Suchergebnisse

The precedents of military interventional decisions by Western countries in the Middle East have been an uneasy topic with vague, long-term strategic objectives and increased questionable attitudes among domestic audiences. This article questions whether these precedents require an updated methodological approach. The aim of this article is to adopt a poliheuristic methodology as an analytic instrument for examining military intervention precedents in the Middle East. This article suggests an analytical solution based on a poliheuristic research methodology, previously defined by Alex Mintz and applied in foreign policy research. This article highlights the need to adopt the methodology to military interventional decisions with an inclusion of additional decision dimensions. The first part of the article reveals a synthesis of the theoretical notions of neoclassical realism. These notions are correlated with the elements of poliheuristic methodology. This path of analysis, applied to theoretical notions and the adopted poliheuristic methodology, reveals additional variables that have a transdimensional role in the military intervention decision process. The following are the variables that influence the cognitive and rational elements of the poliheuristic methodology: the competing dominance of normative or operational ideas, interventional experience and shifting notions of strategic culture. The final part of the article offers an empirical study that illustrates how the suggested poliheuristic methodology is to be applied. The case pays attention to the decision of Barack Obama's administration in 2013 to not escalate its military intervention into the Syrian conflict. Considerations of the Syrian case are also correlated to the previous multinational military campaign in Libya.

The precedents of military interventional decisions by Western countries in the Middle East have been an uneasy topic with vague, long-term strategic objectives and increased questionable attitudes among domestic audiences. This article questions whether these precedents require an updated methodological approach. The aim of this article is to adopt a poliheuristic methodology as an analytic instrument for examining military intervention precedents in the Middle East. This article suggests an analytical solution based on a poliheuristic research methodology, previously defined by Alex Mintz and applied in foreign policy research. This article highlights the need to adopt the methodology to military interventional decisions with an inclusion of additional decision dimensions. The first part of the article reveals a synthesis of the theoretical notions of neoclassical realism. These notions are correlated with the elements of poliheuristic methodology. This path of analysis, applied to theoretical notions and the adopted poliheuristic methodology, reveals additional variables that have a transdimensional role in the military intervention decision process. The following are the variables that influence the cognitive and rational elements of the poliheuristic methodology: the competing dominance of normative or operational ideas, interventional experience and shifting notions of strategic culture. The final part of the article offers an empirical study that illustrates how the suggested poliheuristic methodology is to be applied. The case pays attention to the decision of Barack Obama's administration in 2013 to not escalate its military intervention into the Syrian conflict. Considerations of the Syrian case are also correlated to the previous multinational military campaign in Libya.

The precedents of military interventional decisions by Western countries in the Middle East have been an uneasy topic with vague, long-term strategic objectives and increased questionable attitudes among domestic audiences. This article questions whether these precedents require an updated methodological approach. The aim of this article is to adopt a poliheuristic methodology as an analytic instrument for examining military intervention precedents in the Middle East. This article suggests an analytical solution based on a poliheuristic research methodology, previously defined by Alex Mintz and applied in foreign policy research. This article highlights the need to adopt the methodology to military interventional decisions with an inclusion of additional decision dimensions. The first part of the article reveals a synthesis of the theoretical notions of neoclassical realism. These notions are correlated with the elements of poliheuristic methodology. This path of analysis, applied to theoretical notions and the adopted poliheuristic methodology, reveals additional variables that have a transdimensional role in the military intervention decision process. The following are the variables that influence the cognitive and rational elements of the poliheuristic methodology: the competing dominance of normative or operational ideas, interventional experience and shifting notions of strategic culture. The final part of the article offers an empirical study that illustrates how the suggested poliheuristic methodology is to be applied. The case pays attention to the decision of Barack Obama's administration in 2013 to not escalate its military intervention into the Syrian conflict. Considerations of the Syrian case are also correlated to the previous multinational military campaign in Libya.

