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Résumé Il est tentant de confondre le pluralisme des valeurs qui caractérise les sociétés démocratiques contemporaines avec un pur et simple relativisme moral. Or, le relativisme moral n'est pas facile à justifier en tant que tel, et la démocratie libérale privilégie l'invocation d'une neutralité à l'égard des valeurs qui n'est pas un relativisme. La question la plus pertinente, qui fait l'objet d'une controverse entre républicains et libéraux, est sans doute celle, non du relativisme moral, mais de la nécessité ou non pour un État et pour une société de promouvoir des valeurs communes.

The discourse of anti-relativism in the political thought of the Catholic Church -- Elements for a public critique of the Catholic discourse of anti-relativism -- Rationalism: between relativism and religion -- Defense of a relativist conception of democracy

This article describes the origin of Bloch's moral theory, which was formulated partly as a response to Simmel's moral relativism. It also shows that Bloch's theory is a coherent example of what Charles Taylor calls "expressivism," a contemporary philosophical attitude which emphasizes the creation of values, with its transgressive character. Finally, the article addresses some shortcomings of Bloch's expressivist moral theory, and emphasizes the necessity this author felt to complete it with norms ensuring human dignity.

Jesse Prinz presents a bravura argument for highly controversial claims about morality, which go to the heart of our understanding of ourselves. He argues that moral values are based on emotional responses, and that these are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. These two claims support a form of moral relativism. - ;Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not h

Introduces the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas by presenting it as a response to the problems of relativism. While relativism offers a critique of power abuse, it has the additional effect of undermining the use of reason in political & moral action. Habermas seeks to preserve its strengths, & at the same time to defend a role for reason. Following an exploration of the gains offered by his approach, it is suggested that, though his treatment for relativism is effective, it too has a side effect. 36 References. Adapted from the source document.

Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgments are relative to the individual or culture. When stated so vaguely relativism is embraced by numerous lay persons and a sizeable contingent of philosophers. Other philosophers, however, find the thesis patently false, even wonder how anyone could seriously entertain it.Both factions are on to something, yet both miss something significant as well. Those who whole‐heartedly embrace relativism note salient respects in which ethics is relative, yet erroneously infer that ethical values are noxiously subjective. Those who reject relativism do so because they think ethics is subject to rational scrutiny, that moral views can be correct or incorrect. But in rejecting objectionable features of relativism they overlook significant yet non‐pernicious ways in which ethics is relative.In short, each side harps on the opponent's weaknesses while overlooking its own flaws. That is regrettable. We are not forced to choose between relativism and rationality. We can have both. There are ways in which ethical principles and behavior vary legitimately from culture to culture and individual to individual. That we must recognize. However this in no way suggests we cannot reason about ethics. Rather we should strive for a rational yet relativistic ethic which emphasizes the exercise of cultivated moral judgment rather than the rote application of extant moral rules. Or so I shall argue.

Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited.The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three m

Abstract: I defend cultural relativism against the following objections: (i) The analogy between motion and morality is flawed. (ii) Cultural relativism has greater potential to be harmful to our daily lives than is cultural absolutism. (iii) We made moral progress when we
moved from slavery to equality. (iv) There are some moral principles that are accepted by all cultures around the world. (v) Moral argumentation is impossible within the framework of cultural relativism. (vi) We construct arguments for and against cultures.

This paper introduces the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas by presenting it as a response to the problems of relativism. While relativism offers a critique of power abuse, it has the additional effect of undermining the use of reason in political and moral action. Habermas seeks to preserve its strengths, and at the same time to defend a role for reason. Following an exploration of the gains offered by his approach, it is suggested that, though his treatment for relativism is effective, it too has a side-effect.

Substantive moral theory / Philip Pettit -- Virtue and nature / Christopher W. Gowans -- The importance of metaphysical realism for ethical knowledge / Douglas B. Rasmussen -- Why moral judgments can be objective / Tibor R. Machan -- The importance of the subject in objective morality : distinguishing objective from intrinsic value / Tara Smith -- Evaluative concepts and objective values : rand on moral objectivity / Darryl F. WrighT -- Aristotelian constructivism / Mark LeBar -- Moral construction as a task : sources and limits / Thomas E. Hill, Jr. -- Constructing normative objectivity in ethics / David B. Wong -- What does moral phenomenology tell us about moral objectivity? / Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons -- Imaginative resistance and psychological necessity / Julia Driver -- Objectivism and relational good / Connie S. Rosati -- Foundations in Aquinas's ethics / Scott MacDonald -- Revisionary intuitionism / Michael Huemer -- Moral objectivity / Nicholas Rescher