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In: International Theory (2010), 2:1, 87–112
SSRN
Working paper
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 49, Heft 2, S. 137-159
ISSN: 1552-7441
Analytic social ontology has been dominated by approaches where institutions tend to come out paradigmatically as being relatively harmonious and mutually beneficial. This can however raise worries about such models potentially playing an ideological role in conceptualizing certain politically charged features of our societies as marginal phenomena or not even being institutional matters at all. This article seeks to develop a nonideal theory of institutions, which neither assumes that institutions are beneficial or oppressive, and where ideology is understood as a structuring and stabilizing phenomenon that helps maintain specific distributions of rights and duties by conferring perceived legitimacy onto them.
In: Human affairs: HA ; postdisciplinary humanities & social sciences quarterly, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 8-17
ISSN: 1337-401X
Moral theory has generally focused on resolving ethical dilemmas by identifying ethically sound options. Whether the focus is on consequences, duties, principles or virtues, ethical cases are often approached in ways that assume morally sound solutions can be found and followed. Such 'ideal morality' assumes that moral goodness is always possible, leaving people confident they have done the right thing. Such an approach becomes inadequate in disaster settings where any good solution is often difficult to see. This paper examines recent work on nonideal moral theory as a useful model for disaster bioethics. This approach views moral dilemmas as situations where no choice is ideal and every option involves some element of unavoidable wrongdoing. Rather than straining for ideal answers, this approach acknowledges that sometimes the lesser of two evils is the best that can be done. Such situations inevitably lead to feelings of regret or guilt, commonly encountered in discussions of disaster bioethics. This paper explores the practical implications of nonideal approaches for disaster responders working in tragic situations.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 20, Heft 4, S. 675-697
ISSN: 1741-2730
Ideal theory has been extensively contested on the grounds that it is ideology: namely, that it performs the distorting social role of reifying and enforcing unjust features of the status quo. Indeed, a growing number of philosophers adopt a nonideal methodology—which dispenses with ideal theory—because of this ideology critique. I argue, however, that such philosophers are confused about the ultimate dialectical upshot of this critique even if it succeeds. I do so by constructing a parallel—equally plausible—ideology critique of nonideal methodology; specifically, I argue that capitalist and managerial social attitudes have commodified people's conception of justice and induced suspicion of ideal theory, which is not construed as having direct practical value. Consequently, nonideal methodology performs the distorting role of reifying and enforcing the hegemonies of capitalism and managerialism. Ideal theory and nonideal methodology are, therefore, in symmetrically bad positions.
In: Legal Theory, Band 17, Heft 2
SSRN
In: Journal of social philosophy
ISSN: 1467-9833
Examining the debate about animals in the language of justice this book develops both ideal and nonideal theories of justice for animals. It rejects the abolitionist animal rights position in favour of a revised version of animal rights centering on sentience
In: Social movement studies: journal of social, cultural and political protest, Band 14, Heft 2, S. 250-251
ISSN: 1474-2837
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 363-387
ISSN: 2154-123X
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 242-268
ISSN: 1552-7476
Recent discussions in Just War Theory have been framed by a polarising debate between "traditionalist" and "revisionist" approaches. This debate has largely overlooked the importance of an applied account of Just War Theory. The main aim of this essay is to defend the importance of this applied account and, in particular, a nonideal account of the ethics of war. I argue that the applied, nonideal morality of war is vital for a plausible and comprehensive account of Just War Theory. A subsidiary aim of the essay is to show that once we appreciate the importance of the applied, nonideal account, it becomes clear that the positions proposed by revisionists and traditionalists are, in fact, much closer than often presumed.
In: Social Theory and Practice, 2021
SSRN
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 33, Heft 1-2, S. 175-192
ISSN: 1471-6437
Abstract:The debate between proponents of ideal and nonideal approaches to political philosophy has thus far been framed as a meta-level debate about normative theory. The argument of this essay will be that the ideal/nonideal debate can be helpfully reframed as a ground-level debate within normative theory. Specifically, it can be understood as a debate within the applied normative field of professional ethics, with the profession being examined that of political philosophy itself. If the community of academic political theorists and philosophers cannot help us navigate the problems we face in actual political life, they have not lived up to the moral demands of their vocation. A moderate form of what David Estlund decries as "utopophobia" is therefore an integral element of a proper professional ethic for political philosophers. The moderate utopophobe maintains that while devoting scarce time and resources to constructing utopias may sometimes be justifiable, it is never self-justifying. Utopianism is defensible only insofar as it can reasonably be expected to help inform or improve non-utopian political thinking.
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 411-438
ISSN: 2154-123X
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy
ISSN: 0090-5917