The precedents of military interventional decisions by Western countries in the Middle East have been an uneasy topic with vague, long-term strategic objectives and increased questionable attitudes among domestic audiences. This article questions whether these precedents require an updated methodological approach. The aim of this article is to adopt a poliheuristic methodology as an analytic instrument for examining military intervention precedents in the Middle East. This article suggests an analytical solution based on a poliheuristic research methodology, previously defined by Alex Mintz and applied in foreign policy research. This article highlights the need to adopt the methodology to military interventional decisions with an inclusion of additional decision dimensions. The first part of the article reveals a synthesis of the theoretical notions of neoclassical realism. These notions are correlated with the elements of poliheuristic methodology. This path of analysis, applied to theoretical notions and the adopted poliheuristic methodology, reveals additional variables that have a transdimensional role in the military intervention decision process. The following are the variables that influence the cognitive and rational elements of the poliheuristic methodology: the competing dominance of normative or operational ideas, interventional experience and shifting notions of strategic culture. The final part of the article offers an empirical study that illustrates how the suggested poliheuristic methodology is to be applied. The case pays attention to the decision of Barack Obama's administration in 2013 to not escalate its military intervention into the Syrian conflict. Considerations of the Syrian case are also correlated to the previous multinational military campaign in Libya.

This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.

This final project explained relevant theories of Economic Security in order to construct a definition State Economic Security consistent with modern academic literature and understandings. For this project State Economic Security is defined the protection of a given national economy from sudden intentional non-military disruptions to its economy caused by a foreign state or nonstate actor for the purposes of influencing the target state's policy'. Lithuania's State Economic Security is primarily shaped by state-to-state tensions between the Lithuanian government and the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent Belarus and China. Threats to Lithuanian State Economic Security include proportional and scare resource and proportionally asymmetrical trading relationships, foreign ownership of key infrastructure and financial sectors. The article then compared Lithuanian State Economic Security with 23 other Similarly Situated States. Similarly Situated States are democratic states with a population greater than one million which have a tense political relationship with at least one close treading partner. The comparison found that three distinct groups of Similarly Situated States exist, the first group is most similar to Lithuania and consists of post-Soviet democracies which have political tensions with Russia. The second group is comprised of states which have tensions with China due to sovereignty or human rights issues. States in this group are found exclusively in Asia and Oceania. A third final group consists of States which have proprietary political tensions with various states and Latin American stats which Tense Trading relationships stemming from Pan-American regional political disputes. Lithuania has the highest per capita GDP in the Post-Soviet Democracies group and is near the ranks near the median of all tree groups on most other socio-economic indicators. The paper finally compared Lithuania with the other countries using quantitative composite State Economic Security resilience indicators in addition to the country specific State Economic Security situation in three of the states. The quantitative review found that Lithuania scores near the median of State Economic Security resilience indicators and is has the second highest level of latent state economic resilience in the first group, scoring slightly behind Estonia. The country specific review compared the circumstances in Lithuania to those in South Korea, Taiwan and Georgia. Section revealed that individual and regional circumstances enhance Lithuanian State Economic Security in comparison to the other 22 countries. The review also showed that Lithuanian State has economic conflicts more significant trading partners than any of the other countries reviewed.

This final project explained relevant theories of Economic Security in order to construct a definition State Economic Security consistent with modern academic literature and understandings. For this project State Economic Security is defined the protection of a given national economy from sudden intentional non-military disruptions to its economy caused by a foreign state or nonstate actor for the purposes of influencing the target state's policy'. Lithuania's State Economic Security is primarily shaped by state-to-state tensions between the Lithuanian government and the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent Belarus and China. Threats to Lithuanian State Economic Security include proportional and scare resource and proportionally asymmetrical trading relationships, foreign ownership of key infrastructure and financial sectors. The article then compared Lithuanian State Economic Security with 23 other Similarly Situated States. Similarly Situated States are democratic states with a population greater than one million which have a tense political relationship with at least one close treading partner. The comparison found that three distinct groups of Similarly Situated States exist, the first group is most similar to Lithuania and consists of post-Soviet democracies which have political tensions with Russia. The second group is comprised of states which have tensions with China due to sovereignty or human rights issues. States in this group are found exclusively in Asia and Oceania. A third final group consists of States which have proprietary political tensions with various states and Latin American stats which Tense Trading relationships stemming from Pan-American regional political disputes. Lithuania has the highest per capita GDP in the Post-Soviet Democracies group and is near the ranks near the median of all tree groups on most other socio-economic indicators. The paper finally compared Lithuania with the other countries using quantitative composite State Economic Security resilience indicators in addition to the country specific State Economic Security situation in three of the states. The quantitative review found that Lithuania scores near the median of State Economic Security resilience indicators and is has the second highest level of latent state economic resilience in the first group, scoring slightly behind Estonia. The country specific review compared the circumstances in Lithuania to those in South Korea, Taiwan and Georgia. Section revealed that individual and regional circumstances enhance Lithuanian State Economic Security in comparison to the other 22 countries. The review also showed that Lithuanian State has economic conflicts more significant trading partners than any of the other countries reviewed.

