US Military Intervention and Presidential Communication Frames
In: The journal of politics: JOP
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Routledge frontiers of criminal justice
This book provides an analysis of how penal discourses are used to legitimate post-Cold War military interventions through three main case studies: Kosovo, Iraq and Libya. These cases reveal the operation of diverse modalities of punishment in extending the ambit of international liberal governance. The argument starts from an analysis of these discourses to trace the historical arc in which military interventions have increasingly been launched through reference to both the human rights discourse and humanitarian sentiments, and a desire to punish the perpetrators. The book continues with the analysis of practices involved in the post-intervention phase, looking at the ways in which states have been established as modes of governance (Kosovo), how punitive atmospheres have animated soldiers' violence in the conduct of war (Iraq), and finally how interventions can expand moral control and a system of devolved surveillance in conjunction with both border control and the engagement of the International Criminal Court (Libya). In all these case, tensions and ambiguities emerge. These practices underscore how punitive intents were also present in the expansion of liberal governance, demonstrating how the rhetoric of punishment was useful in legitimating Western state powers and recomposing the borders of the liberal world at the periphery. War as Protection and Punishment ends with a number of critical comments on the diffusion of punitive discourse in the international arena, considering how issues of crime and justice have also animated, at least in part, the current engagement with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
In: Studies in critical social sciences volume 276
In: New scholarship in political economy volume 27
"In Class, Capital, State, and Late Development: The Political Economy of Military Interventions in Turkey, Gönenç Uysal discusses state-military-society relations in Turkey from the late Ottoman era to today by exploring state-class-capital relations under the dynamics of uneven development. Uysal approaches Turkey as a late-developing social formation characterised by unevenness and dependency, arising from the contradictions of capitalist relations of production and integration with the world capitalist system. By drawing upon historical materialism/Marxism, Uysal offers a critical/radical understanding of (re)organisation of the state and military interventions in politics in peripheries of global capitalism"--
"This book applies a systematic framework to explain the course, aftermath, and long-term lessons of the of the US intervention in Iraq. The work follows the rise and fall of violence and progress in building a new Iraq state across the 2003-2023 period. There are four sections. The first outlines an approach able to breakdown the basic components of complex, violent, internal conflicts. The second applies that framework to the period of US military occupation and presence, 2003-2011. The third examines the period after US withdrawal specifying the legacy of US military intervention, addressing the rapid takeover and slow defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq, and explaining the continued power of militias and the persistence of a weak Iraqi state. The fourth section concludes with general lessons gleaned from the Iraq experience, a consideration of political and cultural forces constraining US policymakers from learning those lessons, and informed speculation on the nature of future American military interventions"--
World Affairs Online
SSRN
In: African studies series 166
"Based on extensive empirical research, Katharina P.W. Döring analyses the politics surrounding military deployments in the Sahel since 2012 and stresses the agency of regional organizations in African-led military interventions. Drawing on insights from critical geography, she considers the role that space plays in the power dynamics of the region"--
In: Journal of Asian and African studies: JAAS
ISSN: 1745-2538
From antiquity to the present, states considered military intervention to be one of their tools for pursuing foreign policy objectives. The primary objective of this study is to investigate why Ethiopia's and Kenya's military interventions that used military intervention as their foreign policy largely failed to achieve their intervention objectives. The article used a single case study (the invasion of neighbors into Somalia territory) based on process tracing methodology, which seeks to explain why Ethiopia's and Kenya's interventions have largely failed (or been partially successful) in achieving the proclaimed goals. The article uses the "good enough" approach to analyze the operational outcomes of military incursions into Somalia by Kenya and Ethiopia. The study concludes that the intended goals were only partially achieved based on the findings. Due to inadequate pre-intervention planning, the presence of an intervening coalition, and strained historical ties between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia's intervention was mainly ineffective. In contrast, Kenya's weak pre-intervention planning, domestic circumstances, diplomatic crisis, and rivalry among regional powers have all contributed to the country's interventions' major failure. Thus, the results of the operations in Ethiopia and Kenya show that using military force alone as an instrument of foreign policy was ineffective; it needed to be combined with diplomacy and other means.
