'A gadding passion': envy and the role of 'civil and moral' knowledge in Francis Bacon's political thought
In: History of European ideas, Band 49, Heft 6, S. 909-925
ISSN: 0191-6599
In: History of European ideas, Band 49, Heft 6, S. 909-925
ISSN: 0191-6599
In: New problems of philosophy
ch. 1. Moral epistemology : content and method -- ch. 2. Moral disagreement -- ch. 3. Moral nihilism -- ch. 4. The skeptic and the intuitionist -- ch. 5. Deductive moral knowledge -- ch. 6. Abuctive moral knowledge -- ch. 7. The reliability of our moral judgments -- ch. 8. Epilogue : challenges to moral epistemology.
In a time when conservative politicians challenge the irrefutability of scientific findings such as climate change, it is more important than ever to understand the conflict at the heart of the "religion vs. science" debates unfolding in the public sphere. In this groundbreaking work, John H. Evans reveals that, with a few limited exceptions, even the most conservative religious Americans accept science's ability to make factual claims about the world. However, many religious people take issue with the morality implicitly promoted by some forms of science. Using clear and engaging scholarship, Evans upends the prevailing notion that there is a fundamental conflict over the way that scientists and religious people make claims about nature and argues that only by properly understanding moral conflict between contemporary religion and science will we be able to contribute to a more productive interaction between these two great institutions.
In a time when conservative politicians challenge the irrefutability of scientific findings such as climate change, it is more important than ever to understand the conflict at the heart of the "religion vs. science" debates unfolding in the public sphere. In this groundbreaking work, John H. Evans reveals that, with a few limited exceptions, even the most conservative religious Americans accept science's ability to make factual claims about the world. However, many religious people take issue with the morality implicitly promoted by some forms of science. Using clear and engaging scholarship, Evans upends the prevailing notion that there is a fundamental conflict over the way that scientists and religious people make claims about nature and argues that only by properly understanding moral conflict between contemporary religion and science will we be able to contribute to a more productive interaction between these two great institutions.
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In: Oxford scholarship online
This volume presents two closely related essays by Thomas Nagel: 'Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge' discusses the value of intuitions in understanding human rights and argues against subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality of the kind offered by evolutionary psychology or based on brain scans. The second essay, 'Moral Reality and Moral Progress', proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments. The result is that only some advances in moral knowledge are discoveries of what has been true all along.
"This book consists of two essays that are related to each other: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge" and "Moral Reality and Moral Progress." The longer second essay has not been previously published. Both are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments"--
Cultivating reason and civility as a moral priority requires our attention as world alliances promoting peace, security, and human dignity are breaking down revealing the often immoral underbelly of nations and of national leaders. Our world has grown closer together due to modern technology, and, in a way, further apart, as a diversity of values is spread unevenly within nations and throughout the world. Seeking common or shared values, especially moral values, is needed, requiring political and personal transparency, but remains in short supply. Experience has shown that the assumptions we bring to moral discourse are often undisclosed causing confusion and often the collapsing of open dialogue. We learn from E.A. Burtt (1965, 28 ff.) that presuppositions are the given – the intuitively given – we present to reality that in turn modify reality and become reality itself. And we tend to shape our moral views, perhaps unaware of their cultural origins, by our own cultural genealogy. Presuppositions as culture are the "there" that is "there" but not-yet fully or intentionally realized or openly stated. We know about these presuppositions through the language of discourse and argument, but ever so often they remain hidden and protected so as not to reveal their intended consequences.Our assumptions about value have a motivational quality pushing us to discover the causal links that complete the theory our presuppositions entail. This dynamic relativity calls for discussion – a dialectic of conversation – for agreement and consistency to be sustained. When we transfer this conversation to morals and ethics we notice that the suppositions we bring to the table when answering the question "Why should I be moral?" often determine the answers we give. Thus, if we are truly interested in locating our shared values, transparency is required. As we know, hidden motives – of individuals and nations – more often than not corrupt the search for ethical and moral comity.
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Artiklen analyserer erkendelsesteoretiske og etiske forpligtelser i Wikipedias Neutral Point of View (NPOV) politik. Analyserne afslører revner i NPOV politikkens konceptuelle fundament i forhold til begreber som mening, fakta, viden, sikkerhed, tvivl, og kognitiv autoritet. Ydermere diskuterer artiklen NPOV politikkens etiske position som antagende en absolutistisk kerne og etisk relativisme ved kanterne. Artiklen konkluderer, at Wikipedia burde genkonceptualisere og omskrive NPOV politikken og erkende, at videns lokalitet er væsentligt, at de sprogspil Wikipedianere er en del af er væsentlige, at viden er som en rhizom med inkommensurable punkter, at udfordringerne ved inklusion ligger i kernen og ikke ved kanterne, og eksplicit tage en etisk pluralistisk position i sit foretagende.
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Introduction / Gualtiero Lorini and Robert B. Louden -- Part I. Sources and Influences in Kant's Definition of the Knowledge Concerning the Human Being : Elucidations of the Sources of Kant's Anthropology / Holly L. Wilson -- Anthropology--A Legacy from Wolff to Kant? / Jean-François Goubet -- Anthropology from a Logical Point of View: The Role of Inner Sense from Jungius to Kant / Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero -- The Rules for Knowing the Human Being: Baumgarten's Presence in Kant's Anthropology / Gualtiero Lorini -- Kant on the Vocation and Formation of the Human Being / Ansgar Lyssy -- Part II. The Peculiatrities of Anthropological Knowledge in Kant: Metaphysics, Morals, Psychology, Politics : The Moral Dimensions of Kant's Anthropology / Robert B. Louden -- "Ein Spiel der Sinnlichkeit, durch den Verstand geordnet." Kant's Concept of Poetry and the Anthropological Revolution of Human Imagination / Fernando M. F. Silva -- Somatology: Notes on a Residual Science in Kant and the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries / Francesco Valerio Tommasi -- Controlling Mental Disorder: Kant's Account of Mental Illness in the Anthropology Writings / Nuria Sánchez Madrid -- Index
The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions.
This volume draws together Richard Joyce's work from the last decade on moral skepticism, the view that there is no such thing as moral knowledge. Joyce's radical view is that in making moral judgments speakers attempt to state truths but that the world isn't furnished with the properties and relations necessary to render such judgments true
The author presents a new philosophical theory according to which we need intuitions and emotions in order to have objective moral knowledge, which is called affectual intuitionism. Affectual Intuitionism combines ethical intuitionism with a cognitive theory of emotions
Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong.' Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual's reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about 'oughts' and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest.