Suchergebnisse

En quoi « le moral » et « la morale », au-delà de la consonance, peuvent-ils avoir partie liée ? Telle est la question ici posée, provoquée par quelque réticence de la part de certains, souvent étrangers au monde militaire, devant le sujet des « forces morales ». Le premier rapprochement constaté peut sembler paradoxal : au premier degré, « le moral » résultant pour une part d'une forte cohérence entre les valeurs auxquelles on se réfère et l'action que l'on a à conduire, s'accommode mieux de l'amoralité – celle du pragmatisme cynique, voie de l'immoralité, le nazisme par exemple –, que de nos références éthiques de civilisation. Il faut pourtant aller au-delà : les exigences objectivement antagonistes de l'efficacité militaire et des références morales humanistes ne peuvent être données que par une éthique – elle-même exigeante – de l'exercice du métier des armes. Il est de la responsabilité des chefs de la vivre et de la promouvoir et, par là-même, au-delà des « états d'âme », de nourrir « le moral » de leurs subordonnés.

"This book consists of two essays that are related to each other: "Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge" and "Moral Reality and Moral Progress." The longer second essay has not been previously published. Both are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments"--

Moral Judgments, Moral Virtues, and Moral Norms
The paper consists of two basic parts. In the first, contemporary approaches to moral judgments and their relations with moral virtues and moral norms are analyzed. The focus is on comparing the role of the emotions and reason, and conscious and unconscious processes in forming and/or justifying moral judgments. The second part examines views on the current broader socio-political situation in Western countries and points to the growing feelings of insecurity among people mainly due to the fact that traditional ways of life have been losing solid ground, settled (social) norms and ethical systems are weakening and at the same time the social trust in various state institutions and bureaucratic structures involved in power is decreasing. In conclusion the author argues for the potential of the ethic of autonomy that would lead to still greater cooperation in globalized ethic, primarily thanks to our moral emotions and moral judgments.

Entwicklungspsychologische Befunde zur geschlechtsspezifischen Moral werden mit Blick auf Kompetenz- und Performanzebene diskutiert. Dazu werden u. a. Theorien über Geschlechtsunterschiede des moralischen Bewußtseins (Hexenhammer, S. Freud, T. Parsons und N. Chodorow) und Theorien der kognitiven Entwicklung, z. B. von J. Piaget analysiert. Der Autor stellt auf der Kompetenzebene keine geschlechtsspezifischen Differenzen fest. Bemerkenswerte Unterschiede ergeben sich aus der Performanzebene. Als Beweis dafür wird u. a. angesehen, daß bei auftretenden Differenzen sich die Frauen eher für das Gleichheits- denn für das Beitragsprinzip, das eher verletzend ist, entscheiden. Es wird darauf hingewiesen, daß Männer mehr als Frauen dazu neigen, das Niveau ihrer "moralischen Balance" niedrig anzusetzen. (KG)

Introduction. The concept of "moral agent" and its boundaries are not currently clearly defined. Given the connection between moral agency and moral responsibility, it seems necessary to introduce a clear definition of "moral agent", as well as to differentiate the types of moral agency. The hypothesis of this article is that although the notion of a moral agent in itself is rather limited, there are a number of "borderline" groups, the definition of the status of which needs to be clarified.Methodology and sources. The article provides an ethical and philosophical analysis of approaches to the definition of a moral agency, a comparative analysis of the concepts of a moral agent and a moral subject, as well as approaches to determining the moral statuses of various "borderline" groups in the context of the works of J. MacMurray, A. Taylor, I. Kant, M Rowlands, J. Searle and others.Results and discussion. The article presents an analysis of the definitions of a "moral agent", highlights the key features that make it possible to speak of a moral agency as an independent moral concept, as well as determine the conditions for the onset of moral agency. To differentiate the types of moral agents, the article introduces the concept of "limited moral agent" to denote the special status of children and the mentally ill. Evidence is provided that people belonging to these categories may have the status of a moral agent, although not to the extent that this status initially implies. As part of the definition of artificial intelligence as a "quasi-moral agent", the key features of AI in the framework of moral communication between AI and a person are identified.Conclusion. Based on the analysis, the article proposes a number of requirements for a moral agency. Based on these requirements, it is proposed to distinguish such types of moral agency as a limited moral agent, including children and the mentally ill, as well as a quasi-moral agent, which is an artificially created agent, including artificial intelligence.

