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Subjectivism, some cultural differences, and cultural moral relativism -- A remembered incident, human rights as a "higher standard," and arguments against cultural moral relativism -- More on "higher standards," arguments against subjectivism, why Maria is not a cultural moral relativist, and manners versus morality -- Tolerance, conscience, moral universals, ethnocentrism, and moral absolutes -- Modified cultural moral relativism and qualified subjectivism -- Moral relativism versus moral absolutism, the determining type of moral relativism versus the varying type, Vishnu sums up, and different kinds of cultural differences revisited

Programs of ethical relativism notoriously face two great difficulties: 1) how can they account for our need to make ethical judgements about other groups and individuals with whom we come into conflict? and 2) how can they allow for us to criticize the group, set of desires, etc. to which our ethical norms are said to be relative? Integrity and Moral Relativism develops a moderate version of cultural relativism that can answer these questions. After examining and defending the notion of a "world-picture," and of incommensurable differences across world-pictures, the book brings its theoretical framework together with the history of anthropology to argue that a culture is indeed the appropriate expression of a world picture. It then draws on literary, philosophical and historical resources to illustrate the way in which Western society, specifically, contains traditions distinguishing legitimate cross-cultural judgment, and legitimate from illegitimate cultural self-criticism. As long as there is a language for these possibilities, an individual can see ethics as culturally based without compromising his or her integrity

The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. This text discusses the latest arguments in ethical theory in an accessible manner, with many examples and cases.

In this new edition of Foundations for Moral Relativism a distinguished moral philosopher tames a bugbear of current debate about cultural difference. J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, ""moral black holes". The six self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and virtual worlds, lying in Russian and truth-telling in Quechua, the pleasure of solitude and the fear of absurdity. Accessibly written, this book presupposes no prior training in philosophy.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- I. David Wong's Pluralistic Moral Relativism -- 1. The Strategy and Style of Wong's Approach: Working Out a Defensible Relativism -- 2. The Three Main Theses of Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- 3. Wong's Defense of Pluralistic Relativism -- 4. Wong's Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy -- II. Central Issues between Wong and His Critics -- 1. A Morality of Humanity Over and Above Moralities of Social Groups? -- 2. Can a Metaethics that Is Naturalistic, Pluralistic, and Relativistic Accommodate a Normative Morality that Is Non-Naturalistic, Monistic, or Universalistic Morality? -- 3. The Principle of Humanity vs. the Principle of Charity: Interpretation of Confucianism -- 4. Naturalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy -- 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and Realism -- 6. Speaker Relativism or Patient Relativism? -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Critical Essays -- 2. Human Morality, Naturalism, and Accommodation -- I. Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- II. The Universal Element in Morality -- III. Relativism -- IV. Accommodation -- V. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3. Naturalism and Pluralistic Relativism -- I. Introduction -- II. Individuating Moralities -- III. From Moral Ambivalence to Pluralistic Relativism? -- IV. Value Monism and Universalism Revisited -- V. Should Wong Allow Non-Naturalistic Moralities to be Adequate? -- VI. Moralities as Practiced Versus Ideal Moralities -- VII. A Problem for Wong's Reciprocity Constraint -- VIII. Wong's Use of Xunzi: A Separate Naturalistic Project? -- Acknowledgment -- Notes -- References -- 4. Principle of Humanity vs. Principle of Charity -- I. The Argument -- II. The Rival Principles of Humanity and Charity in Radical Translation -- III. The Role of Comparative Philosophy in the Argument -- IV. Xunzi and Sage Authority.

This volume examines the psychological basis of moral judgments and asks what theories of concepts apply to moral concepts. By combining philosophical reasoning and empirical insights from the fields of moral psychology, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience, it considers what mental states not only influence, but also constitute our moral concepts and judgments. On this basis, Park proposes a novel pluralistic theory of moral concepts which includes three different cognitive structures and emotions. Thus, our moral judgments are shown to be a hybrid that express both cognitive and conative states.In part through analysis of new empirical data on moral semantic intuitions, gathered via cross-cultural experimental research, Park reveals that the referents of individuals' moral judgments and concepts vary across time, contexts, and groups. On this basis, he contends for moral relativism, where moral judgments cannot be universally true across time and location but only relative to groups.This powerfully argued text will be of interest to researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in cognitive science, moral theory, philosophy of psychology, and moral psychology more broadly. Those interested in ethics, applied social psychology, and moral development will also benefit from the volume