At the beginning of the 1990 American libertarian intellectual such as Murray N. Rothbard, Llewellyn Rockwell Jr., and Hans-Hermann Hoppe gave rise to the paleolibertarian movement. Paleolibertarians, who favour laissez-faire in the economic realm but oppose moral relativism, were seeking an alliance with the so-called "paleoconservatives" like Sam Francis, Tom Fleming, Paul Gottfried or Pat Buchanan. The word "paleolibertarian", first used by Rockwell, had the purpose to recapture the radicalism and the political and intellectual rigor of the pre-war libertarian "Old right". Rothbard's death in 1995 was a blow, but paleolibertarians still continued their twofold battle for the defence of the unfettered free-market, developing the methodology of the Austrian School of Economics; and for the defence of the traditional Christian values of the Western Civilization, threatened by the post-modern "liberal" culture, now leading in the political and intellectual elite. Today the paleolibertarians, facilitated by the Internet, have become a rapidly growing intellectual movement. The main centres of diffusion of their ideas are the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn (Alabama) and the website LewRockwell.com, that ranks among the most widely read news website.
Inclusive legal positivism has been in the limelight for some time. There are several reasons for this. Among the structural reasons for this general change of direction within general jurisprudence are cultural changes such as the renewed interest for theory of action or normative methodology. This paper discusses José Juan Moreso's contribution to this debate. The paper focuses especially on the thesis that there would be no connection between non-cognitivism as set out in meta-ethics and positivism in legal theory. This thesis is really the outcome of a compound of different positions: on the political level, the question concerns the possible relationships and tensions between democracy and liberalism. On the ethical and foremost meta-ethical level, the issue basically revolves around the relation between cognitivism and expressivism; and, on the level of legal theory, Moreso attempts to resolve the problem that Benedetto Croce, a century ago, compared to the difficulty of sailing around Cape Horn, i.e. to connect the law and ethics. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, a few historical remarks are made. In section two, I look at how natural law is defined in Moreso. In section three, some observations are made on how legal positivism is qualified in relation to natural law. In section four, I suggest a possible criticism of the conception of moral relativism used by Moreso and recommend an alternative conception that hopefully grasps further features of the way the problem is frequently discussed. Finally, some methodological remarks are made: the choice of disregarding the distinction between authentic and inauthentic normative propositions leads Moreso to conceive the object of dispute between cognitivists and expressivists in an unfruitful way. The lack of distinction between the role played by belief on the one hand and conative attitudes on the other makes it hard, if not impossible to grasp what exactly is the object of this dispute. In fact, their opposition, instead of representing a fertile scientific dialogue becomes similar to a situation where people are talking pass each other. If this outcome is to be avoided and the two positions reconstructed properly, an account of what constitutes belief should complement the theory. Probably greater focus is also needed on what is considered to be the primary function of normative propositions.
My aim, in this work, is to analyze Alasdair MacIntyre's theoretical system. MacIntyre (1929-) is a Scottisch born and American 'adopted' philosopher. Critics usually framed his moral position as representative of current normative ethics of virtue inspired from Aristotle, and his political thought as conservative, seeing as how they consider MacIntyre as neo-comunitarian thinker. But, as I have tried to show, this is a misunderstanding of his political position. Anyway critics omits methodological aspect of macintyrean thought. For this reason, re-writing the history of modernity, exposed not only in After Virtue but also in others papers, this work show the theoretical path that drove Scottish philosopher, also through comparison with the philosophy of science, to build a new method of enquiry that is opposed to the explanatory-predictive method pursued by the 'academic orthodoxy'. Indeed, this methodology, according to MacIntyre, omits history from philosophical enquiry and so brought our contemporary culture into a state of abysmal crisis: the 'disquieting suggestion'. Since following efforts to provide a solution for the moral disagreement have failed, it was necessary to pinpoint another philosophical outlook to solve moral disagreement. In this perspective should be read processing of his historicist method that begin by acknowledgement of narrative character of reality. However