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In the preceding sections of this essay, I have outlined a dialectical procedure whereby a doubting mind might be led to the recognition of moral truth. What has been given is the bare plot of a conversation between teacher and student. The student was, at the beginning, a skeptic about moral matters, denying the objectivity of moral knowledge, supposing that all moral judgments were a matter of opinion, entirely relative to the individual or to his cultural location at a given time and place. The teacher, by asking him to explain the undeniable fact that men exercise preference, gradually made him realize that his own criteria for preference — pleasure and quantity of pleasure — had a certain universal validity; and then, as a result of seeing the inadequacy of these criteria, the student began to understand that happiness, rather than pleasure, was the ultimate principle of moral judgments. The crucial steps in the argument were: (1) the distinction between pleasure as one among many objects of desire and pleasure as the satisfaction of any desire; (2) the enumeration of the variety of goods which are objects of human desire; (3) the point that only the totality of goods could completely satisfy desire; (4) the realization that this totality of goods, leaving nothing to be desired, is the end of all our seeking, and that everything else is sought for the sake of its attainment; (5) the conception of happiness as "all good things," a whole constituted by every type of good, the complete good being the end, the incomplete good its parts or constitutive means; (6) the conclusion that the end, as the first principle in the practical order, is the ultimate criterion of preference, for preferor choice is exercised only with respect to means, and hence we should, in every case, prefer whatever is more conducive to the attainment of happiness.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1-The "Burkean" Outlook and the Problem of Reality -- 2-Aesthetics, Ethics, and Politics -- 3-Reason, Emotion, Knowledge, and Morality -- 4-Characteristics of a Moral Imagination -- 5-Moral Imagination and Public Policy -- 6-Burke and the Good -- Conclusion-Politics, the Moral Imagination, and Burke -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

In St. Thomas and the Gentiles I tried to define the obligations of perennial philosophy in the twentieth century. Philosophy may be perennial, but its work changes according to the cultural conditions in which the philosopher lives and thinks. In its Greek beginnings, philosophy arose out of the dialectical efforts of Plato and Aristotle to clarify and order the welter of opinion. They struggled not only with the sophists to divide the line between knowledge and opinion; but they also moved in the realm of opinion to distinguish the true from the false; and, in their patient consideration of pre-Socratic thought, they both tried, though differently, to convert right opinion into knowledge by making it evident to reason. Although the result of their work was the establishment of philosophy as a body of knowledge, founded on principles and developed by demonstrations, we must not forget that, in their day, the mode of their work was primarily dialectical. In saying this I do not overlook the demonstrative or scientific achievements of Plato and Aristotle; but those must be regarded a secondary, for the first work of pioneers is to stake out the land, to clear away the brush, to prepare the soil, and to dig for firm foundations Only thereafter can a city be planned, buildings raised, and interiors decorated The Platonic dialogues certainly reveal an intellectual pioneer at work; but no less do the so-called "scientific" works of Aristotle, for they are primarily records of exploration and discovery. Rather than orderly expositions of accomplished knowledge, they are, not only in their opening chapters but throughout, dialectical engagement with adversaries, wrestlings with the half-truths of error and opinion in order to set the whole truth forth.

With this is bound: Bacon, Francis. Essays, moral, economical, and political. Boston, 1831. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I -- 1. Exchanging While Not-Knowing -- 2. The Moral Economies of Conversion -- Part II -- Introduction: Some Political and Historical Context -- 3. When Culture Is Not a System -- 4. Legislating Families as Cultural -- 5. Constructing Choice, Compelling Culture -- Conclusion -- References -- Index.

Handwritten diary kept by Brooks Hays ; of the world for peace – with the yearning of the Mother that her son should not die on the field of battle. Bryan says if this compact is not accepted another similar provision for peach with similar Machinery – L of N [League of Nations] is an intimate evolution. Pres. [President] discussing treaty with Foreign relations committee. Moral force and legal force distinguished between. No legal force in international

If Sophocles were alive today to recast the dilemma of Antigone in contemporary, if less sanguine, terms, he might well seize on the problem of the citizen who refuses to answer questions put to him by a congressional investigating committee. Antigone, you will recall, was torn between two loyalties. Her religion commanded her to bury the body of her brother, while her state commanded that his body be left, unburied and unmourned, to be eaten by dogs and vultures on the open plain outside the city walls. As a loyal citizen, Antigone was required to yield her conscience to the state, to guide her conduct not by her rational moral knowledge but by the precepts of the law. As a person bound to her kin by the dictates of her religion, she was required to subordinate the instructions of Creon the king to those of her faith. She chose to obey her conscience and paid the penalty. Socrates, who—according to a traditional interpretation of the Crito—would doubtless have counseled otherwise, was also executed by the state. Thoreau, who at a critical moment followed what has scornfully been termed "the primitive attitude of Antigone, rather than the mature comprehension of Socrates," found that refusal to obey a law resulted not in loss of life but in temporary loss of physical freedom.