In: Forthcoming in International Studies Quarterly
SSRN
In: India quarterly: a journal of international affairs
ISSN: 0975-2684
In the history of politics, states have viewed military intervention as one of their tools of foreign policy. However, many scholars have not agreed on the effectiveness of military means in achieving the foreign policy objectives of states. Like other states, Ethiopia and Kenya have used the military as a means of foreign policy and tested their tools in Somalia practically. However, the effectiveness of their foreign policy tool has not been studied. That is why this article's main objective is to analyse the effectiveness of Ethiopian and Kenyan foreign policies that used military interventions to achieve their foreign policy goals in terms of outcomes. In doing so, the article used a comparative case study methodology. Besides, the 'good enough' approach is the proper theoretical lens that is used in this article to comprehend Ethiopia's and Kenya's operational outcomes. The analysis comes to the conclusion that both Kenya's and Ethiopia's military deployments in Somalia generally failed to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Accordingly, the findings reveal that using hard power as a tool of foreign policy without combining soft power is largely unsuccessful, as indicated by Ethiopia's and Kenya's military engagement in Somalia.
In: Romanian Journal of Military Medicine, Band 127, Heft 3, S. 211-221
ISSN: 2501-2312
The assessment of coping mechanisms in patients diagnosed with oncological diseases is essential for mental health
specialists, who have to design the most appropriate case management strategy for comorbid mood disorders, anxiety disorders,
adjustment disorders, and other psychiatric conditions that may be detected in this vulnerable population. The adequate
treatment of these disorders is important for the preservation of mental health status, quality of life, and overall functionality in
patients diagnosed with cancer. Coping mechanisms modulate the vulnerability toward psychiatric disorders, but they also have
an impact on treatment adherence, which is an important factor correlating with prognosis. Appraisal-focused, problem-focused,
emotion-focused, and occupation-focused coping represent the most well-defined strategies patients use when confronted with
a stressful life situation, like a diagnosis with potentially vital consequences. Maladaptive coping strategies may also be identified
in these patients, e.g., withdrawal from reality, including complete or partial denial of the disease, substance abuse, behavioral
addictions, refusal of the recommended treatment, etc. The psychotherapeutic approach in patients with oncological diseases
should include an initial evaluation of the coping strategies used either currently or in the past stressful conditions, an assessment
of all the psychosocial resources the patients have (e.,g., support group, professional insertion, hobbies), and screening for mood
and anxiety disorders that may have been triggered by the cancer diagnosis. Consequently, within the psychotherapeutic
framework, a trained specialist can enhance the role of adaptive coping strategies and highlight the disadvantages of
dysfunctional ones. This process may possess a favorable impact on treatment adherence, mental health status, and quality of
life in patients with cancer.
In: Millennium: journal of international studies
ISSN: 1477-9021
The paper examines human agency in the production and transformation of global security assemblages. A situated conception of human agency is elaborated theoretically through the reincorporation of key concepts from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's original oeuvre, such as 'bodies' 'desire' and 'affect'. Through this Deleuzoguattarian assemblage framework it becomes possible to distinguish between human/non-human and active/reactive forms of agency, while not losing sight of how human actions invariably take place within broader structures of signification. To showcase the utility and analytical potential of this approach, the paper returns to a paradigmatic case of global security cooperation in recent times: the military intervention in Libya of 2011. Through the assemblage framework advocated it is illustrated how the agency of the governments of the United Kingdom, France and the United States is crucial for making connections with other bodies in the production of a Libyan humanitarian intervention assemblage, and later bringing about its transformation into a Libyan regime change assemblage. More than this, it becomes possible to grasp how in fact both these processes form part of a single Western-led biopolitical-geopolitical strategy. The paper concludes by emphasising the political and ethical significance of an appreciation of human agency in global security assemblages.
In: Journal of Military, Veteran and Family Health: JMVFH
ISSN: 2368-7924
LAY SUMMARY This qualitative study explored the experiences of older U.S. women Veterans regarding their experiences and perceptions of their time in military service and its overall impact on their lives. Five women Veterans participated in interviews that were analyzed and resulted in four main themes: 1) family military history, 2) being treated differently and proving themselves, 3) making the most of opportunities, and 4) lasting personal strengths. Findings from this study highlight how, despite enduring negative experiences during military service because of gender, participants credited the military with having an overall positive impact on their lives in the long term. This study suggests that health care interventions and services that tap into positive aspects of military service, as identified by older women Veterans (i.e., personal strengths such as resilience and pride), may have the potential to promote the health and well-being of this population.