this approach, developed by MacIntyre to give an appropriate answer to the problems of relativism and perspectivism, has resulted criticism of inconsistency: his position would remain entangled in a vicious circle. MacIntyre's answer to the Enlightenment project failure has been labeled itself as a form of relativism by some critics, according to which, if the MacIntyre's aim was to find a solution to the 'disquieting suggestion', he would have failed. He would not reply carefully to relativism and perspectivism. He would not be able to build a convincing theory that escapes relativism and perspectivism, 'the protagonist of post–Enlightenment': he would be a relativist thinker. How can this mistake be avoided? Answering to this challenge, in his later writings, MacIntyre does appeal to Aristotelian-Thomism's synthesis and improves a concept of tradition as a intellectual inquiry. This is the deep meaning of the macintyrean tradition–constituted and tradition–constitutive method of enquiry, whose application on every level of investigation (epistemological, ethical and social and anthropological) allows the full intelligibility of philosophical and ethical concepts because far away from hypostatizing those concepts it gives a rational account by inserting them in the respective contexts of reference and treating them as part of a whole. The MacIntyre's effort is thereby to connect his historical inquiry with the Aristotelian-Thomism's metaphysics.
Sincerity is a key notion within theories of deliberative democracy and a crucial feature of those approaches to public reason that give deliberation a prominent role for the functioning of a just and legitimate democratic society. Indeed, among political theorists sympathetic to the deliberative project, sincerity has been defended in various manners: as a fundamental criterion of validity to identify shared social and political understandings (Habermas 1984); as a means to achieve the practical benefit of promoting free discussions and open debates (Freeman 2000, 383); as an expression of respect among citizens stating their equal membership in the sovereign political body (Cohen 1997, 416); as necessary to sustain the value of civic friendship (Rawls 1997); as an antidote to rhetoric and manipulation (Quong 2010, 265); as a tool to secure relations of trust among citizens and to generate shared commitments (Goodin 2008, 263). Despite such common appraisal of sincere behaviour in democratic deliberation, few theorists have put forward a clear and definite account for it. It seems that norms of sincerity are at most stipulated to solve problems linked with the moral integrity of citizens (Greenawalt 1988; Murphy 1998; Eberle 2002) or strategic actions (Cohen 1989). Two interesting and recent attempts to provide a distinct argument for sincerity in deliberation are Schwartzman's Principle of sincerity in public justification (SPJ) (2011) and Gaus's defence of convergence in public reason as a way to ensure sincerity in public discourse (2011, 288-292). In this paper, I question and reject both accounts and propose a substitute for principles of sincerity in general. First, I tackle Schwartzman's proposal and argue that both his conceptual and his instrumental arguments fail. Drawing from a consensus model of public justification, Schwartzman defends an idea of public reasons as shared, in the sense of drawn from a common set of liberal political values. Accordingly, he proposes a principle of sincerity requiring citizens to offer public reasons they sincerely think are sufficient to justify their preferred norms. In this way, citizens can have other convictions and even express such beliefs in public deliberations, as long as they also provide reasons they believe are public and with an adequate justificatory force. To defend such a view, Schwartzman argues that SPJ is simply an instantiation of the principle of respect: if one is to respect her fellow citizens, she ought to conform to the principle of sincerity. However, the problem is that, conceptualized in this way, SPJ is in tension with the wide view of public reason and the related idea of reasoning by conjecture (Rawls 1997) Schwartzman explicitly claims to adhere to (2012). Indeed, the wide view of public reason and the principle of sincerity cannot be both implied by the principle of respect because if reasoning from conjecture is pursuable, it is not true that the principle of respect always require conforming to SPJ. The second argument Schwartzman advances for SPJ is instrumental in kind and it relies on the idea that the principle of sincerity is justified because of the benefits it brings to deliberation. Schwartzman thinks that actual knowledge of the reasons presented in public justification is necessary to deliberate correctly because it permits to uncover mistakes in reasoning and to discover potentially defeating counterarguments to one's position. However, the link between sincerity and the epistemic enhancement of deliberation cannot help to be controversial for, although it seems reasonable to think that