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This article examines long-standing debates in moral philosophy that are relevant to international human rights law. It discusses the political conception of human rights and the four challenges to moral philosophy which include the notion that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human rights and the belief that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the scope of human rights. This article also highlights the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of contemporary human rights and explains that the traditions of natural rights theories still influence contemporary human rights language in profound ways

This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.

The seemingly inexhaustible debate over the proper role of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication concerns an issue of enormous practical importance: whether the Court has or should have the power to overturn the decision of a democratically elected legislature to, say, prohibit abortions, affects not only the allocation of significant political power, but also the moral lives and indeed the very bodies of millions of citizens. For this reason, many contributions to that debate, from academics as well as from practicing politicians, have burned with the passion of political commitment, seeking to influence events directly by persuading judges (or those who might have power to constrain them) to adopt particular policies. Michael Perry's The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights is not such a book. I don't mean that Perry lacks political commitment, or does not sincerely wish that the courts would adopt the program he proposes. But both his substantive conclusions and his writing style suggest not only that the book is not directly addressed to an audience of judges and legislators, but also that his project is fundamentally detached from what political institutions actually do. Perry brings to his book a thoughtful intelligence and a comprehensive knowledge of the academic literature on the questions he addresses, and he has much to say that is interesting and valuable. But I think that few will find his conclusions satisfying as a program for the Supreme Court to follow.

In this article, I investigate how we may include investigations of actual context in the investigation of moral problems in philosophy. The article has three main parts. The focus of the first is a survey of the dominant view of how to incorporate context into moral philosophy and to exemplify this view, I investigate examples from influential introductions to moral philosophy, identifying what I call the assumption of abstraction. In the second part I present three traditions which attribute a more prominent place to context in philosophical work and which therefore offer resources for thinking about context: moral contextualism, particularism and contextualism in political philosophy. Unconvinced that these resources are sufficient for an understanding of how actual context may be of importance in philosophy, I in the third part turn to a systematic investigation of three suggestions for how to incorporate actual context onto philosophy: the application approach, the bottom-up approach and the contextual approach. Furthermore, I argue that the third and most radical approach develops a superior understanding of how to include context in moral philosophy, reflecting the impossibility of making normatively neutral investigations of context in moral philosophy.

In this dissertation I begin with the claim that silence is part of moral life. Moral philosophy must make every attempt to bring within it all that is part of moral life. The dissertation produces a methodology for learning how to see some of the silences that I claim for moral life and it shows the importance of silence to continuing moral self-formation.

Juan-Ramón Capella es uno de los más importantes filósofos del Derecho y de la política de inspiración marxista. En este texto se discute su tesis de que, en materia moral, no existen otros fundamentos que las puras convenciones. ; Juan-Ramón Capella is one of the most important representatives of the legal and political philosophy of Marxist inspiration. What is discussed in this text is his thesis that, in matters of morality, there are no other foundations that pure conventions.

Utility discounting in intertemporal economic modelling has been viewed as problematic, both for descriptive and normative reasons. However, positive utility discount rates can be defended normatively; in particular, it is rational for future utility to be discounted to take into account model-independent outcomes when decision-making under risk. The resultant values will tend to be smaller than descriptive rates under most probability assignments. This also allows us to address some objections that intertemporal considerations will be overdemanding. A principle for utility discount rates is suggested which is rooted in probability discounting. Utility discounting is defended against objections from Parfit (1984) and Broome (2005); Broome (2012). A sample utility discount rate is estimated. ; (VLID)6124098 ; Version of record

Report of recitation of cadet Woodbridge in moral philosophy (ethics) in Autumn 1821. Woodbridge merited the rating of "mediocrity."

