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The dissertation explores the impact of motivated reasoning, a tendency for reasoning to proceed with the goal of construing evidence in ways that are supportive of a desired conclusion, for normative discussions in the epistemology of disagreement and political philosophy. The introduction provides a brief overview of the psychology of motivated reasoning and its consequences. One of these is belief polarization, a tendency for the beliefs of people who initially disagree to move toward the extremes after the persons view the same body of evidence. Another is that deliberation in groups with internal disagreement is an effective means of epistemic improvement. The introduction also provides overviews of the epistemology of disagreement and the role of disagreement for political legitimacy, and details the contributions of the four articles to these debates.Article 1 responds to arguments for the conclusion that belief polarization is a rational phenomenon. It argues that, when disagreement is salient, the biased processing of evidence that results in belief polarization is incompatible with rationality, and the resulting polarized beliefs are neither reliably formed nor supported by the evidence, properly construed. Article 2 discusses the epistemic significance of political disagreement. It shows that motivated reasoning about politically salient propositions implies that a political opposite's familiarity with relevant evidence and their intellectual virtues are inversely correlated with their perceived probability of being right, conditional on disagreement. This presents us with a puzzle in determining how significant such disagreements are, one that cannot be escaped by denying that political disagreements in general are epistemically significant. Article 3 discusses the impact of the beneficial effects of collective deliberation in groups with internal disagreement for the epistemic significance of discovered disagreement. It argues that these benefits can provide one with epistemic reason to maintain confidence in the face of discovered disagreement when doing so promotes epistemically fruitful deliberation. Article 4 discusses the impact of motivated reasoning in defense of our political or cultural values for the legitimacy of democratic decision-making. It addresses the extent to which democratic authorities should be responsive to mistaken factual beliefs in the public when these beliefs are the result of motivated reasoning in defense of controversial doctrines, and whetherfactual beliefs, even when supported by our best science, are excluded from public reason if they are entangled in a cultural dispute.

I wrote this thesis to create a better understanding of how individual characteristics influence our feelings, our behavior and our way of interpreting information. My focus is on financial behavior and financial information, however I also consider a political context. I investigate the (usually) enabling abilities of financial literacy and numeracy. I also consider impediments such as stereotype threat and motivated reasoning, which can prevent people from engaging in certain behaviors or from interpreting information objectively. Both processes stem from valued beliefs and psychological foundations, consequently peoples' efforts, decisions, and evaluations are based on them. The first essay, "Competence, confidence, and gender: The role of perceived and actual financial literacy in household finance," broadens our understanding of the benefits of financial competence. I contrast perceived and actual levels of financial literacy, and consider the role of numeracy and cognitive reflective ability. I conclude that perceived and actual levels of financial literacy positively affect behavior and wellbeing; however, perceived financial literacy more so than actual financial literacy. No such effect is observed for numeric ability and cognitive reflection. Furthermore, women are more anxious about financial matters even though they tend to engage more frequently in the considered financial behaviors. The second essay, "Threatening finance? Examining the gender gap in financial literacy," continues my exploration of the relationship between gender and financial literacy. In a series of studies, I investigate whether the observed gender gap in financial literacy can be identified in nonnumerical contexts, if it can be associated with confidence in financial matters, and if it can be attributed to stereotype threat, which posits that inbuilt prejudices about gender and finance undermine women's performance of tasks that involve finance. The results show that the observed gender gap in financial literacy is robust even in nonnumerical financial contexts and suggest that a stereotype threat for women in the financial domain might be present. The gender gap in financial literacy could not be attributed to a difference in (displayed) confidence. In the third essay, "Preferences for lump-sum over divided payment structures," I investigate whether or not people display systematic preferences for lump–sum or divided payment structures and how these preferences differ in gain (benefit) and loss (payment) situations. I investigate what happens when payments belong to a single underlying event, such as when people can choose to pay immediately or in installments. I also examine whether or not individual differences in time preferences, risk preferences, numeracy, and financial literacy are associated with preferences for one payment structure or the other. The aggregate results show a tendency for people to prefer obtaining and paying money in lump sums. I find no systematic indication that the considered individual differences play a role in this type of decision. The fourth essay, "Motivated reasoning when assessing the effect of refugee intake," inquires into differences in worldview ideology, whether people identify as nationally or globally oriented, hinder them from objectively interpreting information. I use an experiment to find out if people display motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about the effects of refugees on the crime rate. Our results show evidence of motivated reasoning along the lines of worldview ideology. However, individuals with higher numeric ability were less likely to engage in motivated reasoning, leading to the conclusion that motivated reasoning is more likely to be driven by feelings and emotional cues than by deliberate analytical processes.

