Suchergebnisse

Introduction. Locating a nonideal theory in Kant's political thought: a systematic approach -- History and politics: political history and cosmopolitanism -- A matter of orientation -- Historical patterns, political aims -- Nature, culture, and politics: political anthropology and cosmopolitanism -- Organisms, bodies politic, and progress -- Political Zweckmässigkeit, or from nature to culture -- Nature and politics: political geography and cosmopolitan right -- Teleology and peace on earth -- Peace, hospitality, and the shape of the earth -- Conclusion. Theorizing the lawfulness of the contingent in politics: a defense of teleology.

"Ideal and Nonideal Theory in Political Philosophy" published on by Oxford University Press.

In the past decade, the value of so-called ideal theory has become a major point of dispute among political theorists. While critics of ideal theory accuse this approach of "idle utopianism", its advocates fault the critics for conceding to "cynical realism". This dissertation examines two charges against ideal theory. The demandingness charge states that ideal theory fails to acknowledge the constraints on justice set by the empirical conditions that prevail in our world, and that it therefore produces invalid principles. The uselessness charge states that ideal theory, even if it tells us what justice would require under exceptionally favorable circumstances, offers no information valuable for guiding action in the nonideal circumstances characteristic of today's societies. The two charges target the idealized assumptions made in ideal theory, in particular the assumption of full compliance. By assuming full compliance, the critics argue, ideal theory ignores the way real-world agents' motivational limitations render the pursuit of its proposed principles infeasible or undesirable. In four free-standing articles, I examine when and why noncompliance due to motivational limitations puts constraints on justice, and how this affects the status and usefulness of ideal theory. I argue that motivational limitations constrain justice in ideal theory if we hold that justice is action-guiding in the sense that it confers actual duties on individual agents, and that the distribution of collective duties to individuals requires reasonable expectations of others' compliance. In nonideal theory, adopting an actualist standpoint will lead us to conclude that not only the noncompliance of others, but also our own foreseeable noncompliance constrains what justice can demand. I further argue that how this affects the usefulness of ideal theory depends, on the one hand, on how we interpret crucial concepts such as "action-guidance", and, on the other, on which task we expect political theory to perform. My findings shed new light over the complex conflict lines that underlie the current dispute, and urge debaters to render explicit and argue for the assumptions upon which they rest their judgments about ideal theory.

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls´ theory as presented in his books "A Theory of Justice" and "The Law of Peoples." The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.

Community members seek benefits-sharing planning agreements to advance their own distributive justice goals by directing benefits to communities. Nonideal theory does much to explain the context and possibilities for these agreements. The agreements forged between communities and development interests seek to address, but not completely achieve, distributive justice via consensus about incremental changes in project benefit distribution. However, implementation and outcomes can vary widely. This article develops theory to conceptualize a practical framework for these planning agreements using nonideal justice theories, granted the triple concerns of inaction, tokenism, and rhetorical trickery posed by ineffective implementation. The Crenshaw Light Rail Project in Los Angeles illustrates the issues in play.

Analytic social ontology has been dominated by approaches where institutions tend to come out paradigmatically as being relatively harmonious and mutually beneficial. This can however raise worries about such models potentially playing an ideological role in conceptualizing certain politically charged features of our societies as marginal phenomena or not even being institutional matters at all. This article seeks to develop a nonideal theory of institutions, which neither assumes that institutions are beneficial or oppressive, and where ideology is understood as a structuring and stabilizing phenomenon that helps maintain specific distributions of rights and duties by conferring perceived legitimacy onto them.

Ideal theory has been extensively contested on the grounds that it is ideology: namely, that it performs the distorting social role of reifying and enforcing unjust features of the status quo. Indeed, a growing number of philosophers adopt a nonideal methodology—which dispenses with ideal theory—because of this ideology critique. I argue, however, that such philosophers are confused about the ultimate dialectical upshot of this critique even if it succeeds. I do so by constructing a parallel—equally plausible—ideology critique of nonideal methodology; specifically, I argue that capitalist and managerial social attitudes have commodified people's conception of justice and induced suspicion of ideal theory, which is not construed as having direct practical value. Consequently, nonideal methodology performs the distorting role of reifying and enforcing the hegemonies of capitalism and managerialism. Ideal theory and nonideal methodology are, therefore, in symmetrically bad positions.