deliberation improves citizens' decisions, would not it be better to have open access to all sort of reasons? The point is that if what is important of deliberation is to evaluate and verify the correctness of political positions and their justifications, then all reasons should be, in principle, admissible for all reasons could help improving the understanding of political principles and decisions. Turning to Gaus's argument, I argue that convergence in public justification is incompatible with sincere deliberation because, although some sort of philosophical relativism about reasons might support it, it is nevertheless over-demanding and unrealistic in the actual context of deliberation. Convergence approaches to public justification rely on the idea that for reasons to be public there is no need to enjoy some property of shareability (Vallier 2011), but simply to be intelligible (Gaus 2011). In this sense, public reasons are those reasons that others can recognize as belonging and consistent to one's sound, and logically coherent, set of beliefs. On this account, when citizens deliberate, they need not to find reasons sharable by all members of the citizenry. Rather, they need to offer each other reasons consistent with their respective sets of beliefs and deep convictions. Although it might seem that convergence in public justification may well be suited to secure sincerity in deliberation, it is not clear whether it can admit of sincerity at all. The problem lies in the actual possibility of being sincere in believing a fellow citizen justified when one does not share her set of beliefs and considers it wrong. To rebut this objection, a convergent theorist can endorse some version of moral relativism, but this move is nevertheless highly problematic. Indeed, it would be incoherent for a political theorist like Gaus, who intends to avoid metaphysical problems and ontological debates (2011, 14, 233), to embrace such a controversial account of the nature of moral reasons. Moreover, the relativist strategy has a problem of practice when it comes to sincere convergence: even if relativism was true, it is not possible to expect all people to endorse it. Accepting a relativist framework of understanding is not only controversial at the philosophical level, but also incredibly demanding of citizens for it would require them to consider the normative status of their beliefs the same as that of others. In discussing both Schwartzman and Gaus's proposals, I argue that sincerity, as a general notion, is not only controversial, but also practically irrelevant when it comes to the political domain. Indeed, in being linked with citizens' intentions and inner mental states, which are impossible to ascertain, sincerity ends up being unworkable. As a substitute, I propose a principle of reliability in deliberation (PRD) apt to achieve those political goods theorists have associated with sincerity. Indeed, it is undeniable that manipulation in deliberation is undesirable, given that it constitutes a problem for the relation of trust among citizens and the possibility of deliberation itself. If citizens knew others were to deceive and manipulate them, it would be reasonable for them to refrain from discussion. So, drawing from Audi's idea of reliability as a virtue (2008), I specify some normative features that citizens need to display in order to secure the possibility of deliberation and shelter mutual trust by excluding the possibility of tricking others. In particular, PRD requires citizens to be stable in their commitment to reach the best justification they can for their claims, and to engage in deliberation after careful reasoning and judgment; to be predictable in their behaviour when they engage in deliberation, in their reactions to other people's arguments, challenges, and the possibility of disagreement. Finally, it requires them to be correct most of the times, by not advocating for ideas clearly in opposition to general normative understanding, and by not lying about the factual content of the reasons they propose. PDR does not require citizens to offer the best reasons they have, or the ones they find most convincing in defending those laws they want to enact, maintain, or remove. Rather, citizens need to have justifications for their proposals and can offer different reasons to convince their fellow citizens to agree with them, provided that they are not based on false evidence or in opposition with general normative understandings. PRD neither demands nor prohibits citizens to be sincere about their reasons, but it bans cheating. In the end, the reasons why we care about sincerity in deliberation concern the need to prevent manipulation and cheating among citizens. To achieve that, it is sufficient to use a less controversial and more parsimonious concept than that of sincerity, as the notion of reliability is.
