Suchergebnisse

Artykuł dotyczy rozwoju polityki bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej, od chwili jej powstania do 2014 r. W ramach tej polityki próbowano także pozyskać zdolności wojskowe, niezbędne do zbudowania systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Dokonywało się to na zasadzie pełnej dobrowolności, a w związku z tym wszystkie Państwa Członkowskie UE kierowały się głównie interesami narodowymi. W ramach Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony, przemianowanej w Traktacie lizbońskim na Wspólną Politykę Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej, zrealizowano dwa tzw. Cele Zasadnicze/Operacyjne. Pierwszy z nich został ogłoszony w grudniu 1999 r. w Helsinkach i zrealizowany do końca 2003. Europejski Cel Zasadniczy/Operacyjny 2010 miał na celu doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych, w tym zbudowanie sił szybkiego reagowania pod nazwą Grup Bojowych UE. Zorganizowano i przeszkolono ok. 15 takich jednostek, ale dotychczas żadna z nich nie została skierowana do działań w rejonie kryzysu. Polska należy do aktywnych uczestników WPBiO UE i dotychczas zorganizowała trzy grupy bojowe o składzie wielonarodowym. Dwie spośród nich pełniły dyżury 2010 r. i 2013 r. Kolejna grupa pod polskim dowództwem jest przewidziana w harmonogramie dyżurów na rok 2016 r., ale mało prawdopodobne jest wykorzystanie jej do realnych działań. Temat zdolności wojskowych nie należy do priorytetowych zadań Unii Europejskiej. ; The paper concerns the development of the European Union's security policy, from its beginnings to 2014. The framework of this policy also served the purpose of developing the military capacities that are necessary to establish an emergency response system. The principle of totally voluntary participation has always operated in this respect, therefore all EU member states have mainly been concerned with their national interests. Under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDF), renamed in the Lisbon Treaty as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the European Union, two Headline Goals have been achieved. One was announced in Helsinki, in 1999, and achieved by the end of 2003. The European Headline Goal 2010 involved the improvement of military capability, including rapid response forces, named EU Battle Groups. Around fifteen units have been organised and trained, none of which, however, has been deployed in a crisis region so far. Poland is among the active participants of the CSDP and has organised three multinational battle groups. Two of them were on duty in 2010 and 2013. Another group under Polish command is scheduled to be on duty in 2016, but it is not likely to participate in real action. The issue of military capability is not a priority for the European Union. ; 8 ; 105 ; 120 ; 8 ; Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej

Artykuł dotyczy ewolucji stanowiska rządów Polski wobec kolejnych etapów rozwoju europejskiej autonomii strategicznej (Europejska Tożsamości Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony), Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony oraz Wspólna Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej). Wyodrębnione zostały dwa etapy polskiej Polityki; przed akcesją do UE oraz udział Polski w ESDP/WPBiO, po przystąpieniu do UE. Podczas sprawowania przez Polskę Prezydencji w Radzie, jednym z priorytetów było doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych i systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Scharakteryzowano oficjalne stanowisko władz polskich wobec integracji systemu bezpieczeństwa UE wyrażone w dokumentach strategicznych. Ostatni taki dokument został opublikowany w maju 2017 r. w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej. Zwrócono uwagę na sytuacje kryzysowe w problemach dotyczących integracji europejskiej oraz na brak zainteresowania aktualnych władz politycznych Polski udziałem w reformowaniu systemu bezpieczeństwa UE. ; The article is focusing on the evolution of Polish approach towards the development of the European strategic autonomy in the European military integration (European Security and Defense Identity), the European Security and Defense Policy and the Common European Security and Defense Policy after joining the EU. During Poland's Presidency, one of the priorities was to improve military capabilities and crisis management systems. The article characterizes an official position of the Polish authorities in the process of EU integration security system. The last strategic document has been published in May 2017 by the Ministry of National Defense. There have been identified two stages: prior to accession to the EU and Poland's participation in the ESDP/CSDP EU since 2004. Special attention was paid to the lack of interest of the current Polish political authorities in reforming the EU security system.

