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Working paper
Nudge and Nudging in Public Policy
In: Banerjee, S., John, P. (2023). Nudge and Nudging in Public Policy. In: van Gerven, M., Rothmayr Allison, C., Schubert, K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Public Policy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90434-0_52-1
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SSRN
Working paper
Nudge, la manipulation bienveillante
In: Sciences humaines: SH, Band 287, Heft 12, S. 34-34
La main invisible du nudge
In: Sciences humaines: SH, Band 225, Heft 4, S. 15-15
The power to nudge
In: American political science review, Band 111, Heft 2, S. 404-417
ISSN: 0003-0554
World Affairs Online
Why Nudges Are Unethical
In: The Manipulation of Choice, S. 81-102
2 Nudges: Einordnung und Typen
In: Nudging in der Verbraucherpolitik, S. 25-38
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Working paper
Do Europeans Like Nudges?
In: Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 4, July 2016, pp. 310–325
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Nudges in a post-truth world
Nudges—policy proposals informed by work in behavioural economics and psychology that are designed to lead to better decision-making or better behaviour—are controversial. Critics allege that they bypass our deliberative capacities, thereby undermining autonomy and responsible agency. In this paper, I identify a kind of nudge I call a nudge to reason, which make us more responsive to genuine evidence. I argue that at least some nudges to reason do not bypass our deliberative capacities. Instead, use of these nudges should be seen as appeals to mechanisms partially constitutive of these capacities, and therefore as benign (so far as autonomy and responsible agency are concerned). I sketch some concrete proposals for nudges to reason which are especially important given the apparent widespread resistance to evidence seen in recent political events.
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Nudges in a post-truth world
Nudges—policy proposals informed by work in behavioural economics and psychology that are designed to lead to better decision-making or better behaviour—are controversial. Critics allege that they bypass our deliberative capacities, thereby undermining autonomy and responsible agency. In this paper, I identify a kind of nudge I call a nudge to reason, which make us more responsive to genuine evidence. I argue that at least some nudges to reason do not bypass our deliberative capacities. Instead, use of these nudges should be seen as appeals to mechanisms partially constitutive of these capacities, and therefore as benign (so far as autonomy and responsible agency are concerned). I sketch some concrete proposals for nudges to reason which are especially important given the apparent widespread resistance to evidence seen in recent political events.
BASE