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Working paper
"Nash-in-Nash" tariff bargaining
In: Journal of international economics, Band 122, S. 103263
ISSN: 0022-1996
Interview with Mary Nash ; ENTREVISTA A MARY NASH
Mary Nash was one of the first historians who, in a context certainly adverse, affirmed and showed that women had also been protagonists of the past. In addition to promoting the process of academic institutionalization of this field of historical research, he approached feminist historiographical debates to Spanish historians and opened central lines of research in the history of women and gender for contemporary Spain: women and anarchism, women and movement worker, historical feminism, women in the Civil War, women, colonialism and postcoloniality, women, gender and Transition to democracy. ; Mary Nash fue una de las primeras historiadoras que, en un contexto ciertamente adverso para ello, afirmó y mostró que las mujeres también habían sido protagonistas del pasado. Además de impulsar el proceso de institucionalización académica de este ámbito de investigación histórica, acercó a las historiadoras españolas los debates historiográficos feministas y abrió líneas de investigación centrales en la historia de las mujeres y género para la España contemporánea: mujeres y anarquismo, mujeres y movimiento obrero, feminismo histórico, las mujeres en la Guerra Civil, mujeres, colonialismo y postcolonialidad, mujeres, género y Transición a la democracia.
BASE
Walter Nash
In: Political science, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 61-70
ISSN: 0112-8760, 0032-3187
Nash bargaining solution with coalitions and the joint bargaining paradox
In: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Band 01-15
"The authors propose a solution for bargaining problems where coalitions are bargainers. The solution generalizes the Nash solution and allows one to interpret a coalition as an institutional player whose preferences are obtained by aggregating the preferences of the individual members. One implication of the solution is that forming a coalition is unprofitable in pure-bargaining situations (the joint-bargaining paradox). The authors show, however, that forming a coalition can be profitable in a non-pure bargaining situation." (author's abstract)
DSGE Nash: Solving Nash Games in Macro Models
In: ECB Working Paper No. 2022/2678
SSRN
Nash Claim
In: International law reports, Band 20, S. 213-214
ISSN: 2633-707X
State Responsibility — For Debts — Bonds — Default on — Whether a Breach of Contract Involving State Responsibility.
Mike Nash
In: Labor: studies in working-class history of the Americas, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 171-172
ISSN: 1558-1454
Walter Nash
In: Political science, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 61-70
ISSN: 2041-0611
Nash Equilibrium
In: History of political economy, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 639-666
ISSN: 1527-1919
Minimax-Nash
In: Research Department staff report
In: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 52
In: Staff report 52
In: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Nash Caldera
In: Tijdschrift voor genderstudies, Band 22, Heft 2, S. 183-190
ISSN: 2352-2437
Walter Nash
In: Labour history: a journal of labour and social history, Heft 34, S. 106
ISSN: 1839-3039
Walter Nash
In: Pacific affairs: an international review of Asia and the Pacific, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 157
ISSN: 1715-3379