histoire de la métaphysique et de la prise de pouvoir des mouvements totalitaires, la mise en équivalence nihilisme-scepticisme mérite d'être interrogée. Elle n'est recevable que si les formes anciennes et modernes prises par le scepticisme sont autant de précédents nihilistes et si, inversement, la crise qui scelle la fin de la modernité est interprétable en termes sceptiques. Une approche dynamique de la métaphysique (comme tension et apparentement entre dogmatisme et scepticisme), rend une reconstruction nihiliste du scepticisme sujette à caution. Penser suspensif dans ses formes anciennes, porteur de vacillement à l'époque moderne, le scepticisme se démarque du nihilisme. Ce dernier évide et néantise toutes les différences et consiste, lui, en une négation du fonds commun entre dogmatisme et scepticisme. Quelle que soit la portée créatrice du nihilisme d'un point de vue spéculatif, c'est sa seule dimension destructrice qui s'impose avec l'instauration d'une politique totalitaire. La modernité s'ouvre bien sur un défi de type sceptique : où asseoir sa créance ? Cependant, avec la mort de Dieu, cette question ne se pose plus en termes de vacillement mais de perte définitive de toute assise. S'il en ressort une crise du but dans le cadre métaphysique,l'institutionnalisation du nihilisme donne lieu, quant à elle, à une crise du sens. Le scepticisme contemporain, emporté dans la tourmente, semble disqualifié par sa compromission supposée avec des politiques nihilistes. Forcé d'engager un auto-examen inédit, ne peut-il pas encore être une ressource pour notre temps ?

"Rapport à l'académie des sciences morales et politiques, sur les mémoires envoyés pour concourir au prix de philosophie, proposé en 1833 . sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote; au nom de la section de philosophie . Lu dans les seances du 4 et du 11 avril 1835": p. [1]-120. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The evolution of Bergsonism seems to be going from durée (duration) to life. In hisCreative Evolution, after his first two works, Bergson discovered indeed that life endures,in an at least similar way our consciousness does. Yet, beneath this appearance ofcontinuity, Bergsonism might well conceal some gaps, or even breaks between durée andlife. Our study, beginning with this assumption of a discontinuity in his thought, firstconsists in trying to identify these potential breaks between durée and life in his fourmajor works. We show these ruptures by making plain textual breaks inside each of thesefour books, all of them, but each one in a different way. We discuss their significance,not only for an understanding of Bergsonism but also for Philosophy as a Whole. Wewant to establish by this study two points: 1. In Bergson, the evolution of life manifests atime which is alien to durée, a time which necessarily is woven with some spatiality. Wename the logic characteristic of this time of life the "dialectic of life." 2. The ultimateconsequence of this dialectic of life occurs in the reflexive moment when the subject, ashe realizes this dialectic, commits himself knowingly to this movement of life, as hehimself belongs to the living. This reflexive moment is the very moment of our present,where Politics as the field of the common action for deciding the future opens up to use.This is how the dialectic of life leads us to Politics. ; L'évolution du bergsonisme semble aller de la durée à la vie. C'est que dansL'Evolution créatrice, après ses deux premiers ouvrages, Bergson découvre que la vieelle-même dure, d'une manière au moins analogue à celle dont notre conscience dure.Pourtant, sous cette apparence de continuité, le bergsonisme pourrait bien recelerquelques écarts, et même ruptures, entre durée et vie. Notre étude commence par cettehypothèse d'une discontinuité implicite dans sa pensée, et consiste d'abord à repérer desruptures possibles entre durée et vie dans ses quatre ouvrages majeurs. Nous faisonsapparaître ...

The evolution of Bergsonism seems to be going from durée (duration) to life. In hisCreative Evolution, after his first two works, Bergson discovered indeed that life endures,in an at least similar way our consciousness does. Yet, beneath this appearance ofcontinuity, Bergsonism might well conceal some gaps, or even breaks between durée andlife. Our study, beginning with this assumption of a discontinuity in his thought, firstconsists in trying to identify these potential breaks between durée and life in his fourmajor works. We show these ruptures by making plain textual breaks inside each of thesefour books, all of them, but each one in a different way. We discuss their significance,not only for an understanding of Bergsonism but also for Philosophy as a Whole. Wewant to establish by this study two points: 1. In Bergson, the evolution of life manifests atime which is alien to durée, a time which necessarily is woven with some spatiality. Wename the logic characteristic of this time of life the "dialectic of life." 2. The ultimateconsequence of this dialectic of life occurs in the reflexive moment when the subject, ashe realizes this dialectic, commits himself knowingly to this movement of life, as hehimself belongs to the living. This reflexive moment is the very moment of our present,where Politics as the field of the common action for deciding the future opens up to use.This is how the dialectic of life leads us to Politics. ; L'évolution du bergsonisme semble aller de la durée à la vie. C'est que dansL'Evolution créatrice, après ses deux premiers ouvrages, Bergson découvre que la vieelle-même dure, d'une manière au moins analogue à celle dont notre conscience dure.Pourtant, sous cette apparence de continuité, le bergsonisme pourrait bien recelerquelques écarts, et même ruptures, entre durée et vie. Notre étude commence par cettehypothèse d'une discontinuité implicite dans sa pensée, et consiste d'abord à repérer desruptures possibles entre durée et vie dans ses quatre ouvrages majeurs. Nous faisonsapparaître ...

