Suchergebnisse

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour -- Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. In war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism.

This article brings moral analysis to bear on the distinctive problem of maintaining the protection of non-combatants in contemporary warfare. While all warfare imposes burdens on non-combatants, moral tradition and the law of armed conflicts distinguish combatants from non-combatants and seek to protect the latter from direct, intended attacks. Much contemporary warfare rejects the two premises on which these efforts are based: that it is right and necessary to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in a society at war, and that it is necessary to distinguish direct, intended harm to non-combatants from `collateral' harm that non-combatants may suffer from properly directed and intended military actions. Indeed, as exemplified by numerous contemporary conflicts (e.g. Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland) inflamed by ethnic, religious, or ideological rivalries, recent warfare often reveals a pattern in which the armed forces of one or both sides directly and intentionally attack non-combatants as a preferred means of making war. The article addresses this problem in five steps, which define the article's five major sections: first, an analysis of the problem of warfare on non-combatants in moral terms drawn from the just war tradition; second, an examination of the historical development of non-combatant protection and the reasons for it in this tradition; third, a summary look at the protection of non-combatants in positive international law, from the law of armed conflicts through the ideas of crimes against humanity and genocide; fourth, an examination of the problem of warfare on non-combatants in two contemporary conflicts, those in Rwanda-Zaire and the former Yugoslavia; and fifth, a concluding section of moral argument for the importance of maintaining the protection of non-combatants in armed conflicts.

This article brings moral analysis to bear on the distinctive problem of maintaining the protection of noncombatants in contemporary warfare. Much contemporary warfare rejects two premises on which such efforts are based: that it is right & necessary to distinguish between combatants & noncombatants in a society at war, & it is necessary to distinguish direct, intended harm to noncombatants from "collateral" harm that noncombatants may suffer from properly directed & intended military actions. Indeed, as exemplified by numerous contemporary conflicts, recent warfare often reveals a pattern in which the armed forces of one or both sides directly & intentionally attack noncombatants as a preferred means of making war. The article addresses this problem in five steps: (1) an analysis of the problem of warfare on noncombatants in moral terms drawn from the just war tradition; (2) an examination of the historical development of noncombatant protection & the reasons for it in this tradition; (3) a summary look at the protection of noncombatants in positive international law, from the law of armed conflicts through the ideas of crimes against humanity & genocide; (4) an examination of the problem of warfare on noncombatants in Rwanda-Zaire & the former Yugoslavia; & (5) a moral argument for the importance of maintaining the protection of noncombatants in armed conflicts. 21 References. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Some have argued for the relevance for normative ethics of empirical research in international relations on the origins and role of moral norms. Building on such arguments, the paper considers the relevance of contemporary research in moral psychology and neuroscience for the ethics of war. Research in those fields has implications for our understanding of the sources and nature of moral beliefs and judgement, and thus may shed light on efforts to morally bound violence. In this chapter I consider how such research helps us understand the norm of non-combatant immunity, and explore the implications for understanding the effectiveness of such norms and for normative practice.