In questo nostro intervento avremo modo di soffermarci sulla possibilità di tenere assieme sia la scienza medica sia la libertà di scelta della persona, avendo come tramite il giudizio riflettente kantiano ripreso da autori come Hannah Arendt e Paul Ricœur. Ci pare, infatti, che sia davvero necessario porre al centro del dibattito la possibilità di far crescere questa sinergia fra le diverse discipline, elaborando un approccio che si collochi nell'etica del rispetto, la quale sottende un'epistemologia che accredita come valida la conoscenza del particolare, cominciando ad introdurre il tema della libertà in relazione allo statuto epistemologico delle scienze. ; In the contemporary age there are many different types of approach, but we can reduce them to these two opposite poles: science and its objective knowledge against the existential dimension of the human subject. In addition to this, hyper-specialisation produces a strong separation in the same branch of knowledge and dialogue from one field of research to another is greatly lacking, because everyone only concentrates on his study area without applying a more open vision. Luckily, bioethics adopts an interdisciplinary view and in this way we can have a link through the different areas of the knowledge. In this article, we start to explain the importance of Kant's Reflective Judgment with its political, juridical and medical retakes, which were formulated by Hannah Arendt and Paul Ricœur. Finally, through the concepts of common law and exemplarity, we introduce an argument about the possibility of making an epistemological and scientific debate starting from the singular level and with an approach which considers both the aspects of freedom of choice and the respect for a person's life, but without descending into a relativism perspective.
L'ermeneutica filosofica di Hans-Georg Gadamer – indubbiamente uno dei capisaldi del pensiero novecentesco – rappresenta una filosofia molto composita, sfaccettata e articolata, per così dire formata da una molteplicità di dimensioni diverse che si intrecciano l'una con l'altra. Ciò risulta evidente già da un semplice sguardo alla composizione interna della sua opera principale, Wahrheit und Methode (1960), nella quale si presenta una teoria del comprendere che prende in esame tre differenti dimensioni dell'esperienza umana – arte, storia e linguaggio – ovviamente concepite come fondamentalmente correlate tra loro. Ma questo quadro d'insieme si complica notevolmente non appena si prendano in esame perlomeno alcuni dei numerosi contributi che Gadamer ha scritto e pubblicato prima e dopo il suo opus magnum: contributi che testimoniano l'importante presenza nel suo pensiero di altre tematiche. Di tale complessità, però, non sempre gli interpreti di Gadamer hanno tenuto pienamente conto, visto che una gran parte dei contributi esegetici sul suo pensiero risultano essenzialmente incentrati sul capolavoro del 1960 (ed in particolare sui problemi della legittimazione delle Geisteswissenschaften), dedicando invece minore attenzione agli altri percorsi che egli ha seguito e, in particolare, alla dimensione propriamente etica e politica della sua filosofia ermeneutica. Inoltre, mi sembra che non sempre si sia prestata la giusta attenzione alla fondamentale unitarietà – da non confondere con una presunta "sistematicità", da Gadamer esplicitamente respinta – che a dispetto dell'indubbia molteplicità ed eterogeneità del pensiero gadameriano comunque vige al suo interno. La mia tesi, dunque, è che estetica e scienze umane, filosofia del linguaggio e filosofia morale, dialogo con i Greci e confronto critico col pensiero moderno, considerazioni su problematiche antropologiche e riflessioni sulla nostra attualità sociopolitica e tecnoscientifica, rappresentino le diverse dimensioni di un solo pensiero, le quali in qualche modo vengono a convergere verso un unico centro. Un centro "unificante" che, a mio avviso, va individuato in quello che potremmo chiamare il disagio della modernità. In altre parole, mi sembra cioè che tutta la riflessione filosofica di Gadamer, in fondo, scaturisca dalla presa d'atto di una situazione di crisi o disagio nella quale si troverebbero oggi il nostro mondo e la nostra civiltà. Una crisi che, data la sua profondità e complessità, si è per così dire "ramificata" in molteplici direzioni, andando ad investire svariati ambiti dell'esistenza umana. Ambiti che pertanto vengono analizzati e indagati da Gadamer con occhio critico, cercando di far emergere i principali nodi problematici e, alla luce di ciò, di avanzare proposte alternative, rimedi, "correttivi" e possibili soluzioni. A partire da una tale comprensione di fondo, la mia ricerca si articola allora in tre grandi sezioni dedicate rispettivamente alla pars destruens dell'ermeneutica gadameriana (prima e seconda sezione) ed alla sua pars costruens (terza sezione). Nella prima sezione – intitolata Una fenomenologia della modernità: i molteplici sintomi della crisi – dopo aver evidenziato come buona parte della filosofia del Novecento sia stata dominata dall'idea di una crisi in cui verserebbe attualmente la civiltà occidentale, e come anche l'ermeneutica di Gadamer possa essere fatta rientrare in questo discorso filosofico di fondo, cerco di illustrare uno per volta