This final project explained relevant theories of Economic Security in order to construct a definition State Economic Security consistent with modern academic literature and understandings. For this project State Economic Security is defined the protection of a given national economy from sudden intentional non-military disruptions to its economy caused by a foreign state or nonstate actor for the purposes of influencing the target state's policy'. Lithuania's State Economic Security is primarily shaped by state-to-state tensions between the Lithuanian government and the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent Belarus and China. Threats to Lithuanian State Economic Security include proportional and scare resource and proportionally asymmetrical trading relationships, foreign ownership of key infrastructure and financial sectors. The article then compared Lithuanian State Economic Security with 23 other Similarly Situated States. Similarly Situated States are democratic states with a population greater than one million which have a tense political relationship with at least one close treading partner. The comparison found that three distinct groups of Similarly Situated States exist, the first group is most similar to Lithuania and consists of post-Soviet democracies which have political tensions with Russia. The second group is comprised of states which have tensions with China due to sovereignty or human rights issues. States in this group are found exclusively in Asia and Oceania. A third final group consists of States which have proprietary political tensions with various states and Latin American stats which Tense Trading relationships stemming from Pan-American regional political disputes. Lithuania has the highest per capita GDP in the Post-Soviet Democracies group and is near the ranks near the median of all tree groups on most other socio-economic indicators. The paper finally compared Lithuania with the other countries using quantitative composite State Economic Security resilience indicators in addition to the country specific State Economic Security situation in three of the states. The quantitative review found that Lithuania scores near the median of State Economic Security resilience indicators and is has the second highest level of latent state economic resilience in the first group, scoring slightly behind Estonia. The country specific review compared the circumstances in Lithuania to those in South Korea, Taiwan and Georgia. Section revealed that individual and regional circumstances enhance Lithuanian State Economic Security in comparison to the other 22 countries. The review also showed that Lithuanian State has economic conflicts more significant trading partners than any of the other countries reviewed.

This final project explained relevant theories of Economic Security in order to construct a definition State Economic Security consistent with modern academic literature and understandings. For this project State Economic Security is defined the protection of a given national economy from sudden intentional non-military disruptions to its economy caused by a foreign state or nonstate actor for the purposes of influencing the target state's policy'. Lithuania's State Economic Security is primarily shaped by state-to-state tensions between the Lithuanian government and the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent Belarus and China. Threats to Lithuanian State Economic Security include proportional and scare resource and proportionally asymmetrical trading relationships, foreign ownership of key infrastructure and financial sectors. The article then compared Lithuanian State Economic Security with 23 other Similarly Situated States. Similarly Situated States are democratic states with a population greater than one million which have a tense political relationship with at least one close treading partner. The comparison found that three distinct groups of Similarly Situated States exist, the first group is most similar to Lithuania and consists of post-Soviet democracies which have political tensions with Russia. The second group is comprised of states which have tensions with China due to sovereignty or human rights issues. States in this group are found exclusively in Asia and Oceania. A third final group consists of States which have proprietary political tensions with various states and Latin American stats which Tense Trading relationships stemming from Pan-American regional political disputes. Lithuania has the highest per capita GDP in the Post-Soviet Democracies group and is near the ranks near the median of all tree groups on most other socio-economic indicators. The paper finally compared Lithuania with the other countries using quantitative composite State Economic Security resilience indicators in addition to the country specific State Economic Security situation in three of the states. The quantitative review found that Lithuania scores near the median of State Economic Security resilience indicators and is has the second highest level of latent state economic resilience in the first group, scoring slightly behind Estonia. The country specific review compared the circumstances in Lithuania to those in South Korea, Taiwan and Georgia. Section revealed that individual and regional circumstances enhance Lithuanian State Economic Security in comparison to the other 22 countries. The review also showed that Lithuanian State has economic conflicts more significant trading partners than any of the other countries reviewed.

