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Some twenty-five years ago, John Ruggie defined "multilateralism" in
terms that remain apposite today. As an international lawyer, this
definition prompts me to reflect on the connections between the
international legal order and multilateralism. To be sure, international law
has unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral features, for example in
lawmaking or law enforcement. Similarly, it can be wielded to unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral ends. Indeed, it is precisely because it
transcends ends and issue areas, that international law, by providing
"generalized" principles of conduct and interaction, is an important
component of multilateralism.

There is a crisis in multilateralism. This paper examines multilateralism by looking at the two most important current efforts to devise new multilateral rules binding all nations; the negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) of trade rules and the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to devise rules restricting the annual emissions of greenhouse gases. Both negotiations have failed after several years of intensive effort. There are remarkable parallels in these negotiations. Both have used the same approach to negotiations; consensus decision-taking, a bottom-up approach and differential treatment of developing countries, and complex modalities. These features have made the negotiations tortuous. Major changes in international relations have made agreement impossible to date: large global market imbalances and changes in geopolitical balances have produced a general distrust among major parties and an absence of leadership. What is needed most of all is a common or shared vision of the gains from binding multilateral rules for the world economy.

AbstractThis Article challenges the conventional wisdom that states are always free to choose whether to participate in multilateral regimes. International law often mandates multilateralism to ensure that state laws and practices are compatible with sovereign equality and joint stewardship. The Article maps mandatory multilateralism's domain, defines its requirements, and examines its application to three controversies: the South China Sea dispute, the United States' withdrawal from the 2015 Paris Agreement, and Bolivia's case against Chile in the International Court of Justice.

International organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy. Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, even in well-functioning democracies, in a number of important ways: by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes. The article discusses conflicts and complementarities between multilateralism and democracy, outlines a working conception of constitutional democracy, elaborates theoretically the ways in which multilateral institutions can enhance constitutional democracy, and discusses the empirical conditions under which multilateralism is most likely to have net democratic benefits, using contemporary examples to illustrate the analysis. The overall aim is to articulate a set of critical democratic standards appropriate for evaluating and helping to guide the reform of international institutions. Adapted from the source document.