In order to understand the social, political and intellectual process of Chinese modernization, it is necessary to evaluate their ideological foundations and to thus become able to place it in the suitable political context. Chinese philosophy of the first half of the 20th century was still determined by the conditions of the decline of the pre-modern era. The present article aims to explore and to introduce the rise and growth of Modern Confucianism, as well as some crucial philosophical elaborations in the field of the new moral philosophy, developed by the most well-known exponent of its so-called 2nd generation, Mou Zongsan. ; Če hočemo razumeti družbeni, politični in idejni proces kitajske modernizacije, moramo med drugim tudi dodobra spoznati njihove ideološke temelje in jih postaviti v ustrezni politični kontekst. V prvi polovici 20. stoletja je bila kitajska filozofija še vedno v veliki meri opredeljena s pogoji zatona predmodernega obdobja. Pričujoči članek raziskuje in predstavlja vzpon in padec rasti sodobnega konfucijanstva ter nekatere osrednje filozofske nadgradnje na področju nove moralne filozofije, ki jih je izdelal najbolj znani predstavnik tako imenovane druge generacije tega gibanja, Mou Zongsan.

The moral philosophy of management and the effects of the dominating doctrines in public policy and decision making, in wider terms means to question what kind of relations, once applied, these doctrines and strategies created between state, groups and individual rights. The EU accession of Southeast Europe countries represents a unique chance to understand the real capability and superiority of technocratic solution, as a dominating doctrine in accession processes, exerted in situations of limited capacities in decision making, lack of established democratic institution, which presume weak capabilities in setting up long term strategies. A unique chance to test the real value of the so-called cold and rational solutions in public decision making. In this case the trade off is between the kind of society this political and managerial doctrine creates, how much the interests of those who mandates the "technocratic power" by the power transfer process are still in balance or under consideration.

The moral philosophy of management and the effects of the dominating doctrines in public policy and decision making, in wider terms means to question what kind of relations, once applied, these doctrines and strategies created between state, groups and individual rights. The EU accession of Southeast Europe countries represents a unique chance to understand the real capability and superiority of technocratic solution, as a dominating doctrine in accession processes, exerted in situations of limited capacities in decision making, lack of established democratic institution, which presume weak capabilities in setting up long term strategies. A unique chance to test the real value of the so-called cold and rational solutions in public decision making. In this case the trade off is between the kind of society this political and managerial doctrine creates, how much the interests of those who mandates the "technocratic power" by the power transfer process are still in balance or under consideration.