In: Journal of democracy, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 93-107
ISSN: 1086-3214
Abstract: The recent coups in Africa do not portend a return to praetorian politics in the region. They are the outcomes of country-specific historical processes associated with the underdevelopment of state capacity, the decay of political institutions, and the failures of electoral politics to improve citizens' material conditions. At the same time, the coups are an important warning regarding the state of democracy in Africa. Surveys show that majorities of Africans harbor both a deep dissatisfaction with democracy and an openness to military interventions to address civilian political dysfunction. While coup contagion is a remote possibility due to strong norms against military rule in much of the region, popular dissatisfaction with democracy and permissiveness towards military interventions in politics present a real risk of autocratization through elections.
In: Politics and governance, Band 12
ISSN: 2183-2463
Focusing on Wagner Group (WG) forces, liberal interveners too readily dismiss the scope of WG's Africa engagements, including economic and political "flows" that, in combination, challenge liberal interveners' taken-for-granted access in several states on the African continent. Operationalising the notion of "flows," we present an analysis that foregrounds both the scope of WG's Africa engagements and the challenges. We portray WG as a broad enterprise by attending to military, economic, and political flows. This broadening is relevant to how WG is understood to challenge liberal interveners. Besides country-specific challenges to liberal interveners' access (notably in states where they have been asked to depart or co-exist with WG), a broader reading of WG's Africa presence also foregrounds challenges at a different level, namely to liberal interveners' assumptions about the inevitable attractiveness of the liberal international order. A liberal order that Russia has utilised WG's Africa presence to contest. As such, challenges at the level of liberal order go beyond WG's Africa presence and must, therefore, be viewed alongside other challenges to liberal intervention and order, from the Taliban's takeover of Kabul to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. If liberal interveners' missteps and historicity, as well as the scope of WG's Africa engagements, remain underappreciated, then various challenges specific to the WG, but also broader challenges to liberal interveners' assumptions about liberal order as self-evidently attractive, are too readily dismissed. Liberal actors' dismissiveness may invite misguided responses and unintentionally become an enabling factor for WG's influence in Africa.
Blog: Responsible Statecraft
Ties between big finance and the weapons industry are not new. The first venture capital firm in the U.S. was founded to profit from new technologies developed for use in WWII, and the role of military spending in turning Silicon Valley into a tech hub is well documented.But today's biggest VC titans are making transformative investments in military technology that pose serious consequences far beyond another hype-driven tech bubble. Weaponizing their financial assets to expand the production of war material will not only divert technological resources away from other critical domestic priorities, but also forge novel devices of warfare that will generate demand for battlefield testing grounds both at home and abroad. But before the defense tech evangelists can resurrect the age of American global supremacy, they must transform the way the Pentagon does business. This involves seducing Pentagon planners with exotic promises ranging from "attritable autonomous systems" (or swarm) technology to subscription models for weapons systems — not because these fit some strategic framework but because they align with the VC business model. Venture capital and private equity is about making limited investments in mobile assets (technologies, engineers) to get a startup to the IPO stage (or trim the fat from an existing operator) and cash out. This is at odds with a military industrial complex that boasts millions of employees and a handful of oligopolistic firms with billions of dollars of permanent infrastructure, huge up-front costs, long time horizons, and extremely complex procurement processes. The fingerprints of VC priorities are everywhere: from the Pentagon's Office of Strategic Capital and the Small Business Investment Company/SBIC initiative to the Defense Innovation Board, a collection of Silicon Valley scions elevated to a permanent department under the Secretary of Defense in October 2023. Typically, the Pentagon acquires technologies or equipment through private contracts with a company or by supplying grants to provide funds for research and development. The new Office of Strategic Capital, established in December 2022, lets the Pentagon behave less like a public agency and more like a VC investor. It was in this new spirit that Silicon Valley investors in March 2023 lobbied the Pentagon to bail out Silicon Valley Bank (where many of them had hundreds of millions deposited) by claiming that they would be damaged (thereby losing the Pentagon critical capabilities) if they weren't rescued. Deploying the argument that a run on SVB would be a "national security risk," the Pentagon and its supporters advocated for federal government intervention, according to The Intercept, and the Treasury Department ultimately interceded to bail out SVB on March 12, protecting investors.