Suchergebnisse

Hutcheson and Kant / Dieter Henrich -- The theory of obligation in Wolff, Baumgarten, and the early Kant / Clemens Schwaiger -- What is the purpose of a metaphysics of morals? Some observations on the preface to the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals / Ludwig Siep -- The transition from common rational moral knowledge to philosophical rational moral knowledge in the Groundwork / Dieter Schönecker -- Reason practical in its own right / Gerold Prauss -- Kant's justification of the role of maxims in ethics / Michael Albrecht -- The form of the maxim as the determining ground of the will : The critique of practical reason : SS4-6, 27-30 / Otfried Höffe -- 'On the concept of an object of pure practical reason' : chapter 2 of the analytic of practical reason / Annemarie Pieper -- The dialectic of pure practical reason in the Second critique (CPrR:107-121) / Eckart Förster -- The postulates of pure practical reason : CPrR:122-148 / Friedo Ricken -- On how to acquire something external, and especially on the right to things : a commentary on the Metaphysics of morals SS10-17 / Kristian Kühl -- 'The civil constitution in every state shall be a republican one' / Wolfgang Kersting -- Commentary on Kant's treatment of constitutional right : Metaphysics of morals II : general remark A; SS51-52, conclusion, appendix / Bernd Ludwig -- Refusing sovereign power : the relation between philosophy and politics in the modern age / Volker Gerhardt.

"Widespread disagreement about moral issues is a prominent aspect of contemporary pluralistic societies. Surveys indicate that in the United States opinion is split close to 50/50 on the morality of abortion, the death penalty, same-sex relationships, and physician-assisted suicide. It is also a subject with a long philosophical history, going back to Plato and Aristotle and drives contemporary debates about moral relativism, scepticism and objectivity. Should we be concerned about the extent of moral disagreement? What causes it? What are the onsequence of moral disagreement? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of moral disagreement and its philosophical and political implications Richard Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: Relativism and moral disagreement Moral realism Peer disagreement, moral knowledge and the problem of conciliationism Non-cognitivism and moral disagreement Moral uncertainty Moral disagreement and coercion New directions. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics and political philosophy as well as philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism, scepticism and objectivity. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as political philosophy, ethics and public policy and philosophy of law"

In this paper we assume that innovation requires transmission of information. The content of the transmitted information currently is subject to legal regulation, typically intellectual property, where the agents and the requirement of a needed consent hinder free transmission. To solve this problem, two type of solutions are being implemented: first through legal code and second through computer code. These solutions, rooted on ethical foundations, have political consequences and determine the kind of society we can build using the transmitted knowledge. ; En el presente trabajo se parte de que la innovación requiere transmisión de información. En la actualidad, el contenido de la transmisión de información se halla sometido a una regulación legal, habitualmente la propiedad intelectual, donde los agentes intervinientes y su requisito de sistema de permisos dificultan la transmisión libre. Para solucionar esta problemática, se están promoviendo dos tipos de soluciones: el primero mediante código legal y el segundo mediante código informático. Estas soluciones, que se fundamentan en razones morales, tienen consecuencias políticas y determinan el modelo de sociedad que podemos construir mediante el conocimiento transmitido.

This book develops a unified theory of moral progress. The author argues that there are mechanisms in place that consistently drive societies towards moral improvement and that a sophisticated, naturalistically respectable form of teleology can be defended.

The book's main aim is to flesh out the process of moral progress in more detail, and to show how, when the right mechanisms and institutions of moral progress are matched together, they create pressure for the desired types of moral gains to manifest. The first part of the book deals with two issues: the conceptual one about what moral progress is, and the broadly empirical one whether it is possible. It shows that cultural evolution successfully explains the origins of modern forms of morally welcome change. The second part argues that there is logical space for a moderate, scientifically credible form of teleology, and that the converse case for moral decline is weak. It addresses the types, drivers, and institutions of moral progress that allow for the storage, transmission, and cumulative improvement of our normative infrastructure over time. Finally, the third part demonstrates why moral progress cannot be accounted for in metaethically realist terms.

Moral Teleology will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in ethics, moral epistemology, and moral psychology.

"By explicitly addressing moral knowledge from a particularists perspective, this book can engage with an established and vibrant area of moral philosophy whilst making a distinctive and productive contribution to a relatively neglected dimension of it"--

While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important – reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people's moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement.

Feminists, especially radical feminists, have reason to be dissatisfied with contemporary moral theory, but they are understandably reluctant to abandon the theoretical project until it is seen as unsalvageable. The problem is not, however, as Margaret Urban Walker claims, that theory is abstract, that it seeks to guide conduct, or that it postulates moral knowledge. The problem is that contemporary moral theory is foundational.