First published in 1869 under title: Moral philosophy. ; CHAPTER IX. DUTIES -- SELF-CULTURE -- Aesthetic -- Its expensiveness -- Elevating tendency -- Increases power -- False refinement -- Fastidiousness -- The cultivated lady -- Culture, how attained -- Degree of attention proper -- Other demands to be cousidered -- Physical culture a duty -- Health -- Manual skill --Manners and habits -- Predominance of the soul -- CHAPTER X. DuTIES -- USEFULNESS -- The true aim -- The natural impulse -- Proper occupation -- Notoriety not usefulness -- Wealth and its uses -- Special obligation of the rich -- Social influence -- Difficulties and duties -- Special duties of the young -- The great want -- CHAPTER XL. DUTIES -- FIDELITY --Faithfulness in contracts -- Binding force -- Threats and promises -- In what sense binding -- When null -- Conditions -- Express and implied contracts -- Effect of the oath -- Marriage engagements -- CHAPTER XII. DUTIES -- VERACITY -- ItS nature and obligation -- Significance of the oath -- Its rightfulness -- Profanity -- Violations of veracity -- Limits of the obligation -- Words and gestures -- Legal practice -- Instinct of veracity -- CHAPTER XIII. DUTIES -- CHASTITY -- Nature of the duty -- Effect and criminality of unchastity -- Injustice of society -- Marriage provided for -- Its nature and conditions -- Moral law of divorce -- Civil law -- Incest -- Concluding remarks. ; SECOND DIVISION -- PERSONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES -- Managing the market -- Cicero's example -- Law of wages Woman's wages -- Work that is above wages -- Violations of the right of property -- Bankrupt laws -- Prevalence of fraud upon the government -- Mischief of repudiation -- Immorality of gambling --Conflict of labor and capital -- CHAPTER VI. DUTIEs -- PIETY -- Origin of duties -- Nature of piety -- Its relation to religion -- Morality and religion -- Morality attained by religion -- Opposite of piety -- Duty of worship -- Possibility of prayer -- Speculative objections -- Social and public prayer -- The Sabbath -- Change of day -- Obligation permanent -- Proper observance -- Duty of promoting religion -- CHAPTER VII. Bums -- PHILANTHROPY -- PATRIoTIsM --Nature of philanthropy --Its relation to religion -- Its scope -- Proper test -- Misanthropy -- Patriotism as a virtue -- Required by benevolence -- Things opposed to patriotism -- CHAPTER VIII. DUTIES -- SELF-CULTURE -- Its nature and reasons -- Extends to all the faculties -- Spiritual culture -- Its relation to virtuous character --Intellectual culture -- Things to be held subordinate -- Kind of knowledge to be sought -- Culture of the sensibility -- Gives power --Relation to moral character -- Control indirect -- Associations --Books -- Perfection of character. ; CHAPTER III. RIGHTS -- LIBERTY -- Definition and extent -- Basis of the right -- Misapprehension of its origin -- Application to different powers --Principle of toleration -- Freedom of the press -- Free discussion -- Intervention of government in worship and education -- Subjective limitations -- Respect to the consciences of others -- Use of definite rules -- Violations of liberty -- Its defense -- CHAPTER IV. RIGHTS -- REPUTATION -- The interest involved -- How a good -- The precept -- Temptations to its violation -- Duty of exposing wrong -- Slander in truth-telling -- CHAPTER V. RIGHTS -- PROPERTY -- Origin of the right -- The precqpt -- Property, how acquired -- Transferable -- Right of discovery -- Effect of long possession -- Things not to be appropriated -- Animals made property, human beings not -- Limitations of the right -- Law of exchange -- Duty of the vender -- Standard of value. ; SECOND DIVISION -- PERSONAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES -- CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRLNCIPLES -- BaSIS of rights -- The comprehensive right -- Inalienable rights -- Basis of duties -- Correlation of rights and duties -- Positive and negative precepts -- Subjects of rights and duties -- The rights of brutes -- Superior right of rational beings -- CHAPTER II. RIGHTS -- LIFE -- Basis of the right -- Guilt of murder -- Malice and hatred -- Manslaughter -- Related crimes -- Right of self-preservation limited -- Self-defense -- Protection of property -- Carrying weapons -- Dueling -- Objections to self-defense -- Euthanacia. ; CHAPTER VIII. FAMILV GOVERNMENT -- Has a natural foundation -- Limited in its subjects -- Wide in its application to interests -- Mode of constitution -- Question of headsbip -- A relation of confidence -- To be entered upon with deliberation -- Maintained with care -- A natural sphere for each -- Relations of the family to the state and to society -- CHAPTER IX. DUTIES OF PARENT AND CHILD -- OF TEACHER AND PUPIL -- Chief work of the family -- Place of parental affection -- Leading