Suchergebnisse

This article examines long-standing debates in moral philosophy that are relevant to international human rights law. It discusses the political conception of human rights and the four challenges to moral philosophy which include the notion that no particular religious tradition or particular comprehensive doctrine (or morality) grounded human rights and the belief that natural rights theories end up misrepresenting and narrowing the scope of human rights. This article also highlights the importance of the work of moral philosophers to the understanding of contemporary human rights and explains that the traditions of natural rights theories still influence contemporary human rights language in profound ways

What is moral philosophy? That is the question with which this important volume grapples. Its starting point is the famous critique made in 1958 by Elizabeth Anscombe, who argued that moral philosophy begins from a mistake: that it is fundamentally wrong about the sort of concept that the word 'moral' represents. Anscombe rejected moral philosophy as it was then (and mostly now still is) practised. She offered instead a blueprint for the task moral philosophers must embrace if they are to speak intelligibly to society about good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. The chapters in this book are inspired by Anscombe's classic text. One of the most powerful voices here, among many authoritative voices, is that of Philippa Foot - Anscombe's lifelong friend - who asserts that 'any account of practical reason evacuated of an understanding of what human beings need to flourish is inadequate and must be rejected.'

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Preface -- Contents -- Chapter I Morality-What is it? -- 1. The meaning of ""morality -- 2. Obligation vs. choice -- Chapter II The Moral Philosopher -- 3. The orthodox moralist -- 4. The moralist as a naturalist -- 5. Moral insight -- Chapter III The Many Moral Worlds -- 6. Orthodox morality and the moral standard -- 7. The moralities of race, class, and occupation -- 8. Differing moral tastes -- 9. The good men of the moral philosophies

Although this collection of articles is not formally a commentary on Elizabeth Anscombe's famous article of the same title, in which she criticised the moral philosophy prevalent in 1958, a number of the contributors do take Anscombe's work as a starting point. Taken together the collection could be seen as a demonstration of the extent to which moral philosophers have since attempted to answer Anscombe's challenge, and to develop an approach to their subject which, while psychologically plausible, is neither based on divine law nor permissive of the impermissible

Anscombe's Moral Philosophy is an accessible introduction to Elizabeth Anscombe's work on ethics. It also offers a critique of her views on such diverse subjects as the bombing of Hiroshima, same-sex marriage, consequentialism, moral obligation, and intention

Owen Ware here develops and defends a novel interpretation of Fichte's moral philosophy as an ethics of wholeness. While virtually forgotten for most of the 20th century, Fichte's 'System of Ethics' (1798) is now recognised by scholars as a masterpiece in the history of post-Kantian philosophy, as well as a key text for understanding the work of later German idealist thinkers. This text provides a careful examination of the intellectual context in which Fichte's moral philosophy evolved, and of the specific arguments he offers in response to Kant and his immediate successors. A distinctive feature of this study is a focus on the foundational concepts of Fichte's ethics - freedom, morality, feeling, conscience, community - and their connection to his innovative but largely misunderstood theory of drives.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- The Macat Library -- Critical Thinking and "Modern Moral Philosophy" -- About the Author of the Original Work -- About the Authors of the Analysis -- About Macat -- Ways in to the Text -- Who Was G. E. M. Anscombe? -- What does "Modern Moral Philosophy" Say? -- Why does "Modern Moral Philosophy" Matter? -- Section 1: Influences -- Module 1: The Author and the Historical Context -- Module 2: Academic Context -- Module 3: The Problem -- Module 4: The Author's Contribution -- Section 2: Ideas -- Module 5: Main Ideas -- Module 6: Secondary Ideas -- Module 7: Achievement -- Module 8: Place in the Author's Work -- Section 3: Impact -- Module 9: The First Responses -- Module 10: The Evolving Debate -- Module 11: Impact and Influence Today -- Module 12: Where Next? -- Glossary of Terms -- People Mentioned in the Text -- Works Cited -- The Macat Library by Discipline.

Many ethicists either accept the reflective equilibrium method or think that anything goes in ethical theorizing as long as the results are plausible. The aim of this book is to advance methodological thinking in ethics beyond these common attitudes and to raise new methodological questions about how moral philosophy should be done. What are we entitled to assume as the starting-point of our ethical inquiry? What is the role of empirical sciences in ethics? Is there just one general method for doing moral philosophy or should different questions in moral philosophy be answered in different ways? Are there argumentative structures and strategies that we should be encouraged to use or typical argumentative patterns that we should avoid? This volume brings together leading moral philosophers to consider these questions. The chapters investigate the prospects of empirical ethics, outline new methods of ethics, evaluate recent methodological advances, and explore whether different areas of moral philosophy are methodologically continuous or independent of one another. The aim of Methodology and Moral Philosophy is to make moral philosophers more self-aware and reflective of the way in which they do moral philosophy and also to encourage them to take part in methodological debates.

Abstract
We raise throe issues for Kitcher's Ethical Project: First, we argue that the genealogy of morals starts well before the advent of altruism-failures and the need to remedy them, which Kitcher dates at about 50K years ago. Second, we challenge the likelihood of long term moral progress of the sort Kitcher requires to establish objectivity while circumventing Hume's challenge to avoid trying to derive normative conclusions from positive ones 'ought' from 'is'. Third, we sketch ways in which Kitcher's mctacthical opponents could respond to his arguments against them.