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The economic relation between market structure, government preferences, & the incidence of corruption is analyzed, drawing on Rose-Ackerman's (1975, 1978) microeconomic model of corruption. In this model, three types of agents are posited: the (honest) policymaker, the lower-level bureaucrat whose purchasing decisions may include bribes, & firms offering the government goods or services. The likelihood of corruption is assessed in the cases of corruption where the government has well-defined/unclear preferences, the goods are homogeneous/differentiated, & private markets for the goods exist. The policy implications of this model for encouraging/discouraging corruption & the usefulness of penalties are discussed. Efficient firms & nonstandard goods lead to a higher incidence of corruption; political influence may also play a role. 4 Figures, 1 Appendix. M. Pflum

The disagreement between rational choice (RCI) & historical institutionalism (HI) is investigated in the politics of enfranchisement of universal adult male suffrage. The ease of blurring the HI/RCI distinction is identified in how analysis, explanation, & normative assessment commingle in microeconomics. This underscores the multiple tasks that confront equilibrium based theories. A brief historical sketch characterizes universal suffrage as an equilibrium institution. Further exploration identifies how RCI builds normative justification into purportedly "positive" accounts of "moral" or "ethical" explanations that can advance normatively attractive institutions, such as universal suffrage. The lessons learned from the politics of enfranchisement are that RCI accounts must abandon their reduced form of analysis & harness the analytical advantages offered by bargaining explanations of institutional emergence. References. J. Harwell

The disagreement between rational choice (RCI) & historical institutionalism (HI) is investigated in the politics of enfranchisement of universal adult male suffrage. The ease of blurring the HI/RCI distinction is identified in how analysis, explanation, & normative assessment commingle in microeconomics. This underscores the multiple tasks that confront equilibrium based theories. A brief historical sketch characterizes universal suffrage as an equilibrium institution. Further exploration identifies how RCI builds normative justification into purportedly "positive" accounts of "moral" or "ethical" explanations that can advance normatively attractive institutions, such as universal suffrage. The lessons learned from the politics of enfranchisement are that RCI accounts must abandon their reduced form of analysis & harness the analytical advantages offered by bargaining explanations of institutional emergence. Tables, References. J. Harwell

Examines the 1980s-1990s British economic model as a test case for modern conservative capitalism. The conservative capitalist model that emerged during the prime ministership of Margaret Thatcher had four unequivocal points: low taxes, small governments, production oriented to profit, & a naturalization of inequality. This model is shown to have reduced inflation, revitalized British management, & raised a number of economic indicators in the intermediate terms. However, as a long-term model, it is argued that conservative capitalism is a failure. The 1990s has seen a drastic rise in inequality, substantial growth in poverty, concerted loss of public morale, & net reduction in private ownership of property. The failure of conservative capitalism is traced to large macroeconomic mistakes, gross misunderstandings of microeconomics, & a hypercompetitive ethic that prevented cooperation, thus leading to a need for more governmental regulation. 1 Table. D. Ryfe

Analyzing the poverty and distributional impact of macro events requires understanding how shocks or policy changes on the macro level affect household income and consumption. It is clear that this poses a formidable task, which of course raises the question of the appropriate methodology to address such questions. This paper presents one possible approach: A sequential methodology that combines a macroeconomic model with a behavioral micro-simulation. We discuss the merits and shortcomings of this approach with a focus on developing country applications with a short to medium run time horizon. - This chapter is a re-print of: Lay, J. (2010). Sequential macro-micro modelling with behavioural microsimulations. International Journal of Microsimulation, 3(1), 24-34.