duty of the parent -- Duty of obedience and its natural termination -- Claim of the child -- Limit of obedience -- Duty in maturity toward dependent parents -- The teacher's authority -- Its extent -- Need of closer definition -- The pupil's duty -- Unnatural antagonism -- Mutual regard -- Unfavorable tendencies -- Extreme in dividualism -- Independence of opinion. ; PART 11. PRACTICAL ETHICS -- PRELIMINARY REMARKS -- FIRST DIVISION -- CHAPTER V. PENALTIES IN CIVIL GOVERNMENT -- Uses of penalties -- Dangerous tendency -- Capital punishment -- Reasons for it -- Objection -- CHAPTER VI. LIMITS OF OBEDIENcE TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT -- GOvernment subordinate -- The higher law applied to a democratic state -- No general formula -- Laws, just, indifferent, unjust -- Two possible courses -- Duty of a subordinate magistrate -- Right of revolution -- Apprehended tendency -- Errors in two directions -- CHAPTER VII. THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS To EACH OTHER -- Obligation of nations limited -- Laws of nations -- Duty to respect each other's sovereignty -- Duty in case of rebellion -- In treaties -- In commercial intercourse -- Duty of self-preservation -- The rightfulness of war -- In case of resistance at home -- In case of aggression from without -- In defense of the weak -- In suppression of out rage -- In justifiable revolution -- Objections -- The true aim in war -- Duties in war. ; CHAPTER I. GOVERNMENT -- ITS NATURE AND F0UNDATI0N -- Definitions -- Relation of sanctions to government -- Object of government -- Its right to exist -- The right to govern -- Duty to govern -- Designation of the ruler -- Form of government -- Extent of authority -- Not dependent on desire of the governed -- CHAPTER II. THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT -- Its constitution -- Why God assumes the government -- The divine law -- How known to men -- Revealed law --Authority of examples -- The Saviour's example -- Genuine virtue required -- Personality of the law -- Application to communities -- Dealing with nations -- National sins -- CHAPTER III. PENALTIES UNDER THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT -- Nature of penalty -- Effects of penalty -- Relation of penalty to desert -- True reason of penalty -- Its extent -- Discipline and penalty -- Necessity of penalty in the divine government -- Degree and duration -- Guilt everlasting -- Natural consequences not penalty -- Physical law and penalty -- Remorse and penalty -- Providential conse quence -- CHAPTER IV. CIVIL GOVERNMENT -- Its foundation -- Right to govern -- The form of government -- A legitimate government -- A tyranny -- Constitutions -- Not a social compact -- Right and duty of voting -- The ruler a servant -- Doctrine of instruction -- Right of the majority -- Principle of representation -- The will of the governed a controlling element -- General tendency to democracy -- Relation of law to righteousness -- Mistakes. ; CHAPTER XI. -- THEORIES OF OBLIGATION -- Of right as ultimate -- Of obligation as originating in the will of God -- Difficulties -- Reason not ultimate -- Obligation known intuitively -- No character in God -- Relativity of morality -- Unscriptural -- Founded in the reason or nature of God -- Of spiritual worthiness as ultimate -- Hickok's view -- Janet's -- Seelye's -- Personal perfection not the true aim the term good -- Ambiguous use -- Virtue as ultimate -- Complacency not virtue -- Virtue a quality of choice, not its object -- Of abstract right as ultimate -- Axiom of the theory -- Does not explain the virtues -- Gives no unity to virtue -- Rightness not the final motive -- Maxim of the theory -- Acting from principle -- Rightness not ultimate -- Incidental advantages of the theory of benevolence. ; CHAPTER X. THEORIES OF OBLIGATION -- The question -- Different answers -- Reason for the difference -- Socrates and Plato -- Aristotle -- Doctrine of the Stoics -- Of the Epicureans -- Modern views -- Paley -- Taylor -- Difficulties -- Psychological error -- No freedom -- Misrepresents benevolence -- Mistakes the motive -- Makes no difference between the good and the bad -- Does not accord with Scripture -- Utilitarianism -- Misapplication of the term -- Needed discrimination -- "Holy Happiness" -- Kind of happiness to be sought -- Spencer's "Ethics." ; CHAPTER VIII. CONSCIENCE -- IS IT A GUIDE? -- Definition and office -- Impulse of Conscience -- Approval and condemnation -- Aesthetic conscience -- Conscience as a guide -- Intervention of judgment -- Different views -- Whately and Alexander -- Sins of ignorance -- Rational conscience the guide, not the emotional, nor the casthetic -- Conscientiousness -- Paul -- Honesty -- Sincerity --Conscience educated, enlightened, perverted -- Feeling of obligation -- CHAPTER IX. UNITY OR