In this paper the prospects of Afghanistan's democratization are examined in context of previous U.S. attempts to democratize foreign countries by means of military interventions. Thus the object of this paper is not only the process of Afghanistan's democratization, but also the examination of precedent cases, it's outcomes and inner, as well as outer factors that possibly led to these outcomes. These factors are ethnic homogeneity of democratized state's society, concentration and civil control of coercion, modern economy and developed middle-class, homogeneity of democratizing country's politics towards the process, as well as the nature of process itself – is whole community is chosen as "target" of democratization process, or just it's ruling elite. Comparative analysis of these factors in previous cases allowed to create a framework for a case study of Aghanistan's democratization's prospects. This case study leads to conclusion that prospects of Afghanistan's democratization are at best vague. To add, these conclusions can only be considered as provisory: as comparative analysis of precedent cases revealed, no clear pattern, enabling to predict democratization attempt's success or failure, can be drawn. We cannot state firmly, that country, where democratic institutions and procedures are installed, will become a consolidated democracy. Equally, there is no absolute evidence, that country with poor economic achievements, with weak middle-class, with other theoretically significant factors unfavorable, has no chance for democracy. Hence, if international community, involved in Afghanistan's democratization process, accepts the costs of this initiative, it should carry on.

In this paper the prospects of Afghanistan's democratization are examined in context of previous U.S. attempts to democratize foreign countries by means of military interventions. Thus the object of this paper is not only the process of Afghanistan's democratization, but also the examination of precedent cases, it's outcomes and inner, as well as outer factors that possibly led to these outcomes. These factors are ethnic homogeneity of democratized state's society, concentration and civil control of coercion, modern economy and developed middle-class, homogeneity of democratizing country's politics towards the process, as well as the nature of process itself – is whole community is chosen as "target" of democratization process, or just it's ruling elite. Comparative analysis of these factors in previous cases allowed to create a framework for a case study of Aghanistan's democratization's prospects. This case study leads to conclusion that prospects of Afghanistan's democratization are at best vague. To add, these conclusions can only be considered as provisory: as comparative analysis of precedent cases revealed, no clear pattern, enabling to predict democratization attempt's success or failure, can be drawn. We cannot state firmly, that country, where democratic institutions and procedures are installed, will become a consolidated democracy. Equally, there is no absolute evidence, that country with poor economic achievements, with weak middle-class, with other theoretically significant factors unfavorable, has no chance for democracy. Hence, if international community, involved in Afghanistan's democratization process, accepts the costs of this initiative, it should carry on.

