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The novelty in Adam Burgess' paper is that he assesses nudge policies in the context of the shift in the UK government's approach to risk from the nannying policies of Labour to the nudge policies of the Conservatives. There is a wealth of ideas in this paper. I find it useful to disentangle some of these ideas focusing on the following two questions:1.In what respects do Labour's nannying policies and the Conservatives' nudge policies differ?2.What is problematic about Labour's nannying and the Conservatives' nudge policies?Subsequently I will reflect on how a particular strand of research in the social sciences can be made relevant to designing a more responsible way of dealing with societal risk and show how this approach can evade some of Burgess' concerns.

AbstractInsights from the behavioural sciences are increasingly used by governments and other organizations worldwide to 'nudge' people to make better decisions. Furthermore, a large philosophical literature has emerged on the ethical considerations on nudging human behaviour that has presented key challenges for the area, but is regularly omitted from discussion of policy design and administration. We present and discuss FORGOOD, an ethics framework that synthesizes the debate on the ethics of nudging in a memorable mnemonic. It suggests that nudgers should consider seven core ethical dimensions:Fairness,Openness,Respect,Goals,Opinions,OptionsandDelegation. The framework is designed to capture the key considerations in the philosophical debate about nudging human behaviour, while also being accessible for use in a range of public policy settings, as well as training.

AbstractGovernments use nudges to stimulate citizens to exercise, save money and eat healthily. However, nudging is controversial. How the media frames nudge impacts decisions on whether to use this policy instrument. We, therefore, analyzed 443 newspaper articles about nudging. Overall, the media was positive about nudges. Nudging was viewed as an effective and efficient way to change behavior and received considerable support across the political spectrum. The media also noted that nudges were easy to implement. The controversy about nudges concerns themes like paternalism, fear of manipulation, small effect sizes, and unintended consequences. Academic proponents of nudging were actively involved in media debates, while critical voices were less often heard. There were some reports criticizing how the government used nudges. However, these were exceptions; the media often highlighted the benefits of nudging. Concluding, we show how nudging by governments was discussed in a critical institution: the news media.

Abstract
In this paper, I examine how nudges affect the autonomy and freedom of those nudged. I consider two arguments put forth by Thaler and Sunstein for the claim that these effects can only be minor. According to the first of these arguments, nudges cannot significantly restrict a person's autonomy or freedom since they are easy to resist. According to the second argument, the existence of nudges is inevitable, and thus, pursuing libertarian paternalism by nudging people doesn't make a relevant difference to people's autonomy and freedom. After arguing that both of these arguments fail, I elucidate the general conditions in which, and the degrees to which, a person's autonomy and freedom are affected by nudges. One focus of this discussion concerns how people's autonomy and freedom are affected if—for example, due to progress in information technology—nudges become more effective, more individualized and more common, and affect more people.

AbstractWhy are some nudges ineffective, or at least less effective than choice architects hope and expect? Focusing primarily on default rules, this essay emphasizes two reasons for this. The first involves strong antecedent preferences on the part of choosers. The second involves successful "counternudges," which persuade people to choose in a way that confounds the efforts of choice architects. Nudges might also be ineffective, and less effective than expected, for five other reasons: (1) some nudges produce confusion in the target audience; (2) some nudges have only short-term effects; (3) some nudges produce "reactance" (though this appears to be rare); (4) some nudges are based on an inaccurate (though initially plausible) understanding on the part of choice architects of what kinds of choice architecture will move people in particular contexts; and (5) some nudges produce compensating behavior, resulting in no net effect. When a nudge turns out to be insufficiently effective, choice architects have three potential responses: (1) do nothing; (2) nudge better (or differently); and (3) fortify the effects of the nudge, perhaps through counter-counternudges, or perhaps through incentives, mandates, or bans.