Artykuł dotyczy ewolucji stanowiska rządów Polski wobec kolejnych etapów rozwoju europejskiej autonomii strategicznej (Europejska Tożsamości Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony), Europejskiej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony oraz Wspólna Europejska Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony Unii Europejskiej). Wyodrębnione zostały dwa etapy polskiej Polityki; przed akcesją do UE oraz udział Polski w ESDP /WPBiO, po przystąpieniu do UE . Podczas sprawowania przez Polskę Prezydencji w Radzie, jednym z priorytetów było doskonalenie zdolności wojskowych i systemu reagowania kryzysowego. Scharakteryzowano oficjalne stanowisko władz polskich wobec integracji systemu bezpieczeństwa UE wyrażone w dokumentach strategicznych. Ostatni taki dokument został opublikowany w maju 2017 r. w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej. Zwrócono uwagę na sytuacje kryzysowe w problemach dotyczących integracji europejskiej oraz na brak zainteresowania aktualnych władz politycznych Polski udziałem w reformowaniu systemu bezpieczeństwa UE . ; The article is focusing on the evolution of Polish approach towards the development of the European strategic autonomy in the European military integration (European Security and Defense Identity), the European Security and Defense Policy and the Common European Security and Defense Policy after joining the EU . During Poland's Presidency, one of the priorities was to improve military capabilities and crisis management systems. The article characterizes an official position of the Polish authorities in the process of EU integration security system. The last strategic document has been published in May 2017 by the Ministry of National Defense. There have been identified two stages: prior to accession to the EU and Poland's participation in the ESDP /CSDP EU since 2004. Special attention was paid to the lack of interest of the current Polish political authorities in reforming the EU security system.

The next phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that despite lacking a large military, territorial, population, or raw material potential, Belarus could play a significant role in the project to construct a new regional, continental, and even global security architecture. The purpose of this article is to discuss the problem of repositioning Belarus, which was affected not only by the multidimensional change in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations as a result of the war but also by long-term efforts to elevate Belarusian-EU relations. In this area, the fundamental research question is whether the war in Ukraine, the breach of the so-called Budapest Memorandum and the deepening of the multifaceted Russian-Belarusian integration within the Union State (including the militarisation of Belarus and the allocation of tactical nuclear weapons) will cause the projects for the redefinition of Belarus-EU relations (which are instrumental in reducing the intensity of political turbulence in the region) to disappear from the EU diplomatic agenda for a long time, with a direct negative impact on the future of European security. The article verifies the hypothesis that due to the specificity of the Belarusian authoritarian model, despite the systematically deepening Russian-Belarusian integration and the ever-expanding sanctions policy towards Belarus, (2) due to the shape of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after 2014 and the periodically satisfactory Belarusian-EU relations, (1) there are still prospects for Belarus to pursue foreign policy diversification and repositioning of the European vector in it.

This paper is dedicated to the involvement of Poland in the European Union's military operations in Africa in the 2010s. The development of military capabilities is not one of the European Union's priorities. Nevertheless, the EU is an active participant of the international communities' efforts to aid African states, including the use of armed forces. The vast majority of such EU missions have been undertaken in Africa. Despite the fact that this region is not a priority of Poland's foreign and security policies, Poland has actively participated in such actions, primarily due to the peculiarities of contemporary security threats and Poland's approach to the process of European integration. However, after initial experiences, Poland limited its involvement, due to the limited impact on the achievement of national objectives related to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. This has been reflected in both official documents and political practice associated with deploying troops on foreign soil. The author sets forth a thesis that these limitations are too substantial, and that there are reasons for greater Polish involvement in the European Union's military missions. ; This paper is dedicated to the involvement of Poland in the European Union's military operations in Africa in the 2010s. The development of military capabilities is not one of the European Union's priorities. Nevertheless, the EU is an active participant of the international communities' efforts to aid African states, including the use of armed forces. The vast majority of such EU missions have been undertaken in Africa. Despite the fact that this region is not a priority of Poland's foreign and security policies, Poland has actively participated in such actions, primarily due to the peculiarities of contemporary security threats and Poland's approach to the process of European integration. However, after initial experiences, Poland limited its involvement, due to the limited impact on the achievement of national objectives related to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. This has been reflected in both official documents and political practice associated with deploying troops on foreign soil. The author sets forth a thesis that these limitations are too substantial, and that there are reasons for greater Polish involvement in the European Union's military missions.

The South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) was launched in 1996, however, its functioning is an ongoing research phenomenon. This regional cooperation format includes all 13 states of South-East Europe. It was established as a forum of political dialogue and consultation, where regional issues could be addressed at the highest level. One of the objectives of the SEECP was security cooperation. The aim of this article is to analyse the role of the SEECP in maintaining security in the region of the Western Balkans. This article argues that since 1996, the SEECP has been evolving and is becoming an important format of regional cooperation in South East Europe, however, it plays a limited role in maintaining the military security of the post-conflict states of the Western Balkans. From the point of view of the members of the SEECP, military security and peace could be obtained through the integration of the participants of the SEECP, in particular those located in the Western Balkans, with the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The article also shows that establishing the SEECP did not eliminate tensions and riots based on ethnicity in some states of the Western Balkans and so, the SEECP still has a lot to do in the matters of reconciliation and good-neighbourliness. The article is based on primary and secondary source analysis, case study method comparative analysis, and the historical method.

