Suchergebnisse

The post 9/11 environment has been characterized by domestic policy actors being incorporated into a globalizing defense industrial sector through the concept of civil-military integration. From administration to administration, the push for increased civil-military integration has spread beyond its original boundaries and has reached the frontlines of the American military. This begs the question, can the market-driven logic of the commercial sector be integrated into the objectives and values of the noncivilian, military sector? More precisely, is civil-military integration the appropriate solution to the post 9/11 strategic shift? The purpose of this study is not to address the detailed merits or limitations of the increased reliance on private contractors. Rather, this study's primary focus is to examine the policies that set into motion and continue to promote the cornerstone of civil-military integration: strategic outsourcing. This study argues that in today's threat environment, the extent of civil-military integration poses unique challenges for U.S. strategic policy. With contactors on the battlefield, basic doctrinal issues emerge. The most basic of these is the notion that in a war zone military members are asked to risk their lives for their country. But, while people are willing to risk their lives for their country, they may not be willing to risk their lives for their company.

The purpose of the research. The article considers the perspectives of the military integration of the European Union countries in the spheres of security and defense. The author defines the purposes and prerequisites of the integration in these spheres. The strategic documents of the EU such as the Security Strategy of 2003, the Global Strategy of 2016 and the Strategic Compass of 2022 are examined in this article. The article reveals the main features of the EU strategic autonomy and examines the parameters of the EU strategic culture in the field of security and defense. The author assesses the initiatives of the European Union in the field of further strengthening of the security and autonomy. The transformation of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has been studied by the author. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project was considered in detail as well as the contribution of the EU countries to this project. Conclusions. As a result of the study, the author concludes that European integration is in the process of qualitative changes that affect the formation of the system of collective security and defense. The EU is increasingly acting as a strength pole, and there is a strategic shift from traditional "soft power" to "hard power". Under the pressure of external factors and due to the efforts of the major powers of the region, it is possible to achieve the goal of strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense. The EU is becoming a serious actor not only of the regional but also the global security.

Die Arbeit beinhaltet im Kern einen Maßnahmenkatalog für eine umfassende Militärreform der irakischen Streitkräfte sowie Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung der militärischen Integration.

Petersen, N. Abandonment vs. Entrapment: Denmark and Military Integration in Europe 1948-1951. Cooperation and Conflict, XXI, 1986, 169-186. The article analyses Danish attitudes towards NATO integration in the early years of the alliance in a perspective derived from alliance theory. In particular, Glenn Snyder's hypotheses on the motivations which drive the 'alliance game', i.e. intra-alliance relations, are utilized in analysing the Danish Government's reaction to the US proposal of September 1950 to create a joint, integrated force including German contingents for the defence of Western Europe. It is shown that both fears of 'entrapment' in the alliance and fears of 'abandonment' by the Allies played a significant role in the deliberations of Danish decision-makers, but that the fear of abandonment or, expressed positively, the demand for security outweighed both fears of losing freedom of action and fears of a German rearmament. The article highlights especially the role which Denmark's practically undefended border to the south played in the formulation of security policy in the 1950s.

This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan's integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan's security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.

This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan's integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan's security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.