In a time when conservative politicians challenge the irrefutability of scientific findings such as climate change, it is more important than ever to understand the conflict at the heart of the "religion vs. science" debates unfolding in the public sphere. In this groundbreaking work, John H. Evans reveals that, with a few limited exceptions, even the most conservative religious Americans accept science's ability to make factual claims about the world. However, many religious people take issue with the morality implicitly promoted by some forms of science. Using clear and engaging scholarship, Evans upends the prevailing notion that there is a fundamental conflict over the way that scientists and religious people make claims about nature and argues that only by properly understanding moral conflict between contemporary religion and science will we be able to contribute to a more productive interaction between these two great institutions.
Cultivating reason and civility as a moral priority requires our attention as world alliances promoting peace, security, and human dignity are breaking down revealing the often immoral underbelly of nations and of national leaders. Our world has grown closer together due to modern technology, and, in a way, further apart, as a diversity of values is spread unevenly within nations and throughout the world. Seeking common or shared values, especially moral values, is needed, requiring political and personal transparency, but remains in short supply. Experience has shown that the assumptions we bring to moral discourse are often undisclosed causing confusion and often the collapsing of open dialogue. We learn from E.A. Burtt (1965, 28 ff.) that presuppositions are the given – the intuitively given – we present to reality that in turn modify reality and become reality itself. And we tend to shape our moral views, perhaps unaware of their cultural origins, by our own cultural genealogy. Presuppositions as culture are the "there" that is "there" but not-yet fully or intentionally realized or openly stated. We know about these presuppositions through the language of discourse and argument, but ever so often they remain hidden and protected so as not to reveal their intended consequences.Our assumptions about value have a motivational quality pushing us to discover the causal links that complete the theory our presuppositions entail. This dynamic relativity calls for discussion – a dialectic of conversation – for agreement and consistency to be sustained. When we transfer this conversation to morals and ethics we notice that the suppositions we bring to the table when answering the question "Why should I be moral?" often determine the answers we give. Thus, if we are truly interested in locating our shared values, transparency is required. As we know, hidden motives – of individuals and nations – more often than not corrupt the search for ethical and moral comity.
Artiklen analyserer erkendelsesteoretiske og etiske forpligtelser i Wikipedias Neutral Point of View (NPOV) politik. Analyserne afslører revner i NPOV politikkens konceptuelle fundament i forhold til begreber som mening, fakta, viden, sikkerhed, tvivl, og kognitiv autoritet. Ydermere diskuterer artiklen NPOV politikkens etiske position som antagende en absolutistisk kerne og etisk relativisme ved kanterne. Artiklen konkluderer, at Wikipedia burde genkonceptualisere og omskrive NPOV politikken og erkende, at videns lokalitet er væsentligt, at de sprogspil Wikipedianere er en del af er væsentlige, at viden er som en rhizom med inkommensurable punkter, at udfordringerne ved inklusion ligger i kernen og ikke ved kanterne, og eksplicit tage en etisk pluralistisk position i sit foretagende.
In this paper we assume that innovation requires transmission of information. The content of the transmitted information currently is subject to legal regulation, typically intellectual property, where the agents and the requirement of a needed consent hinder free transmission. To solve this problem, two type of solutions are being implemented: first through legal code and second through computer code. These solutions, rooted on ethical foundations, have political consequences and determine the kind of society we can build using the transmitted knowledge. ; En el presente trabajo se parte de que la innovación requiere transmisión de información. En la actualidad, el contenido de la transmisión de información se halla sometido a una regulación legal, habitualmente la propiedad intelectual, donde los agentes intervinientes y su requisito de sistema de permisos dificultan la transmisión libre. Para solucionar esta problemática, se están promoviendo dos tipos de soluciones: el primero mediante código legal y el segundo mediante código informático. Estas soluciones, que se fundamentan en razones morales, tienen consecuencias políticas y determinan el modelo de sociedad que podemos construir mediante el conocimiento transmitido.
This article agrees with recent arguments suggesting that normative and epistemic power is rife within global health policy and provides further examples of such. However, in doing so, it is argued that it is equally important to recognize that global health is, and always will be, deeply political and that some form of power is not only necessary for the system to advance, but also to try and control the ways in which power within that system operates. In this regard, a better focus on health politics can both expose illegitimate sources of power, but also provide better recommendations to facilitate deliberations that can, although imperfectly, help legitimate sources of influence and power.