The progressing military integration of the EU may become an impulse to undertake changes aimed at increasing the scope of participation of national parliaments in the Member States in decisionmaking processes concerning the delegation of armed forces. In the decision-making system in Germany, the Bundestag has clearly developed constitutional control powers, which is the result of a specific political and military culture and the still reserved attitude towards the use of military force. Member State parliaments also have additional powers of scrutiny based on their powers to scrutinize EU decision-making. The Bundestag has a limited role in scrutinizing the CSDP decision-making process in this way for a variety of reasons. Realization of the political goal of European integration in the fi eld of defense (both in the form of military operations and a defense union) would require modifying the Bundestag's scrutiny powers. Modifying the decision-making system is important for legitimacy and pragmatic reasons if Germany intends to continue the expansion of the CSDP. ; Postępująca integracja militarna UE może stać się impulsem do podjęcia działań na rzecz zwiększenia zakresu partycypacji parlamentów krajowych państw członkowskich w procesach decyzyjnych dotyczących delegowania sił zbrojnych. W systemie decyzyjnym w Niemczech wyraźnie wykształcone konstytucyjne kompetencje kontrolne posiada Bundestag, co jest rezultatem specyfi cznej kultury polityczno-militarnej i nadal powściągliwego stosunku do użycia armii. Parlamenty państw członkowskich dysponują także dodatkowymi możliwościami kontrolnymi na podstawie swoich uprawnień dotyczących kontrolowania procesów decyzyjnych w UE. Bundestag ma ograniczoną rolę w weryfi kowaniu procesu decyzyjnego WPBiO tą drogą z różnych powodów. Realizacja politycznego celu integracji europejskiej w dziedzinie obronnej (zarówno w formie operacji militarnych, jak i unii obronnej) wymagałaby zmodyfi kowania uprawnień kontrolnych Bundestagu. Zmiana systemu decyzyjnego jest ważna ze względów legitymizacyjnych oraz pragmatycznych, jeśli Niemcy zamierzają kontynuować rozbudowę WPBiO.

In the early 1990s, significant changes in the political and geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe occurred: the collapse of communist rule, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The creation, over a short time, of a number of independent nation-states in the immediate vicinity of Poland had a vast influence on individual national minorities, especially those living near the borders. There were huge changes to the political and economic relations between democratic Poland and its newly independent neighbours and, to a large extent, between individual nations, now divided by borders. The process of expanding the area of European integration began, which led, after a dozen or so years, to the inclusion of some Central and Eastern European countries in the NATO and EU structures, while leaving some of those countries outside the zone of political, economic and military integration, thus creating new division lines in the new political and legal reality. One consequence of the contemporary processes of political, economic and military integration of the European continent is the strengthening of its division into the Western Europe (in its widest meaning) and the Eastern Europe (not included in the integration process). At the Polish border with Belarus and Ukraine, the line of the modern division, strengthened in the literal (technical measures to protect the borders) and legal sense (visa regulations) overlaps with the civilisation, cultural and religious division line that has been shaped over the ages. Despite the claims from the government in Warsaw of "Polish eastern policy", we can see a clear turn towards "western policy". In political, military and economic sense, Poland is clearly facing west, which results in turning away from its eastern neighbours, which is particularly disadvantageous for political and geopolitical reasons. Despite spectacular attempts by various governments to revive the cooperation, especially with Ukraine and Lithuania, Poland does not currently have any arguments, especially economic or financial ones, to conduct an effective, pragmatic eastern policy, and not a policy based on historical sentiments. When we compare the contemporary ethnic structure and national policy of Poland and its eastern neighbours, we can see clear asymmetry in both quantitative and legalinstitutional aspects. There is currently a markedly smaller population of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians living in Poland than the Polish population in the territories of our eastern neighbours. At the same time, the national minorities in Poland enjoy wider rights and better conditions to operate than Poles living in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. ; Głównym celem artykułu jest przedstawienie roli mniejszości narodowych w relacjach międzypaństwowych. Szczególnego wymiaru nabiera ona w przypadku sąsiadujących ze sobą państw, których skomplikowana historia doprowadziła do powstania skupisk poszczególnych narodowości w regionach przygranicznych. Zachodząca od początku lat 90. XX w. na obszarze środkowej Europy transformacja ustrojowa, przeobraziła relacje polityczne i ekonomiczne pomiędzy poszczególnymi państwami tego regionu, które dodatkowo komplikuje zróżnicowany stopień zaawansowania procesów integracji wschodnich sąsiadów Polski. Zmianie uległa także sytuacja, zwłaszcza polityczno-prawna, mniejszości narodowych, które – odmiennie niż w okresie komunistycznym – stały się istotnym elementem, niejednokrotnie konfliktogennym, wzajemnych relacji międzypaństwowych. ; Badania terenowe, których wyniki wykorzystano w artykule, zostały sfinansowane ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki przyznanych na podstawie decyzji numer DEC 2011/01/B/HS4/02609.