"This book argues there can be no theory of ethics and that any attempt at such a theory ends up distorting the moral phenomena that it is supposed to explain. It presents clear examples of moral thought outside moral theorising through literature and Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The book's precise target is moral theory understood as a theory of right action. The author begins by arguing against the assumption central to moral theory that moral judgments are universalizable; that what it is right for one agent to do in a given situation is what is right for any agent in that same situation. Rather, moral judgments are essentially first personal. The author's specific contention here is that our understanding of moral thought in literature provides grounds for rejecting the assumption that moral judgments are universalizable. The author then goes on to argue that there is some determinate and objective content to ethics connected to recognising another human being as a limit to our will. He presents several literary examples that have influenced his thinking about the nature of moral value. He combines these readings with insights from Wittgenstein's later writings to demonstrate the ways in which moral theorising fails to capture important aspects of moral thought. Moral Thought Outside Moral Theory will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics and moral theory, literature and philosophy, and Wittgenstein"--

Im vorliegenden Beitrag unterscheidet Luhmann zunächst Risiko und Gefahr. Von Risiko ist immer dann zu sprechen, wenn Nachteile einer eigenen Entscheidung zugerechnet werden müssen. Als Gefahr kann man jede nicht allzu unwahrscheinliche negative Einwirkung auf den eigenen Lebenskreis bezeichnen, etwa die Gefahr, daß ein Blitz einschlägt und daß das Haus abbrennt. Das Risiko ist also, anders als Gefahr, ein Aspekt von Entscheidungen. Diese Unterscheidung macht deutlich, daß die technologische Entwicklung, auch wenn sie in sich relativ ungefährlich wäre, zu einem Anschwellen der Risiken führt. Auf dieses moderne Risikoerleben mit einer "Neuen Ethik der Verantwortung" zu reagieren, hält der Autor für obsolet. Das Problem liegt nicht in der Verantwortung für Risiken, "sondern in der Wahrscheinlichkeit von vermeidbaren Irrtümern bei der Entscheidung über Risiken". (pmb)

The crisis of neoliberal capitalism and liberal democracy has a genesis stretching back a decade or longer. Why is it that, until now, socialists and those on the left have struggled to articulate a coherent counter-hegemonic discourse? We argue that at least part of this failing comes
from an ambivalence about making the moral argument for socialist transformation. Both a moral critique of the existing order and the articulation of socialist future grounded in a distinct moral order are necessary components of transformative change: they are able to fix substantive policy
initiatives - whether a green new deal, universal basic income or the nationalisation of essential services - within a broader vision of how society and the state should function, and on whose behalf. Morals are important in the functioning of any socio-economic order - communicating meaning,
providing rationale and generating expectations regarding the practices of ourselves and others. They construct and stabilise contingent social orders and hierarchies. The current social contract is characterised by increased individualisation, responsibilisation and the moral imperative towards
competition and consumption. Morals are what allow people to tolerate current conditions. But as contemporary capitalism becomes increasingly uninhabitable, a moral critique - that is the ability to both unpick what stabilises the current conjuncture and offer an alternative - becomes all
the more urgent. We look at a number of initiatives and movements, most but not all lodged in the anti-austerity protests of the past decade, for examples of such political strategies. In such movements we see how material criticisms of capitalism are grounded in concrete struggles for justice
and emancipation but framed in a counter-hegemonic moral framework that explicitly challenges the status quo.