Budzetska dilema: Empirijski dokazi iz Hrvatske i Srbije
In: Politicka misao, Band 51, Heft 3
The author applies a variant of the common pool resources theory to the problem of public spending under the coalition governments elected by proportional representation. The claim is that proportional representation produces cabinets with a large number of parties, and that a large number of parties brings about higher public spending (measured by budget deficit and public debt). The author constructs and deploys the concept of budgetary dilemma to the effect that, absent institutional constraints, public spending results in expansionary fiscal policy. In the second part, the author empirically tests the budgetary dilemma in two postcommunist democracies - Serbia and Croatia, which in 2000-2013 had cabinets with a large number of actors and increasing public spending. The analysis shows a statistically unreliable predictive capacity of the main independent variable - the number of parties in the cabinet. Statistical analysis is followed by several illustrations of the budgetary dilemma. Adapted from the source document.