This thesis aims to discuss Thomas Reid's (1710-1796) theory of the first principles of knowledge, more particularly, the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. In the first chapter, I discuss Reid's foundationalist commitments in philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I argue that he is clearly a foundationalist about speculative and moral knowledge, but it is not clear if he keeps foundationalist commitments with regard to political knowledge – the first principles of politics are not self-evident beliefs: they are not justified from the start and, therefore, they do not have what is needed for being basic beliefs in a foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. In the second chapter, I discuss Reid's understanding of the sources of speculative, moral and political knowledge, namely, common sense and knowledge of mankind. I argue that while philosophy of mind and morals are based upon the first principles of common sense – immediate and irresistible beliefs due to the original constitution of mind, politics is based upon first principles of the knowledge of mankind – beliefs that are due to a mixture of the sagacity and the experience of the political scientist who lives among other human beings in a political society. In the third chapter, I try to explain Reid's comprehension on the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I try to explain what a first principle of knowledge is, how to understand the distinction between the principles of contingent and necessary truths and what the means we have to identify the first principles of knowledge are. The fourth and last chapter is entirely dedicated to common sense. More particularly, I discuss how Reid defends the first principles of common sense from the skeptical attack. ; Cette dissertation rend compte de la théorie des premiers principes de la connaissance de Thomas Reid (1710-1796), plus particulièrement, de la théorie des premiers principes de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. ...
While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people's moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement.
Much of the debate between theorists of deliberative democracy has centered on forms of discourse and the role that reason should play. But philosophers have been unable to explain the transformative power attributed to deliberation. I argue that we ought to look to recent studies of moral psychology, which illuminate the moralizing mechanisms brought into play by deliberation. In deliberations by small groups empathic cues, as well as direct and semantically mediated associations between the social situations of oneself and others, produce moral cognition, and broaden awareness of morally salient features of the policies and issues under discussion. Narrations in diverse groups can enhance moral perception, cue empathic reactions, and provide powerful tools for organizing moral knowledge, in contrast to more confrontational forms of discourse, such as direct argumentation. The moral psychology at work in diverse and small groups of deliberators suggests that the institutionalization of deliberative forums could produce a more representative government and achieve morally better politics and policies.
Much of the debate between theorists of deliberative democracy has centered on forms of discourse and the role that reason should play. But philosophers have been unable to explain the transformative power attributed to deliberation. I argue that we ought to look to recent studies of moral psychology, which illuminate the moralizing mechanisms brought into play by deliberation. In deliberations by small groups empathic cues, as well as direct and semantically mediated associations between the social situations of oneself and others, produce moral cognition, and broaden awareness of morally salient features of the policies and issues under discussion. Narrations in diverse groups can enhance moral perception, cue empathic reactions, and provide powerful tools for organizing moral knowledge, in contrast to more confrontational forms of discourse, such as direct argumentation. The moral psychology at work in diverse and small groups of deliberators suggests that the institutionalization of deliberative forums could produce a more representative government and achieve morally better politics and policies.
This thesis aims to discuss Thomas Reid's (1710-1796) theory of the first principles of knowledge, more particularly, the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. In the first chapter, I discuss Reid's foundationalist commitments in philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I argue that he is clearly a foundationalist about speculative and moral knowledge, but it is not clear if he keeps foundationalist commitments with regard to political knowledge – the first principles of politics are not self-evident beliefs: they are not justified from the start and, therefore, they do not have what is needed for being basic beliefs in a foundationalist view of the structure of knowledge. In the second chapter, I discuss Reid's understanding of the sources of speculative, moral and political knowledge, namely, common sense and knowledge of mankind. I argue that while philosophy of mind and morals are based upon the first principles of common sense – immediate and irresistible beliefs due to the original constitution of mind, politics is based upon first principles of the knowledge of mankind – beliefs that are due to a mixture of the sagacity and the experience of the political scientist who lives among other human beings in a political society. In the third chapter, I try to explain Reid's comprehension on the first principles of philosophy of mind, morals and politics. I try to explain what a first principle of knowledge is, how to understand the distinction between the principles of contingent and necessary truths and what the means we have to identify the first principles of knowledge are. The fourth and last chapter is entirely dedicated to common sense. More particularly, I discuss how Reid defends the first principles of common sense from the skeptical attack. ; Cette dissertation rend compte de la théorie des premiers principes de la connaissance de Thomas Reid (1710-1796), plus particulièrement, de la théorie des premiers principes de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Dans le premier chapitre, je discute des engagements fondationnalistes de Reid dans la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Je soutiens qu'il est clairement un fondationnaliste en ce qui concerne la connaissance spéculative et morale, mais qu'il n'est pas clair qu'il conserve les engagements fondationnalistes en matière de savoir politique - les premiers principes de la politique ne sont pas des croyances évidentes en soi : ils ne sont pas justifiés depuis le début de la recherche. Par conséquent, ils n'ont pas ce qu'il faut pour être une croyance fondamentale dans une vision fondationnaliste de la structure de la connaissance. Dans le deuxième chapitre, je discute la compréhension de Reid des sources de la connaissance, à savoir, le sens commun et la connaissance de l'humanité. Je soutiens que si la philosophie de l'esprit et de la morale repose sur les premiers principes du sens commun (croyances immédiates et irrésistibles dues à la constitution originelle de l'esprit), la politique repose sur les premiers principes de la connaissance de l'humanité (croyances dues à un mélange de la sagacité et de l'expérience du philosophe politique qui vit parmi les êtres humains dans une société politique). Dans le troisième chapitre, j'essaie d'expliquer la compréhension de Reid des premiers principes de la philosophie de l'esprit, de la morale et de la politique. Je m'efforce de répondre à ces questions : Qu'est-ce qu'un principe premier de la connaissance ? Comment expliquer la distinction entre les principes des vérités contingentes et les principes des vérités nécessaires ? Quelles sont les moyens que nous avons pour identifier les premiers principes de la connaissance ? Le quatrième et dernier chapitre est entièrement consacré à la discussion du sens commun. Plus particulièrement, je discute la manière dont Reid défend les premiers principes du sens commun contre l'attaque sceptique.