Reseña de: Huseyinzadegan, D., Kant's Nonideal Theory of Politics, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2019, 204 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8101-3987-9.

Reseña de: Huseyinzadegan, D., Kant's Nonideal Theory of Politics, Evanston, Illinois, Northwestern University Press, 2019, 204 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8101-3987-9.

Cover -- 1. Introduction -- Outline of the course of the argument -- 2. Ideal theory and idealization -- 2.1 The output of ideal theory: ideal principles and ideal institutions -- 2.2 The input of ideal theory: empirical and moral construction assumptions -- The first type: conceptions of the person -- The second type: idealized assumptions in thought experiments -- The third type: idealization regarding the range of outcomes being considered -- The fourth type: idealization in the sense of assuming moral ideals -- The fifth type: Idealization as assuming away feasibility restrictions -- Part I: Empirical restrictions in political philosophy -- 3. Nonideal theory and the ideal guidance approach -- 3.1 The practical relevance of ideal theory -- 3.1.1 "Clinical theory" as an alternative to the ideal guidance approach -- 3.1.2 The critique of the ideal guidance approach -- The problem of the second-best -- The legitimacy critique -- 3.2 A reasonable compromise? -- 4. Dimensions of feasibility -- 4.1 Institutional design -- 4.2 Dimensions of feasibility -- 4.2.1 Technical feasibility and accessibility -- 4.2.2 Modal dimensions of feasibility restrictions -- 4.2.3 Ontological dimensions of feasibility restrictions -- 4.3 Mapping different approaches to normative theory -- 5. Constructing ideal institutions for the ideal guidance approach -- 5.1 Principles for designing institutions and the status quo bias -- 5.2 The importance of long-term consequences for evaluating incremental reform options -- 5.3 Do we need ideal theory? -- 5.4 Feasibility in the construction of ideal institutions -- Part II: Moral ideals in political philosophy -- 6. Geuss' critique of ideal theory: moral construction assumptions in the focus -- 6.1 Geuss' conception of critical political philosophy -- 6.2 Geuss' critique of ideal theory.

Tommie Shelby articulates a nonideal theory of black US ghettos that casts them as consequences of an intolerably unjust institutional structure. I argue that, despite some of its significant merits, Shelby's theory is weakened by his rejection of integration as a principle for reforming disadvantaged ghettos and correcting structural injustices in the US. In particular, I argue that Shelby unwarrantedly downplays the socio-economic efficiency of integrationist policies and fails to consider some of the ways in which integration might count as a duty of (corrective) justice.

This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls' theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with whether a Rawlsian framework has the resources to rectify past racial injustice. It is argued that it has more resources to do this than Mills allows. This second part of the article centers on two Rawlsian ideas: ideal theory and the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle. It is argued that ideal theory is essential for the kind of rectificatory work that Mills wants nonideal theory to do, and that where there is a socioeconomic legacy of past injustice, it is hard to see how FEO could be implemented if it did no rectificatory work, a result which means that there is less need to turn to nonideal theory at all.

This article considers how Margaret Jane Radin's theory of the feminist double bind can bring conceptual clarity to the difficulties feminisms face in engaging with political and legal institutions of global governance. I draw on her theory to reinitiate a conversation on ideal and nonideal theory, in order to answer the call of key proponents in international legal feminism to reevaluate methodologies in critiquing mainstream institutions. By providing an account of how to navigate the double bind, this article brings conceptual clarity to the tension between resistance and compliance that has been argued to lie at the heart of the feminist project in international law. I demonstrate how this theoretical framework can foster greater pluralist perspectives in feminist engagement of ideal theories to temper the deradicalising and conservative risk of navigating feasibility constrained nonideal strategies.