Do differences in worldview ideology hinder people from objectively interpreting the effect of immigration? In an experiment with Swedish adults (n = 1015), we investigate whether people display motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about the effects of refugee intake on crime rate. Our results show clear evidence of motivated reasoning along the lines of worldview ideology (i.e., whether people identify themselves primarily as nationally oriented or globally oriented). In scenarios where refugee intake was associated with higher crime rate, nationally oriented people were 18 percentage points more likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Likewise, in scenarios where refugee intake was associated with lower crime rate, nationally oriented people were 20 percentage points less likely to make the correct assessment compared to globally oriented people. Individuals with higher numeric ability were less likely to engage in motivated reasoning, suggesting that motivated reasoning more commonly is driven by feelings and emotional cues rather than deliberate analytical processes.

Scholars often evaluate citizens' democratic competence by focusing on their ability to get relevant facts right. In this article, I show why this approach can yield misleading conclusions about citizen competence. I argue that although citizens with strong partisan loyalties might be forced to accept the same facts, they find alternative ways to rationalize reality. One such way, I show, is through the selective attribution of credit and blame. With four randomized experiments, conducted in diverse national settings and containing closed- as well as open-ended questions, I find that as partisans correctly updated economic beliefs to reflect new facts, they conversely attributed responsibility in a highly selective fashion. Although partisans might acknowledge the same facts, they are apt in seizing on and producing attributional arguments that fit their preferred worldviews.

Motivated reasoning as a pervasive feature of human psychology poses challenges to the ideal of liberal democratic government, which relies on citizens' rationality. Motivated reasoning is at least partially caused by a biased store of knowledge, a partial set of accumulated information that skews reasoning about important political issues. However, there is some evidence that specialized training in a given domain may reduce the effects of motivated reasoning within that domain. To test whether a similar phenomenon is evident in the field of international relations, a signal detection technique is used to measure knowledge of U.S. foreign policy among two samples, one of IR professors and one of laypersons. The results uncover significant differences between experts and nonexperts, indicating that training in IR helps to reduce biases in knowledge, potentially providing "knowledge constraints" on motivated reasoning. Nonetheless, some evidence of bias among IR professors remains, suggesting that knowledge constraints on motivated reasoning may not fully allay normative concerns of bias in the domain of international relations.

Motivated reasoning as a pervasive feature of human psychology poses challenges to the ideal of liberal democratic government, which relies on citizens' rationality. Motivated reasoning is at least partially caused by a biased store of knowledge, a partial set of accumulated information that skews reasoning about important political issues. However, there is some evidence that specialized training in a given domain may reduce the effects of motivated reasoning within that domain. To test whether a similar phenomenon is evident in the field of international relations, a signal detection technique is used to measure knowledge of U.S. foreign policy among two samples, one of IR professors and one of laypersons. The results uncover significant differences between experts and nonexperts, indicating that training in IR helps to reduce biases in knowledge, potentially providing "knowledge constraints" on motivated reasoning. Nonetheless, some evidence of bias among IR professors remains, suggesting that knowledge constraints on motivated reasoning may not fully allay normative concerns of bias in the domain of international relations. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Research on partisan motivated reasoning shows that citizens perceive the world differently based upon their partisan allegiances. Here we marshal evidence from several national surveys to investigate whether partisan motivated reasoning is attenuated among partisans situated within disagreeable political discussion networks. While our analyses suggest that exposure to interpersonal disagreement is associated with weaker partisan identities, we find limited evidence that disagreement attenuates partisan differences in knowledge or retrospective evaluations of the economy. This suggests that interpersonal disagreement is unlikely to help reduce partisan motivated reasoning. Our results thus speak to important debates concerning the influence of social discussion on political attitudes, the nature of partisan motivated reasoning and the ability of citizens to hold elites accountable.