The paper deals with democratization of Iraq which was started to implement by the United States and its allies in March, 2003. The military operation was designed to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, overthrow the authoritarian regime of S. Hussein and install democratic institutions. Neoconservatives who were the authors and advocates of the idea of democratic Iraq believed that with the start in Iraq democracy gradually will spill over to the whole Middle East. And this process would guarantee the security of the United States and the whole world what is its' national interest. Although Iraq has conducted free and fair elections and has established the main democratic institutions, today five years since the outset of the operation it is still not considered a stable democratic country. So the discrepancy between the factual and institutional democracy in Iraq is the main problem of this paper. This problem raises the principal research question: what causes the failure of democratization in Iraq? So according to the theoretical-methodological research concept the main question sounds as such: where the advocates of the intervention in Iraq have made the crucial mistake: whether the democratization of Iraq is theoretically impossible (ideological analysis level), maybe the failure of the project was determined by unsuitable democratization methods (especially the quick democratization) or maybe the misfortune lies in the domestic features of Iraq (practical analysis level). So the research method is the case study and the object – democracy in Iraq in institutional and social level. The analysis is divided into two levels: ideological and practical. The ideological level involves the analysis of neoconservatism (to reveal the genesis of the democratization idea) and the overview of the Muslim societies' political experience and their attitude to the principles of democracy (to answer the question, whether Iraq democratization is theoretically possible). Practical level involves the investigation of the process of political system transformation, the evaluation of the current situation and the analysis whether and why Iraq matches the consolidated democracy criteria indicated by J. Linz and A. Stepan and suits the democratization conditions indicated by S. M. Lipset. This will help to find out what determines the failure of democracy in Iraq. The analysis of intervention in Iraq and its' democratization process is quite a popular field of academic research and publications nowadays. Despite this, it should be noticed that the majority of investigations concentrates on the practical analysis of coalition forces actions and concrete problems of Iraq usually in order to give recommendations to G. W. Bush administration. This paper looks at the issue differently – from the perspective of democratization theories. Thus, the investigation results revealed that the failure to install a stable democratic political system in Iraq lies in practical level. The process is blocked by the domestic features of the country (it is fractured, antagonistic, based on "primordial allegiances", has no national leaders, no future visions and overall is not prepared to govern itself independently) and unsuitable democratization methods (the process was initiated and conducted by foreign powers, without an adequate plan and preparation of the society). So the simple installation of democratic institutions does not guarantee a stable democracy. Whereas the ideological level (the influence of Islam) was not the main force which complicated the democratization, because Muslim societies in principle could live in states which are ruled by democratically. Moreover, according to the research results, the democratization of Iraq as the main reason for military intervention is also questionable. So other reasons for intervention which were not officially declared by US could be the topic of further studies.

The paper deals with democratization of Iraq which was started to implement by the United States and its allies in March, 2003. The military operation was designed to find and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, overthrow the authoritarian regime of S. Hussein and install democratic institutions. Neoconservatives who were the authors and advocates of the idea of democratic Iraq believed that with the start in Iraq democracy gradually will spill over to the whole Middle East. And this process would guarantee the security of the United States and the whole world what is its' national interest. Although Iraq has conducted free and fair elections and has established the main democratic institutions, today five years since the outset of the operation it is still not considered a stable democratic country. So the discrepancy between the factual and institutional democracy in Iraq is the main problem of this paper. This problem raises the principal research question: what causes the failure of democratization in Iraq? So according to the theoretical-methodological research concept the main question sounds as such: where the advocates of the intervention in Iraq have made the crucial mistake: whether the democratization of Iraq is theoretically impossible (ideological analysis level), maybe the failure of the project was determined by unsuitable democratization methods (especially the quick democratization) or maybe the misfortune lies in the domestic features of Iraq (practical analysis level). So the research method is the case study and the object – democracy in Iraq in institutional and social level. The analysis is divided into two levels: ideological and practical. The ideological level involves the analysis of neoconservatism (to reveal the genesis of the democratization idea) and the overview of the Muslim societies' political experience and their attitude to the principles of democracy (to answer the question, whether Iraq democratization is theoretically possible). Practical level involves the investigation of the process of political system transformation, the evaluation of the current situation and the analysis whether and why Iraq matches the consolidated democracy criteria indicated by J. Linz and A. Stepan and suits the democratization conditions indicated by S. M. Lipset. This will help to find out what determines the failure of democracy in Iraq. The analysis of intervention in Iraq and its' democratization process is quite a popular field of academic research and publications nowadays. Despite this, it should be noticed that the majority of investigations concentrates on the practical analysis of coalition forces actions and concrete problems of Iraq usually in order to give recommendations to G. W. Bush administration. This paper looks at the issue differently – from the perspective of democratization theories. Thus, the investigation results revealed that the failure to install a stable democratic political system in Iraq lies in practical level. The process is blocked by the domestic features of the country (it is fractured, antagonistic, based on "primordial allegiances", has no national leaders, no future visions and overall is not prepared to govern itself independently) and unsuitable democratization methods (the process was initiated and conducted by foreign powers, without an adequate plan and preparation of the society). So the simple installation of democratic institutions does not guarantee a stable democracy. Whereas the ideological level (the influence of Islam) was not the main force which complicated the democratization, because Muslim societies in principle could live in states which are ruled by democratically. Moreover, according to the research results, the democratization of Iraq as the main reason for military intervention is also questionable. So other reasons for intervention which were not officially declared by US could be the topic of further studies.

