Introduction -- A theory of aggregation incentives -- Testing the theory -- Aggregation, nationalization, and the number of parties in Thailand -- Explaining aggregation in Thailand -- Term limits, aggregation incentives, and the number of parties in the Philippines -- Conclusion.
We compare single ballot vs dual ballot elections under plurality rule, assuming sincere voting and allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under the dual ballot, the number of parties is larger but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy is smaller, because their bargaining power is reduced compared to a single ballot election. The predictions on the number of parties and on policy volatility are consistent with data on municipal elections in Italy, where cities with more (less) than 15,000 inhabitants have dual (single) ballots respectively.
Electoral Systems and Political Context illustrates how political and social context conditions the effects of electoral rules. The book examines electoral behavior and outcomes in countries that use 'mixed-member' electoral systems – where voters cast one ballot for a party list under proportional representation (PR) and one for a candidate in a single member district (SMD). Based on comparisons of outcomes under the two different rules used in mixed-member systems, the book highlights how electoral systems' effects – especially strategic voting, the number of parties and women's representation – tend to be different in new democracies from what one usually sees in established democracies. Moreover, electoral systems such as SMDs are usually presumed to constrain the number of parties irrespective of the level of social diversity, but this book demonstrates that social diversity frequently shapes party fragmentation even under such restrictive rules
For a given electoral system, what average number and sizes of parties and government duration can we expect? Predicting Party Sizes is the first book to make specific predictions that agree with world averages. The basic factors are the numbers of seats in the assembly and in the average electoral district. While previous models tell us only the direction in which to change the electoral system, the present ones also tell us by how much they must be changed so as to obtainthe desired change in average number of parties and cabinet duration. Hence, combined with known particularities of a coun
Why do people identify with political parties? How stable are those identifications? Stable party systems, with a limited number of parties and mostly stable voter identification with a party, are normally considered significant signals of a steady democracy. Ken Kollman and John E. Jackson study changing patterns of partisanship in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia over the last 50 years in order to disentangle possible reasons for shifting partisanship and party identification. They argue that changes in partisanship can be explained by adjustments in voters' attitudes toward issues or parties; the success or failure of policies advocated by parties; or alterations in parties' positions on key issues.
We employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level
Take the number of seats in a representative assembly and the number of seats in districts through which this assembly is elected. From just these two numbers, the authors of Votes from Seats show that it is possible to deduce the number of parties in the assembly and in the electorate, as well as the size of the largest party. Inside parties, the vote distributions of individual candidates likewise follow predictable patterns. Four laws of party seats and votes are constructed by logic and tested, using scientific approaches rare in social sciences. Both complex and simple electoral systems are covered, and the book offers a set of 'best practices' for electoral system design. The ability to predict so much from so little, and to apply to countries worldwide, is an advance in the systematic analysis of a core institutional feature found in any democracy, and points the way towards making social sciences more predictive
This book addresses the question of why a party system with a modest number of nationally oriented political parties emerges in some democracies but not others. The number of parties and nationalization are the product of coordination between voters, candidates, and party leaders within local electoral districts and coordination among candidates and elites across districts. Candidates and voters can do and do coordinate locally in response to electoral incentives, but coordination across districts, or aggregation, often fails in developing democracies. A key contribution of this book is the development and testing of a theory of aggregation incentives that focuses on the payoff to being a large party and the probability of capturing that payoff. The book relies on in-depth case studies of Thailand and the Philippines, and on large-n analysis to establish its arguments
One: Checks and Balances in the Supply of Government Policies -- The organization of competition in congressional and parliamentary governments -- Political checks and balances and the structure of taxation in the United States and Canada -- Competition within the Italian Public Sector -- Two: New Dimensions of Electoral Competition -- The role of deception in political competition -- Policy decisions and the competiton for symbolic resources -- The number of parties and political competition -- Tectonic policies and political competition -- Political competition and the rise of dictatorship -- Three: International Aspects of Political Competition -- Checks and balances and international openness -- Constitutions as the outcome of imperfect spatial competition -- Four: Competition and the Law -- A competitive model of legal rules -- The market for characteristics of property rights.
An election outcome reflects institutional, behavioural and attitudinal influences. We set out a model showing it is a function of the electoral system, the offices at stake and the number of parties competing as well as the choices of voters and the level of turnout. Therefore, any attempt to estimate the impact of increased turnout on an election outcome must go beyond a comparison of the party preferences of voters and non-voters. This paper presents a model which integrates six different types of influences that collectively determine election outcomes. It demonstrates empirically that maximum turnout falls well short of 100 percent turnout. It also shows the effect of proportional representation and multiple parties in reducing the net benefit that any one party could expect from increased turnout and the inadequacy of using shares of the popular vote to predict increased turnout effects in the United States. It leaves open the normative debate between advocates of civic participation and the libertarian value of being free not to vote.