quelli che, agli occhi del filosofo di Verità e metodo, rappresentano i principali sintomi della crisi attuale. Tali sintomi includono: le patologie socioeconomiche del nostro mondo "amministrato" e burocratizzato; l'indiscriminata espansione planetaria dello stile di vita occidentale a danno di altre culture; la crisi dei valori e delle certezze, con la concomitante diffusione di relativismo, scetticismo e nichilismo; la crescente incapacità a relazionarsi in maniera adeguata e significativa all'arte, alla poesia e alla cultura, sempre più degradate a mero entertainment; infine, le problematiche legate alla diffusione di armi di distruzione di massa, alla concreta possibilità di una catastrofe ecologica ed alle inquietanti prospettive dischiuse da alcune recenti scoperte scientifiche (soprattutto nell'ambito della genetica). Una volta delineato il profilo generale che Gadamer fornisce della nostra epoca, nella seconda sezione – intitolata Una diagnosi del disagio della modernità: il dilagare della razionalità strumentale tecnico-scientifica – cerco di mostrare come alla base di tutti questi fenomeni egli scorga fondamentalmente un'unica radice, coincidente peraltro a suo giudizio con l'origine stessa della modernità. Ossia, la nascita della scienza moderna ed il suo intrinseco legame con la tecnica e con una specifica forma di razionalità che Gadamer – facendo evidentemente riferimento a categorie interpretative elaborate da Max Weber, Martin Heidegger e dalla Scuola di Francoforte – definisce anche «razionalità strumentale» o «pensiero calcolante». A partire da una tale visione di fondo, cerco quindi di fornire un'analisi della concezione gadameriana della tecnoscienza, evidenziando al contempo alcuni aspetti, e cioè: primo, come l'ermeneutica filosofica di Gadamer non vada interpretata come una filosofia unilateralmente antiscientifica, bensì piuttosto come una filosofia antiscientista (il che naturalmente è qualcosa di ben diverso); secondo, come la sua ricostruzione della crisi della modernità non sfoci mai in una critica "totalizzante" della ragione, né in una filosofia della storia pessimistico-negativa incentrata sull'idea di un corso ineluttabile degli eventi guidato da una razionalità "irrazionale" e contaminata dalla brama di potere e di dominio; terzo, infine, come la filosofia di Gadamer – a dispetto delle inveterate interpretazioni che sono solite scorgervi un pensiero tradizionalista, autoritario e radicalmente anti-illuminista – non intenda affatto respingere l'illuminismo scientifico moderno tout court, né rinnegarne le più importanti conquiste, ma più semplicemente "correggerne" alcune tendenze e recuperare una nozione più ampia e comprensiva di ragione, in grado di render conto anche di quegli aspetti dell'esperienza umana che, agli occhi di una razionalità "limitata" come quella scientista, non possono che apparire come meri residui di irrazionalità. Dopo aver così esaminato nelle prime due sezioni quella che possiamo definire la pars destruens della filosofia di Gadamer, nella terza ed ultima sezione – intitolata Una terapia per la crisi della modernità: la riscoperta dell'esperienza e del sapere pratico – passo quindi ad esaminare la sua pars costruens, consistente a mio giudizio in un recupero critico di quello che egli chiama «un altro tipo di sapere». Ossia, in un tentativo di riabilitazione di tutte quelle forme pre- ed extra-scientifiche di sapere e di esperienza che Gadamer considera costitutive della «dimensione ermeneutica» dell'esistenza umana. La mia analisi della concezione gadameriana del Verstehen e dell'Erfahrung – in quanto forme di un «sapere pratico (praktisches Wissen)» differente in linea di principio da quello teorico e tecnico – conduce quindi ad un'interpretazione complessiva dell'ermeneutica filosofica come vera e propria filosofia pratica. Cioè, come uno sforzo di chiarificazione filosofica di quel sapere prescientifico, intersoggettivo e "di senso comune" effettivamente vigente nella sfera della nostra Lebenswelt e della nostra esistenza pratica. Ciò, infine, conduce anche inevitabilmente ad un'accentuazione dei risvolti etico-politici dell'ermeneutica di Gadamer. In particolare, cerco di esaminare la concezione gadameriana dell'etica – tenendo conto dei suoi rapporti con le dottrine morali di Platone, Aristotele, Kant e Hegel – e di delineare alla fine un profilo della sua ermeneutica filosofica come filosofia del dialogo, della solidarietà e della libertà. ; The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer – one of the cornerstones in the 20th century philosophy – certainly represents a compound, prismatic and articulated thought, i.e. a philosophy made up of several different dimensions entwined with each other. A simple look at Gadamer's major work Wahrheit und Methode (1960) can already clarify this point, since the book displays a theory of understanding which takes account of three different dimensions of human experience – art, history and language – obviously conceived as mutually related. But this picture gets a lot more complicated if one takes into