The Museo Migrante (MuMi) is a travelling pop-up exhibition constructed by and for indigenous communities in Chiapas, Mexico, in collaboration with the locally based NGO Voces Mesoamericanas. MuMi is designed to make visible the complex roots and consequences of domestic as well as international migration by revealing the stories of those who move—and of those who can, or do not. Its interventions aim not only to inform but also to examine the processes and material culture of knowledge and memory construction—both collective and individual—and to invite reflection on identity, dignity, rights, and freedom. In addition to its function as a tool for political education, we explain how the naming and operation of MuMi further interrupts popular, nationalist ideas about 'the museum', including whose voices, images, art, and ideas 'belong' within it. In contrast with the calcifying framing of Mexico's Museo Nacional de Antropología, in which indigenous peoples and cultures are consigned to a distant past, MuMi presents images, texts, objects, and creative activities that are continuously reshaped and reinterpreted as it travels between locations, facilitating conversations across and within communities that consider pasts, presents, and possible futures. Throughout the chapter, we guide readers to engage in a series of activities that visitors might encounter at MuMi. In doing so, we demonstrate how interaction, affect, and personal reflection can not only highlight the lived realities of (im)mobility, but may also open spaces for forms of knowledge production that challenge the dominant narratives of the modern nation-state.
Background: Ageing population, high levels of sick leave among eldercare personnel and financial constraints on municipal budgets impact eldercare. Daily care work is complex and ethical dilemmas are constantly present for eldercare personnel. This project aims to a) identify situations that give rise to moral stress, b) study the relationship between moral stress and moral agency c) explore how moral agency can be fostered in eldercare. The argument underpinning this research project is that ethical dilemmas in the work cause moral stress among staff in eldercare. While much research on moral stress highlights the connection between moral stress and negative effects on health and wellbeing, our focus is on the possible connection between moral stress and moral agency. Moral agency encompasses cognitive capacity, feelings, skills, and actions. Methods/Design: This project has a systemic approach to eldercare and interprets eldercare as an advanced system where a range of different skills is required. Participatory action research (PAR) will be used as an overall methodology. Focus-groups and research circles will be conducted with care workers, first line manages and needs assessors. Discussion: An ongoing discussion on relevant knowledge production in research, stresses the importance of participation. This is expressed by concepts such as deliberative democracy, user participation, empowerment, collaboration, follow-up research and citizen dialogue. In our research project we refer to robust knowledge as relevant knowledge that is valid in the eyes of care workers, care municipal needs assessors and first line managers. As the research is performed in collaboration with these three vocational groups, local politicians, and trade unions in three municipalities as well as two educational settings, different sorts of knowledge will be present. This unique stand will show how moral agency, as a response to moral stress, can be the ground for social changes and improve quality of care.
Jeremy Shiffman's editorial appropriately calls on making all forms of power more apparent and accountable, notably productive power derived from expertise and claims to moral authority. This commentary argues that relationships based on productive power can be especially difficult to reveal in global health policy because of embedded notions about the nature of power and politics. Yet, it is essential to recognize that global health is shot through with power relationships, that they can take many forms, and that their explicit acknowledgement should be part of, rather than factored out of, any reform of global health governance.
In the last few years, parallel evolutionary processes in the socio-political, governmental and technological arenas have been providing new pathways for the collaborative generation, coordination and distribution of polycentric information. From a technological perspective, the proliferation of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has boosted the availability of information about our planet, along with its storage, processing and dissemination capabilities. The Worldwide Web and satellite and electronic sensors combined with smart phone technologies have also opened new means for social, political and scientific innovation. From a socio-political standpoint, the implementation of policies that encourage the reutilisation of data and protect the right to information of interested parties, together with growing social demands for transparency, have resulted in an increasing number of governments drawing strategies to open up public data. In this context, this paper addresses two main topics that we deem will be key drivers for improved water governance in the near future. First, it discusses new practices of collaborative and distributed generation and disclosure of information for water governance, and the resulting challenges and opportunities afforded by the use of ICTs. Second, it looks at the interplay between the uptake of ICTs and institutional frameworks, social dynamics and technological structures within which they operate to understand the extent to which ICTs affect decision-making processes and contribute to creating alternative spaces for the production of common services or alternative discourses. Despite the advances in open data policies, findings suggest that there remain significant challenges to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by ICTs, mostly derived from the structural conditions of existing models of decision-making, and information generation and management. It seems that the potentialities of ICTs as transformative tools are conditioned by the regeneration of the context within which decisions are made, that is, the democratic process itself.
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.