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There is tension between Montesquieu's determinist science of human behaviour and his moral prescriptions. He believed in natural law and rights, notably the right to liberty. Yet he advanced physical explanations of individual behaviour and a mixture of physical and social explanations of cultural differences in moral and aesthetic attitudes, religious belief and the capacity to sustain liberty. Such explanations conflict with the assertion that human beings can know and follow universal natural laws. Despite his explanations of religious beliefs, Montesquieu resolved the intellectual and emotional tension between his doctrines by recourse to his own religious beliefs—for a working knowledge of moral principles—and the notion of a freely acting, immaterial soul, although his science seems to leave it almost no room for action.

The theory of ethical relativism has been the subject of much misunderstanding. It is argued that the central insight of relativism is enculturation and not tolerance. Relativism is characterized as a metaethical theory about the nature of moral perceptions. As such it is logically consistent, permits moral criticism, and is compatible with cross‐cultural universals. The existence of universals may indicate global support for particular human rights.

Cultural relativism, a doctrine that holds that at least some of the variations in the validity of a moral rule or right are determined by the predominant culture, ranges along a continuum from weak to strong to radical. It is opposed to radical universalism, which attests to a culture's irrelevancy in determining the universal validity of rules & rights. Arguments against the two radical extremes are presented, & support is given to the weak cultural relativist position, with specific reference to the International Human Rights Covenants & a review of the twenty-eight Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Modern examples pertaining to Third World countries are highlighted. Reconciliation between the positions of relativism & universalism is reached through the conclusion that there is "a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a recognition of the possible need for limited cultural variations." K. Hyatt.

THERE IS TENSION BETWEEN MONTESQUIEU'S DETERMINIST SCIENCE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR & HIS MORAL PRESCRIPTIONS. HE BELIEVED IN NATURAL LAW & RIGHTS, YET HE ADVANCED PHYSICAL EXPLANATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR & A MIXTURE OF PHYSICAL & SOCIAL EXPLANATIONS OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES. SUCH EXPLANATIONS CONFLICT WITH THE ASSERTION THAT HUMAN BEINGS FOLLOW UNIVERSAL NATURAL LAWS.

The international human rights movement has succeeded in establishing universal human rights standards for religious minorities based on moral as well as pragmatic arguments. Modern Muslim countries have had to participate in the formulation & adoption of these standards at the regional & national as well as international levels. However, extremely serious tensions exist between these standards & Muslim historic religious law -- Shari'ah. Muslims cannot, & should not be allowed to, justify discrimination against & persecution of non-Muslims on the basis of Islamic cultural norms; however, the cultural relativist position can be adapted to shape attitudes & inform policy regarding fundamental human rights. A reform methodology for reconciling Shari'ah with the full human rights of religious minorities is summarized. Modified AA

In the September 1988 issue of this Review, Stanley C. Brubaker argued that liberals strive for neutrality concerning how people should live and that this moral ambivalence prevented them from punishing. In this Controversy, Ronald Terchek denies that liberalism is crippled by moral relativism or incapacitated for punishment. In return, Brubaker defends his firm no to the question, Can liberals punish?

A new volume of philosophical essays by Bernard Williams. The book is a successor to Problems of the Self, but whereas that volume dealt mainly with questions of personal identity, Moral Luck centres on questions of moral philosophy and the theory of rational action. That whole area has of course been strikingly reinvigorated over the last deacde, and philosophers have both broadened and deepened their concerns in a way that now makes much earlier moral and political philosophy look sterile and trivial. Moral Luck contains a number of essays that have contributed influentially to this development. Among the recurring themes are the moral and philosophical limitations of utilitarianism, the notion of integrity, relativism, and problems of moral conflict and rational choice. The work presented here is marked by a high degree of imagination and acuity, and also conveys a strong sense of psychological reality. The volume will be a stimulating source of ideas and arguments for all philosophers and a wide range of other readers

