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Friends and foes of liberal neutrality assume that neutrality presupposes pluralism. On this view, the state should be neutral among the many permissible conceptions of the individual good that citizens affirm. I argue that neutrality need not be construed as a response to pluralism. I focus on the case of specifically religious neutrality and argue that it can be an appropriate political response to what I call "the fact of religious hegemony," which is a social scenario in which a particular religion is unanimously recognized as dominant. Religious neutrality, in this kind of context, requires the state to avoid all religious words and symbols that can be taken as an expression of endorsement or criticism of religion. I take this conception of religious neutrality from both political history and current political practice and discourse. Neutrality was originally conceived of as a proper political response in contexts of religious hegemony both in France and in Mexico. Today, and despite the growth of religious pluralism, this conception continues to be a live political posture in the places where it first originated. I call it "neutrality as independence from religion" and argue that it differs from liberal neutrality in crucial respects.

Sweden's recent record of peaceful external relations is often contrasted with the costly and, in the end, futile attempts during earlier centuries to play power politics through wars and alliances. This experience has served to underline the importance of national defense for a credible neutrality posture. Defense expenditures are considerable. The comprehensive nature of national defense and the economic dimension of security have been stressed. Sweden shares strong economic links with the Western economies. As a result of affluence throughout the postwar era and the recognition of the importance of the Western economic channels for this prosperity, official neutrality has interfered only marginally with the private pursuit of commerce and finance. This liberal attitude toward international exchanges has included items of strategic significance, such as advanced technology, arms, and ammunition. Sweden shares with other Nordic nations an inclination for marked visibility in global issues and arenas, hoping to promote international change both in North-South issues and in East-West negotiations. The classic definition of the Swedish foreign policy doctine is freedom from alliances in peace aiming for neutrality in war.

As a member of the Common Market and a nonparticipant in NATO.

In May 2009, Taiwan took a significant step in building a modern bureaucracy by passing a statute to create a civil service neutrality system after two decades of democratization. But its agenda for building a civil service neutrality system was not modeled on that of the Western democracies. Taiwan had its own distinct agenda and followed its own path toward civil service neutrality that was adapted to the demands of a polity transformed from a party-state regime. In the case of Taiwan, the neutrality mechanism was governed by the concept of "administrative neutrality" rather than the more common concept of "political neutrality." This paper reviews and makes sense of the evolution of this concept and the neutrality system in Taiwan, and joins the debate of relevance of politics-administration dichotomy. Adapted from the source document.

The liberal doctrine that public institutions be neutral between conceptions of the good is invoked in response to the pluralism of modern society. The response can take two distinct forms: dialogical – pluralism requires a neutral public space for conversation; and non-dialogical pluralism requires a contractual sphere which allows cooperation without conversation. Both reject perfectionist political theories like Aristotle's which holds that the end of political institutions is the good life. Given pluralism, perfectionism entails the coercive imposition of contested conceptions of the good. Against this view, the paper outlines a neglected argument in Aristotle's Politics for pluralism from perfectionist premises. It defends an Aristotelian conception of a pluralist politics and associational civil society. This conception provides a sounder foundation for a public space of conversation than does the appeal to neutrality and it escapes the charge of totalitarianism made by defenders of non-dialogical neutrality.

For nearly a century, state regulators played an important role in telecommunications regulation. The 1934 Communications Act gave the Federal Communications Commission authority to regulate interstate telephone service, but explicitly left intrastate calls—which comprised 98% of Depression-era telephone traffic—to state public utility commissions. By the late 2000s, however, as landline telephony faded to obscurity, scholars and policymakers alike recognized that the era of comprehensive state telecommunications regulation had largely come to an end.Perhaps surprisingly, however, the first years of the Trump Administration have seen a resurgence in state telecommunications regulation—driven not by state institutional concerns, but by policy disagreements over net neutrality. This Article addresses the broader federalism questions raised by this net neutrality clash. Part I provides an overview of telecommunications federalism from the 1934 Communications Act through the present day, looking at the division of federal and state jurisdiction over traditional telephone service, wireless telephony, and information services. Part II examines the various steps that states have taken to regulate broadband providers' network management practices in response to the Commission's Restoring Internet Freedom Order and assesses the likelihood that these initiatives will survive a federal preemption challenge. Part III looks more broadly at the question of state authority to regulate broadband network management practices. It discusses the statutory and constitutional limits on state power to regulate broadband providers. Once the sphere of potential authority is defined, Part IV addresses how states should exercise this power and highlights alternative tools available for states that wish to shape the net neutrality debate.

Legislative safeguards for the preservation of the neutrality of the United States enacted by Congress in the fall of 1939 immediately took on added significance as the sea warfare of the belligerent powers in Europe increased in intensity. The many losses of neutral as well as belligerent vessels due to unanchored mines, submarine attacks, and other activity confirmed the prevalent opinion in the United States that the withdrawal of American persons, vessels, aircraft, and cargoes from the area of combat in the waters of northern and western Europe was a wise move. The seizure by British warships of cargoes from German ports or of German origin or ownership, although carried on neutral vessels, added to the dangers to which neutral shipping was exposed.

AbstractThis paper clarifies and answers the following question: is technology morally neutral? It is argued that the debate between proponents and opponents of the Neutrality Thesis depends on different underlying assumptions about the nature of technological artifacts. My central argument centres around the claim that a mere physicalistic vocabulary does not suffice in characterizing technological artifacts as artifacts, and that the concepts of function and intention are necessary to describe technological artifacts at the right level of description. Once this has been established, I demystify talk about the possible value-ladenness of technological artifacts by showing how these values can be empirically identified. I draw from examples in biology and the social sciences to show that there is a non-mysterious sense in which functions and values can be empirically identified. I conclude from this that technology can be value-laden and that its value-ladenness can both derive from the intended functions as well as the harmful non-intended functions of technological artifacts.