consideration the many books and articles Gadamer wrote before and after his magnum opus which testify the presence of other interests and topics in his thought. Nevertheless the complexity of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics has not always been recognized by his interpreters, who often concentrated only upon Wahrheit und Methode (in particular upon the problems of the Geisteswissenschaften) and gave no attention to other subjects (in particular the ethical and political dimension of his hermeneutical philosophy). Moreover it seems to me that many interpreters didn't pay enough attention to the fundamental unity – which of course doesn't mean "sistematicity" – that reigns in Gadamer's philosophy despite its pluralist and heterogeneous character. My point is that the many dimensions of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics – aesthetics and human sciences, language philosophy and moral philosophy, dialogue with the Greeks and critical confrontation with modern thought, reflections upon anthropological problems and observations concerning our actual sociopolitical, scientific and technological condition – actually represent the different sides of one thought centered on what we could define the malaise of modernity. In other words, it seems to me that the whole of Gadamer's philosophy originates from the consciousness raising of the critical situation in which our world finds itself today: a deep crisis which, according to Gadamer, branches out into manifold directions and various dimensions of human life. My interpretation tries then to give an account of both the pars destruens and pars costruens of Gadamer's philosophy, namely of his attempt to investigate and take a hard look at this critical dimensions of human existence in order to let out the point at issue and propose remedies, alternatives and possible solutions. In the first section – entitled Phenomenology of modernity: the various symptoms of the crisis – I explain how a great part of the 20th century philosophy has been concerned with the idea and the feeling of a crisis of our culture and our civilization. In my view Gadamer's hermeneutics too takes part in this global philosophical discourse. I try then to show and illustrate the various symptoms of this crisis analyzed by Gadamer, such as: socioeconomic pathologies of our bureaucratic societies; world-wide growth of the Western way of life to the detriment of other cultures; crisis of our values and beliefs (and consequent spread of relativism, skepticism and nihilism); growing inability to have meaningful relations with art, poetry and culture; finally, problems concerning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the risk of an ecological crisis, and the disturbing, unpredictable consequences of some recent scientific discoveries (above all in the field of genetics). Once outlined Gadamer's critical view of our age, in the second section – entitled Diagnosis of the malaise of modernity: the spread of instrumental and techno-scientific reason – I try to show how, according to Gadamer, a common root lies at the base of the many symptoms of the crisis, namely the birth of modern science and its close, intrinsic relationship with technique and with a specific form of rationality that Gadamer – with reference to the analysis developed by such thinkers as Max Weber, Martin Heidegger and the so-called Frankfurt School – calls «instrumental reason» or «calculating thinking». I try then to give an account of the gadamerian conception of techno-science, meanwhile highlighting some aspects: first, how Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics should not be interpreted as an antiscientific thought but rather as an antiscientistic thought (which of course is something quite different); second, how Gadamer's reconstruction of the malaise of modernity never ends up in a "totalizing" critique of reason, nor in some sort of negativistic and pessimistic philosophy of history centered on the idea of an inescapable course of the events guided by a polluted, "irrational" rationality; third, how Gadamer – despite all the inveterate interpretations that read his philosophy as a form of authoritarian, traditionalist and antienlightenment thought – never aimed to reject the modern scientific Enlightenment tout court but rather to "correct" some of its tendencies and so to regain a wider and more comprehensive concept of reason. After having analyzed in the first two sections the pars destruens of Gadamer's philosophy, in the third and last section of my work – entitled Therapy of the crisis of modernity: the rediscovery of experience and practical knowledge – I take into consideration the pars costruens of his thought, which according to my interpretation consists of a rediscovery of what he calls «a different kind of knowledge», i.e. of a rehabilitation of the all those forms of pre- and extra-scientific experience that constitute the «hermeneutical dimension» of human life. My analysis of Gadamer's conception of understanding and experience – seen as forms of «practical knowledge» different in principle from theoretical and technical knowledge – leads then to a global interpretation of philosophical hermeneutics as practical philosophy, i.e. as a philosophical elucidation of the prescientific, intersubjective and "of commonsense" reasoning which characterizes our «life-world» and our practical life. But obviously this analysis also implies a special consideration of the ethical and political implications of Gadamer's thought. In particular, I try to examine Gadamer's conception of ethics – taking account of his relation with Plato's, Aristotle's, Kant's and Hegel's moral theories – and finally I sketch an outline of his philosophical hermeneutics as a philosophy of freedom, dialogue and solidarity.
