Suchergebnisse

At least four criterions/methods to measure mechanical effects of electoral systems can be distinguished: measuring disproportionality, the reduction in number of parties, the party advantages & the threshold percentages. In this manuscript we focus on the thresholds. We first concentrate on a description of legal, theoretical, & empirical thresholds as measures of mechanical effects. Further, we analyse the relationship between (the natural logarithm) of district magnitude & the empirical threshold & between the empirical threshold & the effective number of parties. As starting point we take districts in Spain, Portugal & Hungary as the level of analysis. We clearly show that there is a negative causal connection between district magnitude & the threshold percentage & between threshold percentage & the number of parties. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The concern is with how the soc & econ structure of cities affects the degree of pol'al competition & how these factors in turn affect the degree of pol'al stability. Data derive from a comparative empirical study of the outcomes of the communal elections of 1952, 1958, & 1964, in 147 Belgian cities with a pop size of 10,000 or more in 1947. The following generalizations are noted: A general proliferation of election lists or parties participating in the elections from 1952 to 1964; a trend from 1-party control over the electoral college of thc city council toward coalition control; a net increase in the number of Catholic lists & a net decrease in the number of socialist & liberal lists participating; & an increase in the number of cities in which newer, smaller & non-traditional parties or lists participated in the electoral college of the city council. 3 measures of pol'al competition were used: (1) the average number of parties or lists that entered the communal elections of 1952, 1958 & 1964; (2) the average number of lists that received at least 10% of the vote in these 3 elections: & (3) the presence or absence of a coalition on the electoral college of the city council in 1952. 2 measures of pol'al stability were employed: (a) the degree of stability in the lists & parties participating, & (b) the degree of stability in the list or party controlling the electoral college of the city council. In general, measures of structural diff'iation, linguistic diversity, industr diversity, & soc heterogeneity (ie, the presence of a large Mc) are found to be positively related to the degree of competition in local pol. In turn, measures of each of these structural factors & measures of pol'al competition are negatively related to measures of pol'al stability. Regression analysis supports the interpretation that diversity & heterogeneity in the soc structure of cities--specifically, pop size, density, & the presence of many persons with high occup'al status--contribute to greater pol'al competition in local pol; but it was the degree of pol'al competition that most strongly affected the degree of pol'al stability. It is concluded that cities with a high degree of soc & econ heterogeneity have a greater amount of conflict & cleavage. This results in greater competition in the pol'al arena. 16 Tables. M. Maxfield.

The listing of candidates proposed by the parties for the Belgian general elections is quite determinative. Due to electoral code arrangements & despite a growing number of preference votes, only candidates placed within the lists' "necessary sequence" (ie, the number of seats a party gains in a particular district) actually get elected. Thus the Belgian voter does not elect the mandataries but only determines the number of mandates due each of the several parties. While the statutes of the three major Belgian parties (Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals) provide opportunities for wide member participation through the "general member polls," in which all party members are franchised to select the candidates for their party lists, an examination of elections reveals a growing tendency to deviate from the system: in 1958, 89% of all representatives were placed on their party list by general member polls; in 1978, only 10%. (The procedure was abandoned by the CVP-PSC in 1968 & by the PVV-PLP in 1971.) Thus the final phase of the party list composition has, since 1958, become increasingly a matter decided only by the national & federal party executives & councils. Whether the trend toward oligarchization will spread to decision making in other matters (party organ composition, party programs, etc) is not clear. 8 Tables, 1 Figure. Modified HA.

Existing models for the formation of governmental coalitions do not score high in predictability for Belgium. A more complex model, covering 3 fields, 7 vectors, & 1 strong actor among a limited number of decisionmakers, fits much better. A prerequisite for a coalition is a majority within the elitist parties in Parliament. Favoring coalition formation are: the decision-making capabilities of the cabinet; elite consensus on the basic values prominent in Belgian society; similarities of program among the political parties; & their capacity to manipulate issues. Hampering coalition formation are: the development of partisan options; the polarization of issues; & internal dissensions within the political parties. This model stresses the combined action of strong structures & actors, which is paramount in Belgian society. 2 Figures. Modified HA

Problems concerning the subsidization of pol'al parties are discussed. 1st the situation in countries other than the Netherlands is considered. Public funds are used for direct support of pol'al parties in Argentina, Germany, Israel, Turkey & Sweden. Indirect support (tax facilities, air time, etc) is given in many more countries. Arguments against subsidization are: (1) it makes parties dependent on the gov; (2) it freezes the pol'al pattern; & (3) it is contrary to the private character of pol'al parties. The form of subsidization is seen to be an important consideration: a form must be sought which guarantees equality of opportunity between the parties. There are no principle objections to subsidization, however, direct support is rejected for the present because it is difficult to find a system of allocation which is perfect & equitable from all points of view, & because subsidization would serve to increase the psychol'al distance between the parties & the electorate. If subvention is desired, the best system is seen to be one in which allocation depends on the amount contributed by the party members & the number of seats in parliament. This amount would be limited, & the subsidization regulated by law. The parties would be obliged to publish their income & expenditures. Modified HA.

TYPICAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NETHERLANDS IS THAT CONFLICTS ARE QUICKLY POLITICIZED. EITHER AN EXISTING POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ITSELF A MOUTH-PIECE OF ONE OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, OR ONE OF THESE GROUPS FORMS A NEW PARTY. THE LATTER SOLUTION IS FAVORED BY THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM, THAT GUARANTEES EASY ACCESS FOR NEW PARTIES TO PARLIAMENT. VARIOUS NEW PARTIES HAVE EMERGED IN THIS WAY, HAVE ATTRACTED MANY VOTERS, BUT HAVE LOST THEM AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITHOUT HAVING REACHED THE GOAL AT WHICH THEY AIMED. OPINION-RESEARCH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SHARPNESS OF A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIES HAS INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE OPPOSITION OF EMPLOYEES TO EMPLOYERS. THE DUTCH POLITICAL SYSTEM CANNOT BE DENIED FLEXIBILITY IN THE HANDLING OF CONFLICTS. WITH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS, THIS FLEXIBILITY MAY BE LOST IF THE INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT INCREASED AT THE SAME TIME & IF NO STRUCTURAL CHANGES ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS & EMPLOYEES. HA.

Main political events of 1999 in Flanders (Belgium) are discussed. Following a description of the formalities, notably budget control issues, leading up to the June 13 elections, the results of the elections & the formation of the new Flemish parliament are described. Although the Christian democratic party CVP emerged as the largest party, it forfeited its governing rights; instead, a socialist/environmentalist coalition consisting of VLD, SP, Agalev, & VU-ID was formed. The development of budgetary agreements is summarized, & main elements of discussions & agreements in the following policy fields are addressed: economy & labor, infrastructure, environment, welfare, education, media, & state reformation. Since the Flemish parliament, established in 1995, is a relatively new institution, organizational & structural aspects of its departments are highlighted & explained, & the developmental processes of each department & office are emphasized. S. Paul