Handwritten diary kept by Brooks Hays ; [illegible] alone – world is ready to back the ideals of democracy. Japan wants foothold in that rich province. What we need is another Yuan Shai Kai [Shikai] ? Its [sic] like the spirit of Y S K [Yuan Shikai] to call upon the world for their moral support. Kia Chow would have gone to China if Japan had not interpoa [illegible]. Our people have not yet had the opportunity to have the open forum. Shantung is home of the boxers – home of

Front cover -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter One: Criminal Regime, its Subjects, and Collective Crime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Challenge of the Disturbing Past -- 3 Regime and its Subjects: Regime Crime andCollective Crime -- 3.1 REGIME CRIMES -- 3.2 COLLECTIVE CRIMES -- 3.2.1 The preparation of collective crime -- 3.2.2 Criminal action -- 3.2.3 Approving outcomes of crime -- Chapter Two: Politics of Silence and Denial -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Transitional Justice or Just the Transition? Politics of Silence -- 2.1 GENERAL ARGUMENT: VULNERABILITY OF DEMOCRACY -- 2.2 SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS -- 2.2.1 Political reconciliation in the name of protecting the genuine common identity -- 2.2.2 Injustice -- 2.2.3 Unmasterable burden -- 3 "We did Nothing Wrong": Politics of Denial -- 4 A Summary -- Chapter Three: Culture, Knowledge, and Collective Crime: Reading Relativism -- 1 Introduction: Crime-specific Culture -- 2 Moral Relativism as a Philosophical Argument -- 3 Blaming Culture for Moral Confusion? -- 3.1 COLLECTIVE CRIME AS A NORMATIVE PRACTICE -- 3.2 INABILITY THESIS -- 3.2.1 Supporting inability thesis: psychology of obedience to authority -- 3.2.2 Supporting inability thesis: on the political production of culture -- 4 The Inability Thesis as the Authenticity Thesis: on "Broken Thermometers," "Genuine Beliefs," and Mass Crimes -- 4.1 RICHARD ARNESON ON MORAL INEQUALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY -- 4.2 MICHAEL ZIMMERMAN AND THE DEBATE ON "EXCUSING THE INEXCUSABLE" -- 5 Gilbert Harman on the Non-moral Character of Extreme Intentions -- Chapter Four: Moral Responsibility for Collective Crime -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Conceptualizing Moral Responsibility -- 2.1 A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION -- 2.2 RESPONSIBILITY AS A RELATIONSHIP -- 3 Social Groups -- 3.1 THE CHALLENGE OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM.

The ethical value of Hellenism.--The influence of philosophy on Greek political life.--The alleged socialism of the prophets.--The higher criticism and the supernatural.--Pascal's wager.--Buckle and the economics of knowledge.--The morals of an immoralist.--Friedrich Nietzsche.--What is agnosticism?--Index. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The second partof the Summa Theologica of the "Universal Doctor," Thomas Aquinas, begins with the following sentence: Because man has been created in God's image, now after having spoken of God, the archetype, we must still deal with His image which is man. (Summa Theologica I, II, Prologus.) There is something peculiar about this sentence; its meaning must not be misunderstood. It is stated as a matter of fact but its meaning is not to be taken for granted. This first sentence of Moral Theology expresses a fact which has almost entirely disappeared from the knowledge of Christians of today; namely, die fact that moral doctrine is primarily and above all a doctrine about man; that moral doctrine must plainly reveal the conception of man, and that, therefore, the doctrine of Christian morals must concern the Christian model of man. This fact was a matter of course in' the Christianity of the high Middle Ages. This fundamental conception—which, to be sure, was not definitely taken for granted as the polemical wording shows—compelled Eckhart to say two generations after St. Thomas: people should not think about what they ought to do, they should rather think about what they ought to be.

In this classic analysis, Leo Strauss pinpoints what is original and innovative in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. He argues that Hobbes's ideas arose not from tradition or science but from his own deep knowledge and experience of human nature. Tracing the development of Hobbes's moral doctrine from his early writings to his major work The Leviathan, Strauss explains contradictions in the body of Hobbes's work and discovers startling connections between Hobbes and the thought of Plato, Thucydides, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hegel.

Classification is regarded by some as a very elementary and a very barren scientific device or method. For those who attach most importance to applied science, and to the achievement of practical ends, classification seems a dry and futile procedure. For those likewise who insist upon the importance of moral standards and purposes, the brutally empirical inductive process of classification seems inhuman, possibly even anti-social.That classification is an elementary task of science, in the sense of occurring early in the whole scientific process, no one could deny, albeit only some one who has had immediate and serious experience in classification can appreciate the advanced problems, both of theory and of application, which can be encountered therein. From the point of view of human interest, something would depend upon what is being classified, whether pearls or potatoes, for example, although it would seem to be an implied tenet of pure science that no knowledge of the universe is without value and that we are not able to say beforehand how important a given piece of knowledge will turn out to be.

To discuss the influence of one type of economic activity such as transportation on economic growth is a hazardous undertaking. There is the obvious temptation, which has led many astray, to magnify the importance of that which is particularized. Such a characterization as "Transportation a Measure of Civilization" or the assertion that the railway "is a revolution among nations … [a] moral revolution … affecting the diffusion of knowledge, the interchange of social relations, the perpetuation of peace, the extension of commerce; and a revolution in all the relations of property," is hardly impartial or balanced with respect to the whole picture of economic activity. A prime objective of this paper is to avoid the dominant parochial note in appraisals of transportation's contributions to economic growth and to present instead thoroughly critical analysis.

Many books have been written on Mennonite history, but these deal largely with the religious aspect of their life. The purpose of this thesis is to present the social, moral, economic and political aspects of their migrations and life, not only of their early centuries, but of the present time. Only enough of the religious element will be presented to give a general modern knowledge of their religious beliefs which in turn influence their life in general. Particularly will it be stressed how these people have influenced the history of Kansas. This thesis was written for the purpose of preserving early Kansas history, and I was granted that subject because of my personal acquaintances with many of the early Mennonite settlers making it possible to present sketches of their intimate life that probably a stranger would not have been able to secure.