Suchergebnisse

Norge er internasjonalt forpliktet til å avstå fra våpeneksport dersom det er overveiende sannsynlig at materiellet som eksporteres kan brukes i humanitærrettsbrudd. I tillegg har Norge nasjonale vedtak om å ikke eksportere våpen til krigende land uten at eksporten er sikkerhetspolitisk motivert, fortrinnsvis av alliansehensyn. Likevel vedvarte Norges eksport av militærmateriell til flere land i den Saudi-Arabia-ledede koalisjonen under krigen i Jemen; en koalisjon som har begått utallige humanitærrettsbrudd i Jemen, og som Norge eksporterer til på kommersielt grunnlag. Denne artikkelen undersøker hvordan norske myndigheter har legitimert våpeneksporten til land som kriger i Jemen. Artikkelen finner at legitimeringen er konstruert rundt fem dimensjoner, hvorav fire tar form som offentlig kommuniserte forsikringer om at norske myndigheter har full kontroll og følger regelverket. En femte dimensjon, bevisst utelatt og ikke-kommunisert av myndighetene, men synlig i lekkede kilder, omhandler bekymringer om at stans i eksporten kan skade forsvarsindustriens markedsmuligheter i regionen. Artikkelens konklusjon er todelt: For det første viser kombinasjonen av forsikringer og utelatelse at legitimeringen av eksporten til koalisjonslandene i stor grad er ment å berolige kritikere. For det andre viser innholdet i legitimeringen at eksporten hviler på en tidvis feilaktig fortolkning av retningslinjene for våpeneksporten.
Abstract in English:Legitimation Between Norms and Interests. Norway's Arms Exports to Countries at War in YemenNorway is internationally obliged to abstain from arms exports in the presence of an overriding risk that the exported equipment can be used in international humanitarian law violations. In addition, Norwegian national decisions state that Norway should not export weapons to warring countries without the export being motivated by security policy, particularly alliance considerations. Nevertheless, Norway's arms exports to several countries in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition persisted during the war in Yemen; a coalition that has committed numerous humanitarian law violations in Yemen, and to which Norway exports on a commercial basis. This article examines how the Norwegian government has legitimized its arms exports to countries in the coalition. The article finds that the government's legitimation is constructed around five dimensions, four of which take the form of publicly communicated reassurances that the government is in full control and follows the regulations. A fifth dimension, deliberately omitted and not communicated by the government, but visible in leaked sources, contains concerns that stopping exports could damage the defence industry's market opportunities in the region. The article's conclusion is twofold: First, the combination of reassurances and omissions shows that the legitimation is largely intended to reassure critics. Secondly, the content of the legitimation shows that exports are based on sometimes incorrect interpretations of the guidelines for arms exports.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.