The Italian foreign policy is the topic of the present research; more precisely, the policies pursued in relation to the Libyan crisis of the year 2011. The most recent events taking place in the African country bring along the necessity of shedding a new light on the role of the Western state that most interests had to defend in Libya, and that is still very much concerned by the latter situation at a time when a new possible military intervention is considered. The object of the research is the Italian foreign policy considered from the beginning of the Libyan crises in 2011, namely from when protests against the government started in Benghazi and clashes with the police took place in mid February, until the end of the NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya on October 31 of that same year, following the death of Col. Gaddafi and the defeat of the loyalist forces. The goal of the research is to identify the Italian postures and their consistency with its actual behaviour during the Libyan crisis, evaluating if the Italian foreign policy has been capable of serving the national interest. The tasks of the research are to justify the choice of the neorealist theoretical framework introducing the main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and their relations with the Libyan case, to assess the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the year 2010, to trace the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the crisis understanding the rational behind the Italian formal positioning, to check it against the actual Italian actions along the crisis, and to assess the results achieved. Document analysis is the research method employed, and the results indicate that Italy displayed a negligent management of the crisis since non-linearity, inconsistency and ineffectiveness were recurrent features to be found in its behaviour, sided by a lack of understanding of the overall Libyan situation. The Italian stances and actions were taken into account through a neorealist theoretical framework. The conclusion of the work is that the Italian foreign policy in relation to the Libyan crisis of 2011 have showed strong signs of non-linearity and inconsistency during the last phase of the crisis, and that the results achieved can not be considered satisfactory in any of the two phases, whilst in both of them an important lack of knowledge on key elements related to the issue has been displayed.

The Italian foreign policy is the topic of the present research; more precisely, the policies pursued in relation to the Libyan crisis of the year 2011. The most recent events taking place in the African country bring along the necessity of shedding a new light on the role of the Western state that most interests had to defend in Libya, and that is still very much concerned by the latter situation at a time when a new possible military intervention is considered. The object of the research is the Italian foreign policy considered from the beginning of the Libyan crises in 2011, namely from when protests against the government started in Benghazi and clashes with the police took place in mid February, until the end of the NATO mission Operation Unified Protector in Libya on October 31 of that same year, following the death of Col. Gaddafi and the defeat of the loyalist forces. The goal of the research is to identify the Italian postures and their consistency with its actual behaviour during the Libyan crisis, evaluating if the Italian foreign policy has been capable of serving the national interest. The tasks of the research are to justify the choice of the neorealist theoretical framework introducing the main vectors of Italian foreign policy from 1945 to the present and their relations with the Libyan case, to assess the status of the relations between Italy and Libya at the end of the year 2010, to trace the Italian diplomatic and political rhetoric related to the crisis understanding the rational behind the Italian formal positioning, to check it against the actual Italian actions along the crisis, and to assess the results achieved. Document analysis is the research method employed, and the results indicate that Italy displayed a negligent management of the crisis since non-linearity, inconsistency and ineffectiveness were recurrent features to be found in its behaviour, sided by a lack of understanding of the overall Libyan situation. The Italian stances and actions were taken into account through a neorealist theoretical framework. The conclusion of the work is that the Italian foreign policy in relation to the Libyan crisis of 2011 have showed strong signs of non-linearity and inconsistency during the last phase of the crisis, and that the results achieved can not be considered satisfactory in any of the two phases, whilst in both of them an important lack of knowledge on key elements related to the issue has been displayed.