Implications of the Effective Number of Parties for Cabinet Formation
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 227-236
ISSN: 1354-0688
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In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 227-236
ISSN: 1354-0688
Political science knows a fair amount about the variables explaining party systems fragmentation or the constant in the equation of the number of parties. But we know much less about changes in the number of parties over time within countries or the slope in the equation of the number of parties. This paper fills this gap explaining the entry of new viable competitors in party systems after the founding election. Using empirical evidence from Spain, we show that when there is an electoral market failure and the higher the number of perfectly elastic voters, the higher the probability of new viable entrants. ; La ciencia política tiene un conocimiento bastante extenso de las variables que explican el sistema de fragmentación de partidos o de la constante en la ecuación del número de partidos. Pero, en cambio, se sabe mucho menos sobre los cambios en el número de partidos en el tiempo en los países o la pendiente de la ecuación en el número de los partidos. Este trabajo viene a cubrir esta carencia al explicar la entrada de los nuevos competidores viables en el sistema de partidos después de la elección fundacional. Utilizando la evidencia empírica de España, mostramos que cuando hay un fallo del mercado electoral y cuanto mayor es el número de votantes perfectamente elásticos, mayor es la probabilidad de nuevas entradas viables.
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Political science knows a fair amount about the variables explaining party systems fragmentation or the constant in the equation of the number of parties. But we know much less about changes in the number of parties over time within countries or the slope in the equation of the number of parties. This paper fills this gap explaining the entry of new viable competitors in party systems after the founding election. Using empirical evidence from Spain, we show that when there is an electoral market failure and the higher the number of perfectly elastic voters, the higher the probability of new viable entrants. ; La ciencia política tiene un conocimiento bastante extenso de las variables que explican el sistema de fragmentación de partidos o de la constante en la ecuación del número de partidos. Pero, en cambio, se sabe mucho menos sobre los cambios en el número de partidos en el tiempo en los países o la pendiente de la ecuación en el número de los partidos. Este trabajo viene a cubrir esta carencia al explicar la entrada de los nuevos competidores viables en el sistema de partidos después de la elección fundacional. Utilizando la evidencia empírica de España, mostramos que cuando hay un fallo del mercado electoral y cuanto mayor es el número de votantes perfectamente elásticos, mayor es la probabilidad de nuevas entradas viables.
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In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 21, Heft 5, S. 803
ISSN: 1354-0688
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 410-421
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 410-421
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Linking Citizens and Parties, S. 67-81
In: Electoral Studies, Band 45, S. 44-54
In: Electoral studies: an international journal
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 393-413
ISSN: 1745-7297
We illustrate the power of 'logical models' (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. Adapted from the source document.
We illustrate the power of "logical models" (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. © 2013 © 2013 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties.
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We illustrate the power of "logical models" (Taagepera, 2007) by offering a three-parameter model of the relationship between the effective number of parties and electoral turnout that makes use of the constraints on what parameter values are internally coherent given boundary conditions to specify functional form, and seeks not optimal curve fitting but rather a direct model testing. In our model, one parameter reflects an effect that generally acts to increase turnout as the effective number of parties increases, another an effect that generally acts to decrease turnout as the effective number of parties increases, while a third parameter allows for baseline variation in turnout across countries (or within countries across elections). We fit this model to district-level data from 237 elections held in 17 countries, representing a wide range of electoral system types generating multi-party contests, with over 20,000 district-election observations. The basic intuition, that turnout rises to a peak as the effective number of parties increases and then falls slowly, fits our data pretty well. © 2013 © 2013 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties.
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In: Politics in Central Europe: the journal of the Central European Political Science Association, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 459-478
ISSN: 2787-9038
Abstract
What is the best electoral system to increase the number of political parties represented in Parliament? This article answers the question using data from all the elections in Macedonia since 2002, and by making simulations of the results according to different electoral systems. In principle, we found that the electoral model that would bring most parties to the Macedonian Parliament is the Droop and Hare used in one electoral district. Moreover, the article answers the question how favourable different electoral systems are to larger/smaller parties. We find that the following is the order of electoral systems from most to least favourable for larger parties: Imperiali highest averages, D'Hondt, Sainte-Laguë, Largest remainders – Imperiali, Danish, Largest remainders – Droop, Largest remainders – Hare.
In: Electoral studies: an international journal, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 63-86
ISSN: 0261-3794
In: Journal of elections, public opinion and parties, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 393-413
ISSN: 1745-7297