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Moral relativism is often regarded as both fatally flawed and incompatible with liberalism. This book aims to show why such criticism is misconceived. First, it argues that relativism provides a plausible account of moral justification. Drawing on the contemporary relativist and universalist analyses of thinkers such as Harman, Nagel and Habermas, it develops an alternative account of 'coherence relativism'. Turning to liberalism, the book argues that moral relativism is not only consistent …

I could not write the essay I hoped to write. I hoped to write about cultural pluralism and moral epistemology by assuming that the first is the case and exploring what implications this may have for the second. But I soon realized that I do not know what cultural pluralism is. I do not mean that I have just belatedly discovered that the phrase "cultural pluralism" is used in different ways on different occasions. I mean that I realized that I myself did not know in what sense the phrase may be used which makes it relevant to the inquiry suggested by the general topic of this volume. So the following reflections are based on one assumption: The fact of multiculturalism cannot have much bearing on moral epistemology unless it bears on moral truths.

This article examines the social context of conceptual and moral relativism; more specifically, it explores links between religious orientation and experience in an ideologically plural setting. I argue that cultural models of 'changing places' serve to guide a number of Javanese practices: child–borrowing, gender–switching, language use, and even religious conversion. These models, formed in childhood experience, engender and express a relativism which is highly valued in rural Java.

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Table of Contents -- Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? -- On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks -- Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? -- Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel -- Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? -- Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung -- Two Ways of Exploring the World -- The Truth of Social Constructivism -- The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion -- Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality -- Angelina's Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible -- Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? -- Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus -- Relativisms and Their Opposites -- When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian's Antirelativism -- Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn -- Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus -- Realism without Foundation -- Constructed Reality -- Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism -- Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings -- What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? -- Relativism about Morality -- Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins -- A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing 'Truth' in Moral Relativism -- Zum Wert von Vertrauen -- Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie -- Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? -- The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics -- Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the "Person" from the Writings of Wittgenstein? -- Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke -- Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence -- Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 -- Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 -- Index of names -- Index of subjects

Note on citation style -- Abbreviations and works cited by title -- Introduction -- 1. The question of moral relativism -- 2. Happiness and the moral life -- 3. History and human destiny -- 4. The concept of race -- 5. Language and world -- 6. The place of reason -- 7. Religious diversity

Integrity : a shared moral value -- Religion, nature, and intuition as possible sources of moral truth -- Some distinctions and some mistakes -- Rights and procedures -- Principles that define morality -- Reasons for being moral -- Relativism -- Second-order principles -- Moral vs. social, ecological, and sexual values -- Moral vs. health and safety values -- Moral questions in education -- The question of moral education -- Forms of moral education

During the 1970s and 1980s, the field of ethics underwent a profound change in perspective from noncognitivism to cognitivism regarding moral judgments and reasoning. Although metaethical noncognitivism had been the predominant point of view during the previous three decades, a series of attacks had undermined its authority by the 1970s, and it gave way to the cognitivist belief that moral judgments have truth values. This book provides a descriptive and critical guide to the often bewildering scene that resulted from these controversies in contemporary moral epistemology

Preface second edition -- Introduction second edition -- Part I -- 1 Cognitive Relativism and Experiential Rationality -- 1.1 Beyond Cognitive and Linguistic Relativism -- 1.2 Epistemic Relativism Refuted -- 1.3 The Experiential Validity of the Cognitive System -- 1.3.1 Judgement and Truth -- 2 Beyond Moral Relativism and Objectivism -- 2.1 Forms of Moral Relativism -- 2.2 The Two Horns of the Dilemma: Relativism versus Objectivism -- 2.2.1 Harman's Inner-Judgments Relativism -- 2.2.2 The Limits of Nagel's Objectivism in Morality -- 2.3 Wong's Mixed Position: the Idea of Pluralistic Relativism -- 2.4 Discursive Dialectic of Recognition -- Part II -- 3 Human Rights and Pluralisitc Universalism -- 3.1 From Purposive Action to Communicative Action -- 3.1.1 Discursive dialectics and the processes of subjectivization -- 3.2 The Priority of Recognition and the Formal System of Basic Liberties -- 3.3 Human Dignity as an orienting principle of the universal system of human rights -- 3.3.1 Human Dignity as a Juridical Principle -- 3.3 The Exemplar Validity of Human Rights -- 3.4 Deliberative Constraints and Pluralistic Universalism -- 4 The Legal Dimensions of Human Rights -- 4.1 The Source and the Content Validity of Law -- 4.2 The Structure and Function of Human Rights -- 4.3 Transplantability and Legal Commensurability -- 4.4 What is Wrong in the Democratic Peace Theory -- Bibliography -- Index of names -- Index of topics.

It is frequently suggested, today, that toleration and relativism are the same thing. This essay focuses on how John Locke dealt with this issue, that is, how he defended his principle of toleration against the charges of Jonas Proast that it would devolve into unbelief and moral relativism. In replying to Proast, Locke attempts to demonstrate that his principle of toleration will not become a sanction for unbelief and that while it extends to competing conceptions of salvation it does not extend to competing conceptions of the good. That is to say, Locke builds a fire wall between the two areas, the aim of which is to confine toleration to the realm of mere theology—it is this barrier, its basis and its extent and its durability, which I explore.

The failure of internationally renowned organisations together with the global financial catastrophe in 2008, which emerged as a result of the collapse in corporate governance, in general, and business ethics, in particular, has led to an amplified focus on business ethics around the world. This has led to governments, private sector, and even individuals to call for stronger regulation and control of business practices in order to stamp out, or at least to reduce, instances of morally and ethically questionable practices.The main purpose of this study was to measure small business owners differences in moral thought based on idealism and relativism. This is measured by determining the ethical ideological classification of individuals based on Forsyths ethical taxonomy. The research followed a quantitative analysis and an online survey questionnaire was used to collect the data from Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) owners in South Africa. The results found that the majority of SME owners fall in the situationist and absolutist category of Forsyths ethical taxonomy.

Cover -- Half-Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction and Overview -- 2 Morality and Its Discontents -- 3 Reason as a Foundation for Morality -- 4 The Appeal of Moral Naturalism -- 5 Moral Relativism(s) -- 6 Appeals to God -- 7 Living as a Moral Sceptic -- 8 A Metaethical Coda -- References -- Index