Suchergebnisse

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties ( N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions ( I) and effective magnitude ( M) of electoral system: N = I.6M.15+ 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties (N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions (I) and effective magnitude (M) of electoral system: N= I.6M.15 + 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

What determines the number of parties in a national assembly? Previous work has emphasized either sociopolitical heterogeneity or electoral system permissiveness, or brought them together on an empirical basis. Here an equation is developed that satisfies two theoretical boundary conditions and expresses the effective number of assembly parties (N) in terms of both the number of politicized issue dimensions (I) and effective magnitude (M) of electoral system: N= I.6M.15 + 1. Actually, depending on circumstances, any of the three variables could become the dependent one, affected by the two others. Empirical evidence is presented, based on Lijphart's (1984) data on 22 stable regimes.

The mechanical effect of electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which the effective number of parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions. © 1993, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

Themechanical effectof electoral systems, identified by Maurice Duverger, can be estimated by means of a quantitative model. The model predicts the range within which theeffective numberof parties in a district should fall for a given magnitude (number of seats) of the district. At the national level, a related model predicts the effective number of parties based on the effective magnitude and the number of seats in the national assembly. The institutional variables considered—magnitude and assembly size—define a great portion of the structural constraints within which a given country's politics must take place. The model developed provides a good fit to data in spite of its having been developed from outrageously simple starting assumptions.

ObjectivesThe objective of this study is to explore how party systems can affect turnout by exploring the conditional effect of number of parties and party polarization on democracies.MethodsUsing Comparative Manifesto Project data from 26 democracies, this study develops a measure of party systems that interacts party polarization and number of parties to explain turnout.ResultsFindings show that the composition of the party system as a whole is a key determinate of a voter's propensity to vote. Highly polarized systems with few parties spur individuals to vote, while low levels of polarization and many parties reduce incentives to vote.ConclusionsResults have important implications for theories of turnout, resolving the confusion surrounding how party systems affect political participation.

We rely on data from India and the United States to show that political and economic centralization can influence the number of national parties in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. Historically, in both countries the number of parties in local electoral districts has been near two, but the number of national parties has fluctuated. Periods of a small number of national parties in both countries correspond to periods of centralization. We argue that, as national governments centralize power and make policies that affect local areas, candidates have greater incentives to associate with national organizations, and voters have greater incentives to abandon locally competitive but nationally noncompetitive parties.

We rely on data from India and the United States to show that political and economic centralization can influence the number of national parties in single-member simple-plurality electoral systems. Historically, in both countries the number of parties in local electoral districts has been near two, but the number of national parties has fluctuated. Periods of a small number of national parties in both countries correspond to periods of centralization. We argue that, as national governments centralize power and make policies that affect local areas, candidates have greater incentives to associate with national organizations, and voters have greater incentives to abandon locally competitive but nationally noncompetitive parties. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

We exploit a rare natural experiment, a recent reform of local elections in Poland, to study an extension of Duverger's laws. We analyse party system fragmentation under single-member plurality rule vis-à-vis a proportional representation formula accompanied by a legal threshold. We demonstrate that the presence of a threshold alters Duverger's 'psychological' effect. Proportional representation with a threshold tends to be on a par with single-member plurality as regards restricting the effective number of electoral parties, largely due to the absence of smaller groupings with spatially concentrated support. At the same time, Duverger's 'mechanical' effect takes a rather standard form, single-member plurality being relatively powerful at constraining the effective number of legislative parties.

This article examines the forces shaping changes in the number of parties between consecutive elections. We argue that the transaction costs in electoral coordination depend on the turnout level in the previous election. The greater the number of peripheral voters entering the electorate, the less likely a substantial change in the distribution of partisan support in the subsequent election. The argument is tested using data for 313 parliamentary elections in 63 countries from 1990 to 2011, and two cases studies of countries using compulsory voting (the Netherlands and Australia). ; We acknowledge support from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [Grant number CSO2017-85024-C2-1-P (AEI/FEDER], ICREA under the ICREA Academia programme, and the Australian Research Council Discovery Project [Grant number DP190101978].