General election presidential debates are highly argumentative encounters filled with evidence, argument, and refutation. While the candidates come to the debates armed with evidence and arguments in support of their positions, it is unclear how the audience interprets the information. This paper reports the findings from a study of the first presidential debate in 2012. Participants evaluated the strength of arguments made by Obama and Romney, as well as which candidate won each segment of the debate. The study confirms that viewers do not dispassionately evaluate the debate, but instead are driven by partisan interests that lead them to find their candidate made stronger arguments and won the debate. Partisan motivations overwhelmed the structural changes in the 2012 debate format designed to encourage more in-depth discussion of the topic.

With the rise of social media and fast-paced news, the American electorate is inundated with information now more than ever. One of the consequences of the increase in technology is the proliferation of fake news. Fake news is defined as "fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent" (Lazer et al. 2018). The growth of the Internet means that more information is conveniently accessible to people without any sort of vetting for factual basis.Although scholars have done much to chart the landscape of fake news, less is known about how much people believe it and why. This dissertation seeks to understand the role of news source cues and the individual characteristics and traits that shape the believability of news. The credibility of a source affects whether people believe what they see, read, or hear. When the source is high in credibility, people are likely to accept the information as true but if the source is low in credibility, people are likely to be skeptical or reject the information. For the news, previous research suggests that source credibility matters in precisely this way (Druckman 2001). Yet, the credibility of a news source can be ambiguous, and people often have biases that predispose them to believing a story. Such is the world of fake news wherein "news organizations" masquerading as reputable sources peddle sensationalistic stories. Using a nationally representative sample, I conducted a survey experiment featuring ten news stories and a variety of news sources, mainstream and fake. I find little evidence that people are mindful of the news source. Regardless of whether a story comes from a well-established source such as ABC News or an unknown fake news source, people largely disregard news source cues. Instead, in line with the theories of partisan motivated reasoning, respondents react to the partisan tenor of news, believing news that confirms their partisan biases and disbelieving news to the contrary. Aside from partisanship, I also find various traits, some political and some nonpolitical such as the Big 5 personality traits, to help account for who is susceptible to fake news. I find that those who are low in political knowledge, high in self-monitoring, and high in magical thinking are more likely to be susceptible to believing in fake news.

ABSTRACT: Recent studies find motivated reasoning in citizens' processing of information about public performance. Using experiments in the US and Denmark, we examine effects on an accuracy-based task of two forms of motivated reasoning: partisan identity-based reasoning and reasoning from ideology-based governance preferences (favoring either the public or the private sector). The experiments incorporate a political prime, a health care needs prime (to reduce politicization), and a neutral, no-prime, condition. We find that priming citizens to think politically accentuates the influence of partisan identities and governance preferences on reasoning. In contrast, priming about the need for a service reduces these biases. These findings extend knowledge of motivated reasoning in an accuracy-based task and priming with a no-prime benchmark, and confirm some findings of previous studies. Reducing the salience of partisan identities or governance preferences in the presentation of information may help stimulate more accuracy-based reasoning about public performance.