*The financial services sector is likewise providing innovative products to facilitate the expansion of VC-backed defense tech in Pentagon contracting. One example is Leonid Bank, which is an invoice factoring company that basically lends to defense tech startups based on the DOD invoices that those startups have for future projects, to provide them with more money (over and above the contract value) which is not something that has ever existed for Pentagon contracts. Much of the VC discourse emphasizes the benefits of reforming the procurement system to acquire more "commercial" off-the-shelf items not custom built just for the Pentagon. This transformation is marketed as a way of matching the production methods of global adversaries, because development is faster and cheaper; if there are venture investors and other funds involved then the government is footing less of the upfront bill. However, if the success of the product and the firm that develops it is dependent on the widespread adoption of that technology commercially this will introduce a new range of militarized technologies into a global system that is already awash with lethal tech, dystopian surveillance products, and an ideology that depicts weapons production as the primary avenue to innovation, economic growth, decent industrial jobs, and infrastructure spending. The stated desire of venture capital (and the increasing number of private equity funds focused on military tech) is to disrupt an industry they see as monopolistic, inefficient, and too close to government bureaucracy. This rationale is easy to understand, as the path to innovation for the prime contractors has for decades been external: find small firms developing marginally improved technologies or hardware parts, acquire them and integrate their products into existing large weapons platforms. The financial industry – VC firms, asset managers, PE fund managers – have observed (correctly) that if they can find the small tech firms first (or fund them into existence) then the potential profits are enormous. VCs also identify startups working on civilian technologies and steer them toward developing military applications. Startups working on technologies to improve navigation in driverless vehicles may find that after a new round of investment their objective is to apply those technologies to weapons targeting systems. Individual engineers working on civilian tech are also being lured away by the promise of better funding and broader impact from defense investors. If startups want to see their technologies advance they're much more likely to find the necessary funding if they pivot to military applications. Venture capitalists are eagerly supplying geostrategic justifications and policy blueprints to the Pentagon on how to reshape its contracting ecosystem to facilitate this shift. An example from one of the most well-known VC funds, Andreesen Horowitz, focuses on the promise of "attritable" warfare – specifically a model of warfare that uses technology to develop cheaper, simpler weapons in large quantities. One example of this style of warfare is the Pentagon's "Replicator" initiative to develop drone swarm capabilities — basically the capacity to field literally thousands (maybe tens of thousands) of drones simultaneously. And this is "attritable" because each individual drone unit is cheap and simple to deploy, so that the moment it's knocked out of the sky it's already been replaced by two more. But this requires an enormous amount of coding, and constant re-coding and re-writing which is not necessarily a capability that exists in the big primes. Predictably, the response from major think tanks (whose primary funders are the primes) is that these kinds of initiatives are "crowding out" the focus on "long-range precision fire programs" — which is code for the huge range of super expensive fighter jets and missile systems that are the bread and butter of firms like Lockheed and Northrop Grumman. So VC firms like Andreesen Horowitz kindly offer guidance for this transition: "As general computing platforms become applicable to a host of defense applications, from programming autonomous behavior to conducting live targeting analysis, sweeping advances in software and other technologies not originally designed for defense have unintentionally compounded computing's impact on war…..Responding to the paradigm shift requires reengineering the Pentagon's DNA for a new era." [author's italics] The AH authors emphasize that this reengineering will allow for a "reduction in operational complexity, driving lower costs through commoditization" with "smaller" "modular modern production" that uses "'just-in-time' manufacturing techniques like 3D printing to cut latency" allowing for "decentralizing a military's industrial footprint."This reads a lot like outsourcing the military industrial supply chain, which may sound revolutionary. But the huge weapons platforms in use by the U.S. military already incorporate parts and materials from all over the world, including a lot of stuff from China. So this modification is more about transforming production so VC-backed firms have an entry point into production chains currently dominated by the primes.To achieve this, Andreesen Horowitz advocates what they call "Broad and open API standards" that would presumably enable startups to propose the use of cheaper/more widely-available materials and technology for incorporation into the expensive platforms built by the primes. This would mean that some material the primes consider proprietary would have to be opened up to tinkering. Not to be outdone, the primes are putting their own pressure on the Pentagon to counter the challenge from VC-backed startups. Their latest efforts focus on speeding up and expanding the scope for foreign military sales by allowing overseas customers to purchase research and development services to design new weapons. And they're pushing for other modifications that would turbocharge technology transfer and joint ventures to help lock-in future exports.In the battle between the primes and the VC-backed tech firms to expand the U.S. arsenal, the Pentagon is ill-equipped to responsibly navigate the competing interests, least of all since its senior members are routinely bought off with (entirely legal) sinecures. It's a battle with a sadly predictable outcome, because no matter which side wins, we all will pay the cost. Editor's Note: The story has been edited to accurately reflect the timeline of when and how defense tech investors lobbied the Pentagon for SVB bailout in March 2023.