SIMPLICITY OF MORAL AcTI0N -- Virtue and sin contradictory -- Their coexistence impossible -- Different hypotheses to explain their coexistence -- Imperfect powers -- From the fall --From past sin -- Right intention with wrong thoughts and feelings -- Mixed motives -- Partial regard for good -- Lack of intensity -- Right ultimate choice and wrong acts -- The teaching of the Scriptores -- Practical teaching -- N.W. Taylor -- Objections and answers -- Prevailing consciousness -- Negative testimony -- No room for improvement -- Degrees of goodness -- Degrees of sinfulness -- Temptation and guilt -- Knowledge of past sinfulness -- General bearing of the doctrine. ; CHAPTER VI. ADDITIONAL REMARKS AND INFERRNCES -- Universality of the law of benevolence -- Works of supererogation impossible -- Morality personal, not transferable -- Ambiguity of the term character -- The seat of moral depravity -- Total moral depravity -- The moral change required -- Relation of emotion to the moral state -- Moral character in consciousness -- Moral consistency -- CHAPTER VII. RIGHT AND WRONG -- DUTY, KNOWN ANO UNKNOWN -- NEED OF A REvELATI0N -- Ambiguity of the terms right and wrong -- Absolute right and wrong -- Relative right and wrong -- Objective and subjective right and wrong -- Right and wrong per se -- The expedient and the right -- Our knowledge of the right -- End and means -- Doing evil that good may Come -- Least of two evils -- Known and unknown dUty -- Need of revelation to furnish motive and to indicate objective duty. ; CHAPTER V. OF PARTICULAR VICES -- Their common element -- Their relation to sinful character -- Their origin -- Sensuality -- Ambition -- Avarice -- Pride and vanity -- Selfishness -- The desire not sinful -- Malevolent impulses -- Natural or impulsive goodness -- Two characters possible -- Apparent goodness -- Right moral judgments -- Kindly affections -- Devotional feelings -- Impulsive virtues, their relation to true virtue -- Imitative goodness -- Deficiency exhibited -- Are the impulsive virtues sinful? -- Their utility. ; PART 1.--THEORETICAL -- CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY DEFINITIONS. -- Divisions of the science -- Topics treated of -- Obligation a simple idea -- Undefinable --Attempted definitions --A moral being or person --Essential attributes -- Intellect -- Sensibility -- Free-will -- A moral act -- The moral element, where found -- Different forms of voluntary action -- More exact location of the moral element -- Character and intention -- Two kinds of moral action -- CHAPTER II. RIGHT OR VIRTUOUS ACTION -- The true good -- Absolute and relative good -- Illustrations of the two -- Mere animal life valuable -- The Summum Bonum -- No comparison of the two forms of good -- Happiness -- Obligation, how perceived -- Regard to our own good -- Of virtue as good -- Of benevolence as virtue -- Benevolence in consciousness -- CHAPTER III. WRONG OR SINFUL ACTION -- Its nature -- Its motive -- Its form, how determined --Gratification of desire not sin -- Sin subordinates reason -- No rational end in sin -- Sin not a choice of evil -- Sin not selfishness --Impossibility of making one's own good the supreme end -- Sin in consciousness -- Self-gratification not the intelligent end -- Sin subjection to impulse, or carnal-mindedness -- Desires and passions not sinful -- Their uses -- CHAPTER IV. OF THE PARTICULAR VIRTUES -- Benevolence the root -- Constitutes right character -- Its relation to the particular virtues, and to right acts -- Love -- Gratitude -- Justice not an independent -- virtue -- Mercy not opposed to justice -- Self-denial --Veracity -- Humility -- Faith -- Obedience -- The teaching of Scripture -- Misapprehensions of benevolence -- Interdependence of the virtues. ; Mode of access: Internet.

beneficiary pays principle burden sharing excusable ignorance historical emissions legitimate expectations restitution unjust enrichment ; Version of record

Translation of Eine staatslehre auf ethischer grundlage; oder Lehrbegriff des chinesischen philosophen Mencius. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Sixteenth-century Spanish thought is constitutive of an established, though insufficiently studied, tradition of European political theorizing. As against the politics of Machiavellism, the Spanish tradition argued in favor of an ethical perspective on statecraft. As an introduction to the subject, this article addresses key concepts set forth by the Dominican theologian-jurist Francisco de Vitoria regarding the natural foundations and teleology of the state and its coercive power. Terms such as "natural law", "dominium", and "perfect community" describe the Thomistic basis of his political philosophy and illustrate the moral significance and legitimate basis of political society in early modern Spanish politico-theological thought.