Artykuł poświęcony został zaangażowaniu Polski w operacje wojskowe Unii Europejskiej w Afryce w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Mimo, że rozwój zdolności wojskowych nie należy do priorytetów Unii Europejskiej, to organizacja ta włącza się aktywnie w podejmowane przez społeczność międzynarodową próby pomocy państwom afrykańskim także poprzez użycie sił zbrojnych. Zdecydowana większość tego typu misji unijnych realizowana była właśnie na kontynencie afrykańskim. Chociaż dla Polski nie jest to kierunek priorytetowy polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa, to ze względu na specyfikę współczesnych zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa oraz jej stosunek do procesu integracji europejskiej, włączyła się aktywnie w te działania. Jednak po pierwszych doświadczeniach z tym związanych i ograniczonej skuteczności realizacji stawianych przy tym celów narodowych związanych z rozwojem Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE, Polska ograniczyła swoje zaangażowanie. Ma to swoje odzwierciedlenie w dokumentach i linii politycznej związanej z wysyłaniem wojsk poza granice państwa. Autor stawia tezę, że ograniczenie to jest zbyt daleko idące i istnieją powody do zwiększenia polskiego wkładu w misje wojskowe Unii Europejskiej. ; This paper is dedicated to the involvement of Poland in the European Union's military operations in Africa in the 2010s. The development of military capabilities is not one of the European Union's priorities. Nevertheless, the EU is an active participant of the international communities' efforts to aid African states, including the use of armed forces. The vast majority of such EU missions have been undertaken in Africa. Despite the fact that this region is not a priority of Poland's foreign and security policies, Poland has actively participated in such actions, primarily due to the peculiarities of contemporary security threats and Poland's approach to the process of European integration. However, after initial experiences, Poland limited its involvement, due to the limited impact on the achievement of national objectives related to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. This has been reflected in both official documents and political practice associated with deploying troops on foreign soil. The author sets forth a thesis that these limitations are too substantial, and that there are reasons for greater Polish involvement in the European Union's military missions.

Już George Waszyngton miał wyrazić często przywoływane później przez Amerykanów życzenie, by na wzór Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki powstały również Stany Zjednoczone Europy. W rzeczywistości idea ta narodziła się zapewne wśród europejskich federalistów w XIX w., realne kształty mogła zaś przybrać dopiero u progu zimnej wojny. Dokonana wówczas przez administrację Harry'ego Trumana redefinicja globalnych interesów USA oraz ich roli w świecie prowadziła w konsekwencji nie tylko do wsparcia, ale wręcz zdecydowanego promowania koncepcji ekonomicznej, politycznej i militarnej integracji europejskiej. Kierując się mieszanką pobudek idealistycznych i pragmatycznych waszyngtońska elita oceniała, że zjednoczona w oparciu o amerykańskie wzorce Europa federalna z jednej strony przezwycięży w ten sposób swe odwieczne problemy (rywalizacja narodowa i marnotrawienie potencjału ekonomicznego), z drugiej zaś - odciąży USA od części odpowiedzialności za losy świata zachodniego. W miarę normalizacji sytuacji w Europie Zachodniej po II wojnie światowej jej przywódcy wykazywali jednak coraz mniejszy entuzjazm wobec amerykańskich planów federacji, na co Waszyngton reagował coraz bardziej stanowczymi groźbami pozbawienia Europy swego parasola ochronnego. Dopiero ostateczna klęska projektów EWO i EWP spowodowała zmianę polityki administracji Eisenhowera, oznaczającą pogodzenie się ze zmierzchem idei federalistycznej oraz triumfem funkcjonalizmu. ; It was George Washington who many authors claim first expressed the wish, often reported by Americans, that "one day, on the model of the United States of America a United States of Europe will come into being". In fact, the idea seems to have been launched by 19th century European federalists, yet it could not materialize until the dawn of the Cold War. Not only did the Truman administration's reappraisal of US global security interests and its role in the world lead to their support, but to their relentless promotion of Europe's economic, political and military integration. Out of their mixed idealistic and pragmatic motivation, the Washington establishment argued that, if united along the American model, a federal Europe would overcome its traditional problems (national rivalries and wasting its economic potential) while, on the other hand, it would also reduce US responsibility for the well-being of the Western world. However, as post-war normalization set in, the leaders of Western Europe grew increasingly skeptical of American federalist visions, while Washington responded with ever more resolute threats of withdrawing its forces from Europe. It was not until the ultimate failure of the EDC/EPC project that the Eisenhower administration modified its European policy, coming to terms with the end of federalism and the triumph of functionalism.