The Human Rights topic is increasing its relevance in the field of legal studies and in the agenda of inter/transnational actors. The Sociology of Law is deeply engaged in this dialogue, but some of its contributions seem to share a common lack of concern about the dimensions of cultural legitimacy and politics of imagination. Refusing the "simplistic" vision of «legal transplants», the approach in term of regionalization and the genealogical theories (i.e. the so called generations of human rights), the thesis aims to outline a multidisciplinary frame, trying to merge the anthropological and the socio-legal knowledge to shed light on the «anthropologies of human rights». The use of the plural suggests several orders of realities: firstly, it reflects the high fragmentation which characterizes the epistemological and methodological debate of contemporary anthropology, as a disciplinary field. An "internal" multiplication of points of view which becomes even more striking in its interactions whit the HR subject and its own kind of internal dissemination. Secondly (and consequently), it enlightens that the "pluralisation" of human rights discourse could be better understood as a proliferation of world-visions and axiologies. In this second meaning, the summoned «anthropologies» have to be intended in term of theories on human beings, on social reality and social order, shaped by cultural assumptions, taken-for-granted and (shared) symbolical repertoires. Deeply merged within every manifestation of the «humanitarian transnational narration», these world-versions need to be studied as sources of influence and inspiration for legal claims, texts and declarations that build the corpus of international humanitarian law. Lastly, this plurality which stems from the relationship between the macro-narrative of the International Bill of Human Rights and its situated appropriations points out the potentiality of a cultural analysis of the social life of (human) rights in avoiding the dichotomist models (universalism versus relativism, global versus local and so on) in favor of a representation in term of narrative encounters between different conceptions of human dignity, human beings, normative orders and social realities. To grasp this mutual and multilayered overlapping, the first part of the thesis builds an analytical framework destined to be applied, in the second part, to the specific context of the «African system of human rights». This choice was dictated by the peculiarities which seem to distinguish it from others regional systems: amongst these features, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights deserves a special place, considered its aspects of relevant innovation and creativity as well its signs of criticism and its lack of real efficacy. In the first chapter we start from the general liaison between Law and Culture, looking for a «relational paradigm» which rejects determinist or reductionist presentations of this organic link. Adopting a pluralist point of view (centered on the idea of «normative pluralism» preferred to the classical one in term of «legal pluralism»), we borrow some insights from early anthropological researches on «primitive law» and on the co-existence of plural normative orders in colonial settings. The second chapter deals with the concept of «legal culture», trying to discuss a cardinal notion of sociology of law that often pretend to exhaustively grasp the complexity of law/culture nexus. We explore the richness and the pitfalls of influent theorizations about this topic, sorting out three dimensions which seem to require a deeper engagement: the power, the (construction of the) collective identities and the pluralism. In strict dialogue with the studies on «legal consciousness» and «legal socialization», we move towards a textual description of culture. The third chapter sketches a theory of culture in term of cognitive and normative interface between men and the meaningful world they try to create (and to live in). Borrowing from Clifford Geertz the fundamental ideas about the «social traffic of meanings», the textual dimension of cultures and the law as a way of world-making – or better, of imaging the reality –, we keep developing our model in a more comprehensive perspective which dismisses the "literary" constraints entrenched in the