Suchergebnisse

Multiparty negotiation is a developing but complex field whose literature is scattered across a broad range of disciplines and sources. This collection consolidates this knowledge by bringing together classic works and cutting-edge papers from law international politics, organization studies and public administration

"Gesture in Multiparty Interaction confronts the competing views that exist regarding gesture's relationship to language. In this work, Emily Shaw examines embodied discourses in American Sign Language and spoken English and seeks to establish connections between sign language and co-speech gesture. By bringing the two modalities together, Shaw illuminates the similarities between certain phenomena and presents a unified analysis of embodied discourse that more clearly captures gesture's connection to language as a whole. Shaw filmed Deaf and hearing participants playing a gesture-based game as part of a social game night. Their interactions were then studied using discourse analysis to see whether and how Deaf and hearing people craft discourses through the use of their bodies. This volume examines gesture, not just for its iconic, imagistic qualities, but also as an interactive resource in signed and spoken discourse. In addition, Shaw addresses the key theoretical barriers that prevent a full accounting of gesture's interface with signed and spoken language. Her study pushes further the notion that language is fundamentally embodied"--

The objective of this paper is to identify crucial research problems occurring in multiparty negotiations. The formulation of those problems is necessary to elaborate methodological framework for the analysis of such negotiations, in order to find effective tools of conducting them. Firstly, the general idea of multiparty negotiations was presented, pointing out their features in comparison with typical, two-party (bilateral) negotiations. Secondly, in the subsequent parts of the paper, crucial research problems of multiparty negotiations analysis were characterized, according to the dimensions of complexity of such negotiations, namely: informational and computational, social, procedural and strategic ones. Moreover some potential solutions to those problems were suggested as well. Summing up the paper, the subsequent areas of research were pointed out.

The pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) solution to multiparty auctions makes the strong but unrealistic assumption that all participants share the same beliefs about the type distributions of the others, and that all know that this information is mutually known. This paper proposes two alternative analyses of such auction problems that do not make that presupposition. The first is based on a solution concept similar to the PSNE. The second is employs the level k thinking solution concept.

"Coalition preferences in multiparty systems have received increasing attention in recent
years, both as an additional political identity beyond parties and as another explanatory factor for vote decisions above and beyond party preferences. In this paper, we use survey data from the
2006 Austrian election to investigate the accessibility of party and coalition preferences and the extent to which coalition preferences can be explained by party preferences and other affective and cognitive factors such as candidates, ideology, and issue positions. The evidence suggests that questions about coalitions are associated with longer response times than similar questions about party preferences, that is, respondents must make more of a cognitive effort to form and/or retrieve them. Finally, coalition preferences are only partially predicted by party preferences and
candidate evaluations, while policy preferences are mostly unrelated. Coalition preferences
emerge as a fairly independent factor in multiparty systems." (author's abstract)