Już George Waszyngton miał wyrazić często przywoływane później przez Amerykanów życzenie, by na wzór Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki powstały również Stany Zjednoczone Europy. W rzeczywistości idea ta narodziła się zapewne wśród europejskich federalistów w XIX w., realne kształty mogła zaś przybrać dopiero u progu zimnej wojny. Dokonana wówczas przez administrację Harry'ego Trumana redefinicja globalnych interesów USA oraz ich roli w świecie prowadziła w konsekwencji nie tylko do wsparcia, ale wręcz zdecydowanego promowania koncepcji ekonomicznej, politycznej i militarnej integracji europejskiej. Kierując się mieszanką pobudek idealistycznych i pragmatycznych waszyngtońska elita oceniała, że zjednoczona w oparciu o amerykańskie wzorce Europa federalna z jednej strony przezwycięży w ten sposób swe odwieczne problemy (rywalizacja narodowa i marnotrawienie potencjału ekonomicznego), z drugiej zaś – odciąży USA od części odpowiedzialności za losy świata zachodniego. W miarę normalizacji sytuacji w Europie Zachodniej po II wojnie światowej jej przywódcy wykazywali jednak coraz mniejszy entuzjazm wobec amerykańskich planów federacji, na co Waszyngton reagował coraz bardziej stanowczymi groźbami pozbawienia Europy swego parasola ochronnego. Dopiero ostateczna klęska projektów EWO i EWP spowodowała zmianę polityki administracji Eisenhowera, oznaczającą pogodzenie się ze zmierzchem idei federalistycznej oraz triumfem funkcjonalizmu. ; It was George Washington who many authors claim first expressed the wish, often reported by Americans, that "one day, on the model of the United States of America a United States of Europe will come into being". In fact, the idea seems to have been launched by 19th century European federalists, yet it could not materialize until the dawn of the Cold War. Not only did the Truman administration's reappraisal of US global security interests and its role in the world lead to their support, but to their relentless promotion of Europe's economic, political and military integration. Out of their mixed idealistic and pragmatic motivation, the Washington establishment argued that, if united along the American model, a federal Europe would overcome its traditional problems (national rivalries and wasting its economic potential) while, on the other hand, it would also reduce US responsibility for the well-being of the Western world. However, as post-war normalization set in, the leaders of Western Europe grew increasingly skeptical of American federalist visions, while Washington responded with ever more resolute threats of withdrawing its forces from Europe. It was not until the ultimate failure of the EDC/EPC project that the Eisenhower administration modified its European policy, coming to terms with the end of federalism and the triumph of functionalism.

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe's interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries' difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties' coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe's interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries' difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties' coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe's interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries' difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties' coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.

The influence of the US on the forms and course of the integration processes in Western Europe was very strong, especially in the first post-war years. It was the influence of an external force which, being free of the internal contradictions stemming from Western Europe's interests, had at its disposal real capabilities to impose integration concepts beneficial to itself. Such integration was in line with both the economic and military interests of the United States during this period. The main reasons prompting Western European countries in the first post-war years to accept the solutions suggested by the United States were: the said countries' difficult economic situation, fear of the communist parties' coming to power, and the reluctant (hostile) attitude towards the USSR and the communist bloc. The combination of these causes served to temporarily neutralize the centrifugal tendencies and muted the divergence of interests between the individual countries of Western Europe. Such motives of integration also influenced the character of the emerging Western European political, military and economic organizations. The economic development of Western European countries, whose sources, in addition to the Marshall Plan, should be seen also in other factors, later led to a shift of integration initiatives from the American side to the European one. From a formal point of view, the effects of US policy in the period up to 1950 entailed: the establishment of NATO, the creation of the OEEC and the signing of the agreement on the EUP.