idea of «text». The forth chapter deals with some assumptions of the so-called «narrative paradigm», trying to "dissolve" the persisting rigidities of the textual frame into a larger and (more) universal human ability: the narrative competence. We examine the coalescence between narrative attitude and normative attitude, stressing the similarities and the constitutive power of both of them. Starting from narration as a meta-model for the social construction of reality, we move towards the specificities of «legal narration» as expression of the legal construction of social reality. This narrative standpoint can be synthesized as follow: the human skill to produce, to understand and to manipulate tales (and other sources of narrative production) is the key that ensures the transmission and the socializations of cultural meanings, representations and symbols. Trough the narrativization of culture it becomes easier to conceive the narrativization of legal cultures as shared, contested, polyphonic repertories of legal and social ideas. In the fifth chapter we start applying our theoretical framework to the human rights topic. We begin with a preliminary set of issues regrouped under the label of «spatial problematic». It underlines the paradox of the Universalist project, with its claims of cultural independence and planetary applicability on the one hand, and the need of cultural resonance and local relevance on the other. We explore critical contributions about the «globalization talk», which stress some traps of this overriding way of representing social and socio-legal phenomena in the contemporary world. Aiming to reject monodimensional explanations, we merge the «rhetoric of flaws» with the sensibility for «friction events» generated by and trough the encounters between transnational narratives and specific local (and cultural) settings. The concept of «vernacularization» helps us to conceive these interactions/intersections between global flows and punctual frictions. The sixth chapter introduces the main elements of the African context, starting from a sketched portrait of what we define its «radical normative pluralism». In order to cope with the complex reality of the African human rights system, we outline a historical (and political) description of the events that preceded the creation of the Organization for the African Unity, the institutional body which had the main responsibility in the consolidation of the system itself. We also examine various "legal" precedents (the so-called Lagos Law, the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples and so on) which influenced the elaboration of the African Charter with their moral and political authority. Whit the seventh chapter we finally land the heart of our topic: the narrative analysis of the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights. After a quick identification of the focal features of the document, we approach the meaningful core of the Charter: the organic/holistic relationship between individual human rights and collective dimension of peoples' (human) rights. We split our investigation in two different but related paths: the individual/people pole and the rights/duties pole, assuming they are two dissimilar strategies to arrange this underlying "cohabitation". We also draw to several pronunciations of the African Commission of human and peoples' rights exploring the potential meanings of people and peoples' rights to clarify the official/institutional position on the subject. Anthropological and sociological studies on the ongoing modifications of collective frames of reference (the family, the ethnic group and other strategies of kinship allegiance) in contemporary Africa are employed to complete our inquiry. In the eighth chapter we (temporary) leave the African Charter in favor of other documents and protocols produced by the African system, strictly related to the «culture variable»: the Pan-African Cultural Manifesto, the Cultural Charter for Africa and the Charter for African Cultural Renaissance. After that, we approach three other texts more engaged on the promotion and protection of human rights for specific categories of people: the African Charter on the rights and welfare of the child, the Protocol to the African Charter on human and peoples' rights on the rights of women in Africa and the African Youth Charter. Our aim is to show how cultural assumptions about the subjects concerned shape or influence the normative prescriptions designed to protect them. The ninth chapter, finally, outlines a general evaluation of our analytical model trough the exploration of its weakness and its points of strength. It shows the hermeneutical advantages provided by the «gius-narrative» key, which enabled us to trace and emphasize the links between myths and foundational narratives of social groups and theirs normative constructions. It also stresses the need for a cultural study of social life of human rights, to (try to) grasp the many faces that the struggle for human rights is showing in its continuous spread around the world.