A large disconnect exists between the general public's acceptance of human-caused climate change and the prevailing consensus of actively publishing scientists. Previous research has examined both political and economic motivated reasoning, media influence in print and television, conspiracy ideation as a predictor of science rejection, and the role of the social construction of scientific knowledge in science rejection. Using these previously studied justifications for climate change rejection as a starting point, this research examines 212 written responses to a prompt at Climate Etc. asking the community to explain their acceptance / rejection of climate change. Using a textual content analysis, this study finds that media choice, motivated reasoning, conspiracy ideation, and the scientific construction of knowledge all play important roles in explanations for climate science rejection. Work and educational background, as well as a reframing of the scientific consensus as a "religion," add new analytical perspectives to the motivated reasoning explanations offered in prior research. This analysis also finds that the explanations for climate science denial given by respondents are often complex, falling into two or more of the explanation types suggesting that science rejection may be a more complex social process than previously thought. ; 2015-08-01 ; M.A. ; Sciences, Sociology ; Masters ; This record was generated from author submitted information.

We draw from theories of motivated reasoning, dual-processing models, and attribution of responsibility to examine how scientific messages may increase public polarization with respect to emerging risk issues such as Lyme disease. A nationally representative sample of Americans (N = 460) read messages about Lyme disease that varied the framing of responsibility for the prevalence of the disease (human/wildlife vs. wildlife only) and when its effects will occur (today vs. in the next 10 years). The influence of framing was contingent on participants' partisanship, which resulted in a boomerang effect among Republicans and increased the degree of political polarization regarding support for proenvironmental behaviors.

Introduction. This paper examines the potential of the motivated reasoning approach as a framework explaining why people prefer and use health-related misinformation. Method. Conceptual analysis of a sample of 41 studies drawing on the motivated reasoning approach examine the selection and use of information and misinformation. Results. Preferring and using health-related misinformation occur most likely when people are primarily driven by directional goals. They tend to give rise to confirmation bias which favours the adherence to existing beliefs about the relevance of information sources of certain types, for example, websites advocating anti-vaccination ideas. Moreover, disconfirmation bias results in the rejection of information that challenges the existing beliefs about an issue. Directional goals seldom appear in a pure form because motivated reasoning is also driven by accuracy goals motivating people to select and use information that enables them to support, justify and defend their beliefs against critique. Conclusion. Motivated reasoning offers a relatively robust psychological approach to the study of reasons by which people prefer and use misinformation in order to confirm their existing beliefs and to protect their identities. There is a need to explore further the potential and limitations of the motivated reasoning approach by conducting empirical research focusing on controversial and politicized issues such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. ; publishedVersion ; Peer reviewed

It has long been understood that political knowledge in the U.S. is very low. For those who care about the quality of American democracy, this is a big problem. In attempting to find a solution, many people often blame education. While increasing civic knowledge is a laudatory goal, increased political sophistication does not necessarily turn individuals into good democratic citizens. Research in cognitive and social psychology paints a picture of people as motivated reasoners. Instead of having an open-minded engagement with issues, individuals typically only seek, see, and understand information in a manner that reinforces what they already believe. Here, we examine motivated reasoning and argue that the strongest partisans and the most committed ideologues will be the most susceptible to holding contradictory policy positions with regard to same-sex marriage and religious freedom.

News media offer balanced political messages and many citizens also seek content that presents two sides of a political issue. Despite this supply and demand, most work on information processing tests exposure to one-sided content, i.e., either pro- or counter-attitudinal. We advance this work by studying (1) how balanced and one-sided messages affect information processing; (2) whether the processing of balanced information is moderated by individual motivations; and (3) the impact of balanced exposure on attitude polarization. Using an online experiment (N = 677), we primed either accuracy or defensive motivation and examined how participants processed information about two distinct issues (i.e., climate change and Syrian refugees). On both issues, participants were less biased in response to balanced content, compared to one-sided content. In addition, defensive and accuracy motivated people processed balanced content in a similar manner. Furthermore, pro-attitudinal content polarized individual attitudes, but not balanced content, and this effect was not moderated by motivation.