One: A Brentanist Theory of Moral Judgments -- 1.1. The Theory -- 1.2. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Non-Cognitivist Theories -- 1.3. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Cognitivist Theories -- 1.4. Answers to Some Objections to the Brentanist Theory -- Two: The Ideal Observer Theory and Moral Objectivism -- 2.1. An Argument for Accepting the Ideal Observer Theory as a Standard for Determining the Correctness of Moral Judgments -- 2.2. Firth's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- 2.3. My Characterization of the Ideal Observer -- 2.4 Three Versions of the Ideal Observer Theory and Their Implications for the Objectivity of Moral Judgments -- 2.5. Sermonette on the Importance of Empathy -- 2.6. Intuitionism and the Ideal Observer Theory -- Three: Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.1 Some Different Meanings of the Term 'Ethical Relativism' -- 3.2. The Definition of 'Meta-Ethical Relativism' -- 3.3. Some Necessary Conditions of One's Accepting a Moral Judgment or a Moral Principle -- 3.4. Meta-Ethical Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.5. A Non-Nihilistic Version of Meta-Ethical Relativism -- 3.6. Conclusion -- Four: The Wages of Relativism -- 4.1. What Sorts of Attitudes and Commitments Presuppose a Belief in the Objectivity of Normative Judgments? -- 4.2. Causal or Psychological Connections Between Meta-Ethical Views and Attitudes and First-Order Normative Standards -- Appendix I: Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.1. Nietzsche's Claims Concerning the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.2. What Are Nietzsche's Genetic Claims Intended to Show? -- Appendix II: Normative Relativism and Nihilism -- Appendix III: Hare's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography.

In a comment on Tibor Machan's "Terrorism and Objective Moral Principles" (see abstract in this section), the importance of the study of morality & ethics is addressed. Relativism is eschewed here in favor of the universality & impartiality of certain moral principles. A public education campaign is suggested to reinstill impartial respect of such principles. Terrorists are classified in four categories: crusaders, mercenaries, conscripts, & misfits. It is argued that a better understanding of terrorists' personalities & motivations will make antiterrorist action more effective. A. Waters

The interpretivist perspective is rapidly growing in acceptance and influence in the feld of organization and management. This perspective has important implications for the field of administrative ethics that have not yet been sufficiently acknowledged. Traditionally, administrative ethics appears to have assumed an objectivist epistemological and legalistic ethical perspective, and interpretivism seems to imply epistemological subjectivism and ethical relativism as alternatives. Using Jung's theory of the unconscious as a foundation, an ethical perspective is developed indicating that through the vehicle of human relationship one can find stable points of reference for moral action in the requisities of the personal development of the actors involved in the situation, and hence, this perspective avoids the trap of ethical relativism to which interpretivism is vulnerable. Lying, cheating, and stealing are used as examples and the case of the Washington Post reporter Janet Cooke is presented as an illustration of how the approach applies in organizational situations.

Addiction is viewed from a range of perspectives that often seem incompatible and perhaps incommensurable. This volume presents the major visions of addiction in contemporary science and therapy, including cognitive-behavior, medical-disease, adaptive, genetic, neurobehavioral, social, learning, ego-analytic, and moral models of addiction. Although we must examine the bases of these diverse visions in order to make sense of the welter of conflicting views of addiction, it is not necessary to surrender to nihilism or relativism in response to their diversity and contradictoriness.

The quest for unassailable "foundations" for knowledge has preoccupied Western thinkers at least since Descartes. Without some such foundation or Archimedian standpoint, it was argued, our knowledge of the external world as well as our basis for moral and political judgment would fall prey to relativism, historicism, and ultimately nihilism. Recently, though, this Cartesian quest for foundations has come under attack from some of the most powerful minds of our age.In this article I examine the contribution of Louis Althusser to this current of thought and assess whether his critique of foundationalist epistemologies and ethics can avoid the pitfalls of relativism. Althusser is compared to other thinkers who share his anti-Cartesian persuasion (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Foucault) and is criticized for his use of a kind of structuralism to abolish the "knowing subject" as the locus of thought and action. I conclude that Althusser's "antihumanism" has produced a convenient ideology for a new class of Marxist intellectuals to exert their claims to power over ordinary human agents who have been reduced to "bearers" or "supports" of certain systemic, structural relations.

Given the widespread moral conventionalism or historicism in contemporary social science and ethics, many have viewed Marx as arguing either that conceptions of justice simply shift historically and lack objectivity (relativism) or that notions of justice are to be understood solely as expressions of class interests (reductionism). Although metaethical ambiguities about the status of conceptions of justice influenced some of Marx's and Engels's formulations, they condemned the "crying contrasts" of rich and poor. Marx is better understood as defending a version of moral objectivity or moral realism. The paper begins with an example from the recent debate about justice in the international distribution of wealth to highlight the implausibility of a relativist or reductionist account. It then describes alternative views of the status of justice and equality in Marx and Engels and explores the logical structure of Marx's critique of Proudhon. A fourth section examines the analogy between Marx's and Engels's realism in the philosophy of science and their realist arguments in ethics, focusing on Marx's and Engels's non-relativist and non-reductionist conception of moral progress. The conclusion sets Marx's use of concepts of exploitation in the context of his overall moral judgments and suggests that Marx's social or historical theory rather than his moral standards are the most controversial part of his ethical argument.