Intro -- CONTENTS -- List of Maps and Tables -- Preface -- 1. Introduction: Explaining Interstate Conflict and Boundary Disputes in Post-Cold War Latin America -- 2. Two Nations in Conflict -- 3. Presidential Decision Making: The Institutional and Personal Context -- 4. Domestic Politics and the Push toward War -- 5. The Domestic Bases for Resolution -- 6. Hemispheric Diplomacy and the Politics of a Solution -- 7. Conclusions: Lessons Learned, Progress Achieved, and Implications for Other Boundary Disputes -- Appendix A. Effective Number of Parties -- Appendix B. Ecuadorean Attitudes toward Relations with Peru (November 1992) -- Appendix C. Polling Data on Border Issues (1994-1996) -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.
How should we think about electoral reform? What are the prospects for modern-day efforts to reform away the two-party system? This book offers a "shifting coalitions" theory of electoral-system change, puts the Progressive Era in comparative perspective, and warns against repeating history. It casts reform as an effort to get or keep control of government, usually during periods of party realignment. Reform can be used to insulate some coalition, dislodge the one in power, or deal with noncommittal "centrists." Whether reform lasts depends less on the number of parties than on whether it helps coalitions hold themselves together. This is where the Progressives got it wrong. Unable to win support for "multi-party politics," they built a reform movement on the idea of "no parties." They polarized local politics on the issue of "corruption," won proportional representation in twenty-four cities, then watched (and sometimes joined) its repeal in all but one case. Along the way, they found they needed parties after all, but the rules they had designed were not up to the task. This movement's legacy still shapes American politics: nonpartisan elections to undersized city councils. Today's reformers might do well to make peace with parties, and their critics might do well to make peace with having more.
Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgements -- 1 Introduction -- Defining 'political party' -- The three faces of party organisations -- The structure of parties -- The role of parties in democratic states -- The crisis of parties -- Outline of the book -- 2 Party Systems -- The importance of understanding party systems -- Early approaches to party systems -- Party system typologies -- The effective number of parties -- Explaining party system variation -- Which party system is best? -- Conclusion -- 3 Theories of Party Development -- The 'internal' and 'external' origins of parties -- An alternative view of the emergence of political parties -- Understanding party types -- Cadre parties to mass parties -- Challenging the mass party model: the catch-all party -- Organisational consequences of the catch-all party: the electoral-professional party model -- The cartel party -- Conclusion: Beyond the cartel - beyond party types? -- 4 Ideology -- On ideology and party politics -- Political cleavages -- Party families -- Ideology in contemporary European party politics -- Party ideology beyond Europe -- United States -- India -- Africa -- Conclusion -- 5 Party Members, Activists and Supporters -- Defining party member, activist and supporter -- The rise (and fall?) of party members -- Why members? -- Party membership incentives: supply -- Leadership incentives: demand -- The costs of a membership organisation -- Explaining and reversing decline -- The effects of membership decline -- Conclusion -- 6 Candidate Selection -- The importance of candidate selection -- Selecting candidates -- The political system -- National legislation -- The candidate selection process: impact of different methods -- Territorial (de-) centralisation and in/exclusiveness of the selectorate.
"How should we think about electoral reform? What are the prospects for modern-day efforts to reform away the two-party system? This book offers a 'shifting coalitions' theory of electoral-system change, puts the Progressive Era in comparative perspective, and warns against repeating history. It casts reform as an effort to get or keep control of government, usually during periods of party realignment. Reform can be used to insulate some coalition, dislodge the one in power, or deal with noncommittal 'centrists.' Whether reform lasts depends less on the number of parties than whether it helps coalitions hold themselves together. This is where the Progressives got it wrong. Unable to win support for 'multi-party politics,' they built a reform movement on the idea of 'no parties.' They polarized local politics on the issue of 'corruption,' won proportional representation in 24 cities, then watched (and sometimes joined) its repeal in all but one case. Along the way, they found they needed parties after all, but the rules they had designed were not up to the task. This movement's legacy still shapes American politics: nonpartisan elections to undersized city councils. Today's reformers might do well to make peace with parties, and their critics might do well to make peace with having more. Keywords: American political development, comparative democratic institutions, electoral systems, institutional choice, party realignment, party systems, ranked-choice voting, representation, single transferable vote, social movements"--
Volumes I, II, III and IV of this reference work were published in 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1994 respectively. The core of the books consists of court decisions involving the Hague Conventions in force in the field of private international law. This wealth of information has been made accessible by arranging the decisions per Convention and then per legal issue, thus clearly showing similarities and differences in the application of each Convention by a variety of countries and tribunals. Considering the increasing number of Conventions between a growing number of parties, this system is eminently suited to illustrate problems of application. Volume V completes the jurisprudence of the series with cases covering the period from 1990 to 1995 as well as a number of cases of an earlier date which were only recently received. They originate from fourteen European countries, the USA, Canada, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Dutch Antilles and Israel. Also included are a few decisions from the ICC and the European Court of Justice. A survey as per April 1994 of signatures, ratifications, reservations and other declarations relating to each Convention can be found in Volume IV, which volume also includes an overview of the vast literature the Conventions have given rise to throughout the world. The Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference has cooperated in the realization of this series, which will prove to be indispensable for practising lawyers and legal scholars who have anything to do with the Hague Conference in any area of private international law or international procedural law