AbstractSince the last decades of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, the use of metaphysics by philosophers when approaching conceptual problems in biology has increased. Some philosophers call this tendency in philosophy of biology 'Metaphysics of Biology' (Guay and Pradeu in Synthese 1–20, 2017). In this paper, I aim at characterizing Metaphysics of Biology by paying attention to the diverse ways philosophers use metaphysics when addressing conceptual problems in biology. I will claim that there are two different modes of doing Metaphysics of Biology, namely MetaphysicsforBiology and MetaphysicsinBiology.
AbstractNaturalized metaphysics aims to establish justified metaphysical claims, where metaphysics is meant to carry its usual significance, while avoiding the traditional methods of metaphysics—a priori reasoning, conceptual analysis, intuitions, and common sense—which naturalized metaphysics argues are not epistemically probative. After offering an explication of what it means to do metaphysics, this paper argues that naturalized metaphysics, at the outset, is hospitable to doing metaphysics. The underdetermination of metaphysics by science, however, changes the picture. Naturalized metaphysics has to break this underdetermination, but the criticism of the traditional methods of metaphysics leaves no resources with which to do so. Naturalized metaphysics must therefore be more restrictive than originally intended to ensure that some metaphysical features avoid underdetermination. In this restrictive naturalized metaphysics, however, metaphysicians are only left the task of surveying the opinions of scientists which, it is argued, does not qualify as doing metaphysics. Thus, to fulfill its promise to save metaphysics, naturalized metaphysics displaces the metaphysician. Furthermore, the attempt to re-employ them via the principle of naturalistic closure is argued to fail. Metaphysicians should therefore not be happier with naturalized metaphysics than they are with the more explicitly eliminative trends in contemporary metametaphysics, such as neo-Carnapian deflationism, despite the promise of naturalized metaphysics, likely to Carnap's dismay, to deliver justified claims about ultimate reality.
In this paper, I deal with Heidegger's evolving account of metaphysics, since Heidegger's persistent concern, the question of being, is a basic metaphysical question. To date, most Heidegger scholars have focused only on a particular stage of Heidegger's philosophy: either his early attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, or his efforts to overcome metaphysics in the 1930s, or his late embrace of 'releasement' from metaphysics. However, these limited approaches fail to address Heidegger's different understandings of metaphysics, which lie at the root of his changing approaches to the question of being. They also fail to explain whether there is any inner connection between the various approaches. Further, given Heidegger's unremittingly negative attitude towards metaphysics, some scholars have even maintained that Heidegger thought it both possible and desirable to leave metaphysics behind altogether. I address these issues first by arguing that metaphysics for Heidegger has three interconnected meanings: initially it is the representation of the totality of things that are present-at-hand, a view subsequently developed into subjective representational thinking, and finally radicalized into an expression of the will to power. At each stage, Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition but never claims that it can be fully eliminated, since it is a mode of Dasein's being and ultimately possiblized by being itself. For this reason, Heidegger's own philosophy of being remains inseparable from metaphysics.
Ian Hunter has made a name for himself as a critic of German university metaphysics, finding its progeny at work in places where many of us would not even think of looking, for example in the late twentieth-century celebration of theory in the humanities. Some of his recent work has focused on a rather different issue: the methodological task of making intellectual history empirical. Here he builds on Quentin Skinner's rationale for the Cambridge School's efforts to make the history of political thought more properly historical. Skinner's argument draws on the work of R. G. Collingwood, at least in its earlier versions, and on neo-Kantian tendencies in mid-twentieth century Oxford philosophy. Thus, in aligning his methodological programme with Skinner's argument, Hunter may risk bringing elements of university metaphysics back in another form. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]
This review deals with the book by S. V. Klimenko, a well-known philologist, a staff member of the N. G. Chernyshevskiy Estate Museum. It shows the academic character of the book under review. The book is timed according to the periods of the author's creative life, but at the same time the identified periods appear to be crucial for the history of the museum as they were linked to anniversaries of N. G. Chernyshevskiy or memorable dates in the history of the museum itself. The content of the book combines fascinating stories about the creation of new museum "products" and the definition of the essence and purpose of the profession of someone whose life is connected to a literary museum. A literary museum worker is presented in the book as a person for whom the literary studies of sources become not only a process inseparable from the museum work but also an object of academic research and exploration. Considerable attention is paid to the problems of museum work as the most important area of humanitarian knowledge. S. V. Klimenko is also concerned with the issues of personnel training and funding. An important point for the author of the book becomes the question of what materials a separate museum exhibition or a large exposition should be based on. S.V. Klimenko assigns great importance to the development of the concept of an exhibition or exposition in museum work. Discussions that accompany the emergence of any new "product" represent the birth of the concept, i.e. understanding of the principles of material selection, logic of its presentation and scientific commentary. The author of the book advocates the conceptual approach to the presentation of museum exhibits in showcases or on walls in an essentially rigorous way. S. V. Klimenko has succeeded not only in opening the world of the literary museum to the reader, but in showing its heartbeat in several dimensions, projected on the science, source studies, archives, education, working with the visitors, and the work of exhibition designers.
A ternary ontological model in which the living being is a triad of I – form – substrate is described. I is an intangible subject, contemplating the content of consciousness and controlling the material body, which is the unity of the form and the substrate. The contents of consciousness are connected both with the form of the body, which I contemplate in the inner "mental space" in the form of information, and with the substrate, which embodies the forms of the body and is responsible for sensations and intentions. The problem of control of the material body by the non-material self is solved under the assumption that the human brain is a quantum object. The ternary model of a living being is inscribed in an absolute ontology, in which the Absolute also has a threefold structure and is the unstitched unity of the absolute I, the absolute Form and the absolute Substrate. The Absolute creates the other world with its threefold energies, which provides the threefold structure of a living being. The created world arises from the timeless world of the potential possibilities of the Universe, which modern cosmology associates with its wave function. Created entities arise in the process of alienation from the Absolute, resulting in free will.
Purpose. To consider the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Its implementation involves: a) outlining methodological changes in the philosophy of the twentieth century; b) analysis of ways to interpret anthropological component of philosophizing in Descartes studies; c) appeal to Descartes' texts to clarify the authentic form of his interpretation of metaphysics. Theoretical basis. I base my view of Descartes' legacy on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. Originality. Based on Descartes' own concept of teaching, the author substantiates the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Important prerequisites for its comprehension are attention to the ethical motive as the driving force of philosophizing and recognition of the importance of the poetic worldview. The idea of the basic role of poetics finds its meaningful confirmation in the texts of the philosopher, who interprets the main areas of philosophy (science, morality and medicine) as the forms of art. Conclusions. Based on his own vision of anthropology and metaphysics as the forms of completion of the revolution initiated by Copernicus, the author defends the idea of the constitutive presence of personality in Descartes' metaphysics. In the process of studying the research literature, methodological guidelines are outlined in the form of the importance of personal determination of the search for truth, the key role of ethical motive and art as components of philosophizing. The thesis about the poetic form of presentation of metaphysics by Descartes as a form of fixation of its personal dimension is substantiated.