The evolution of Bergsonism seems to be going from durée (duration) to life. In hisCreative Evolution, after his first two works, Bergson discovered indeed that life endures,in an at least similar way our consciousness does. Yet, beneath this appearance ofcontinuity, Bergsonism might well conceal some gaps, or even breaks between durée andlife. Our study, beginning with this assumption of a discontinuity in his thought, firstconsists in trying to identify these potential breaks between durée and life in his fourmajor works. We show these ruptures by making plain textual breaks inside each of thesefour books, all of them, but each one in a different way. We discuss their significance,not only for an understanding of Bergsonism but also for Philosophy as a Whole. Wewant to establish by this study two points: 1. In Bergson, the evolution of life manifests atime which is alien to durée, a time which necessarily is woven with some spatiality. Wename the logic characteristic of this time of life the "dialectic of life." 2. The ultimateconsequence of this dialectic of life occurs in the reflexive moment when the subject, ashe realizes this dialectic, commits himself knowingly to this movement of life, as hehimself belongs to the living. This reflexive moment is the very moment of our present,where Politics as the field of the common action for deciding the future opens up to use.This is how the dialectic of life leads us to Politics. ; L'évolution du bergsonisme semble aller de la durée à la vie. C'est que dansL'Evolution créatrice, après ses deux premiers ouvrages, Bergson découvre que la vieelle-même dure, d'une manière au moins analogue à celle dont notre conscience dure.Pourtant, sous cette apparence de continuité, le bergsonisme pourrait bien recelerquelques écarts, et même ruptures, entre durée et vie. Notre étude commence par cettehypothèse d'une discontinuité implicite dans sa pensée, et consiste d'abord à repérer desruptures possibles entre durée et vie dans ses quatre ouvrages majeurs. Nous faisonsapparaître ...

This thesis aims at highlighting the ethical, metaphysical and aesthetic questions that arise in the mature works of the Austrian author Hugo von Hofmannsthal. After having dealt with Hofmannsthal's original dilemma between opposing conceptions of the world and of his own existence, this work considers the two versions of The Woman without a Shadow. This opus is the first expression at maturity of his aesthetic whose underlying metaphysical foundation it enlightens.The experience of First World War, subject of our third chapter, compelled Hofmannsthal to widen the scope of his thoughts. His later plays illustrate which ethical conducts should rule individuals in a given society as well as between the peoples in Europe. The Salzburg Great World Theaterwhich is the focus of our fourth chapter, sets the pattern of his social ethics inspired by the principles of the social doctrine of the Church. As for The Tower, a tragedy which we will deeply analyse in our fifth chapter, it sketches his ethics for political action. The purpose of this play is indeed to advocate peace in Europe while helping nations to achieve higher standard of Humanity. ; L'objet de cette thèse est de mettre en lumière les interrogations éthiques, métaphysiques et esthétiques qui accompagnent la production des œuvres de maturité de !'écrivain autrichien Hugo von Hofmannsthal. Après avoir rappelé ses hésitations initiales entre des conceptions du monde et de l'existence distinctes, ce travail envisage les deux versions de la Femme sans ombre. Cette œuvre offre une première expression de son esthétique de maturité dont elle éclaire aussi les fondements métaphysiques. L'expérience de la Première Guerre mondiale, analysée dans le troisième chapitre, conduit Hofmannsthal à élargir le champ de ses réflexions. Son œuvre dramatique devient l'illustration des principes éthiques devant régler les échanges entre les membres d'une même société ainsi qu'entre les peuples d'Europe. Le Grand Théâtre du monde à Salzbourg, dont l'examen occupe le quatrième ...

The articulation of the themes of development and creation undertaken by Bergson in Creative Development is achieved through internal criticism of the metaphysics of the representation, as G. Deleuze said. Bergson undertook to redesign metaphysics in order to re-integrate the 'subject' into the differential movement of life, without the paralysing idea of substance. The mediatising spatial and rationalisation of the world's intellectual interpretation then replaced the immediate timing of the duration, freed by the intuition method. Its aim is to give the intuitive duration of the decomposed subject to the crucial duration of the vital momentum, which is an excellent image of its 'true evolutionism'. Similarly, in Nietzsche, thought of the will of power is aimed at dehumanisation of the world for access to the prational, pulsional and archiferous current of life. The similarity between Nietzsche's physio-psychological method and Bergson's intuitive method reveals, in the negative, a humanist bias in the vital impulse, which is directed to and for the benefit of humans. It is therefore necessary to show, in the light of a comparative study between Nietzsche and Bergson, that despite the ambition of its author, the vital impetus remains a 'human, too human' interpretation, and, by extension, always a prisoner of the metaphysics of the representation. ; L'articulation des thèmes de l'évolution et de la création entreprise par Bergson dans l'Évolution créatrice s'accomplit à travers une critique interne de la métaphysique de la représentation, selon l'expression de G. Deleuze. Bergson y engage une refonte de la métaphysique en faveur d'une réintégration du « sujet » dans le mouvement différenciel de la vie, affranchi de l'idée paralysante de substance. À la spatialisation et à la rationalisation médiatisantes de l'interprétation intellectuelle du monde il substitue alors la temporalisation immédiate de la durée, libérée par la méthode de l'intuition. Son objectif consiste à accorder la durée intuitive du sujet ...