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Syllable margins and the phonotactic peculiarities of word-edges have always drawn attention of researches working within different theoretical approaches. In the following paper some Norwegian consonantal clusters will be examined, with special reference to the left-margin of the words. Our attention will be focused on establishing the set of possible branching onsets in Norwegian, both word-initially and in the word-internal position.

AbstractSchizophrenia has been described in children as young as five years of age and should be a diagnostic consideration in any child with psychosis.

Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Conflict Termination Dataset, 1946-2007, we investigate determinants of war duration: How long does war last before the onset of peace? We provide an exposition of the nature of the data and of the transformations statistical issues involved in quantifying the dynamics of conflict, in particular the onset of peace. Various duration models are used to analyze the length of wars that ended with victory and peace or cease fires or show low activity. Multispell Cox proportional hazards models and single-spell log-logistic hazard models suggest that major wars are of shorter duration than minor wars, internal wars last longer than wars between states, and peace comes quicker in Europe than in other regions. We find only small differences in the determinants of terminated wars and wars with low activities or no activities.

This paper addresses the false dichotomy of 'greed-grievance' regarding the onset of civil wars, providing a theory that specifies the interaction of economic and identity-based factors within a two-stage causal process. The sociological concept of overlapping versus cross-cutting social cleavages is applied to explain the origins of the potential for ethnic civil war, as the overlap of ethnic cleavages with material cleavages fuels an in-group/out-group ideology. Such situations can, however, exist for decades without the onset of war, thus it is necessary to delineate this question from the necessarily separate, temporal question of the timing of the outbreak of such wars as a second stage. Catalysts such as economic decline and adverse regime change provide the variables that, in the presence of a social structure of overlapping social cleavages, exacerbate existing intergroup tensions to the point of organized violence, or are mitigated by the lack of major cleavages or the presence of cross-cutting cleavages. Evidence from cases is provided, followed by a discussion of the implications of this theory for further research. Adapted from the source document.

Does the recurrence of wars suggest that we fail to recognize dangerous situations for what they are, and are doomed to repeat the errors of the past? Or rather that policymakers correctly anticipate the consequences of their actions but knowingly choose conflict? Unfortunately, little is known about how well wars are anticipated. Do conflicts tend to come as a surprise? I estimated the risk of war as perceived by contemporaries of all interstate and intrastate conflicts between 1816 and 2007. Using historical financial data of government bond yields, I find that market participants tend to underestimate the risk of war prior to its onset, and to react with surprise immediately thereafter. This result illustrates how conflict forecasts can be self-fulfilling or self-defeating. Present predictions may affect future behavior, such that wars may be less likely to occur when they are predicted, but more likely when they are not. I also show that the forecasting record has not improved over the past 200 years, and that wars involving democracies lead to greater market shocks. These findings also have implications for the way decisionmakers respond to new information, and how audiences perceive the risk of war and hence their leaders' actions.

Abstract
The spread of civil war poses serious risks and costs. We argue that conflict environments, which vary across time and space, systematically exacerbate the spread of civil war. As conflict in a state's neighborhood becomes more spatially proximate and as lingering effects of conflict accumulate over time, that state's risk of civil war onset increases. To theorize and test this argument, we construct the conflict environment (CE) score, a concept that taps into spatial and temporal dimensions of violence in a state's neighborhood. Using the CE score in established empirical models of civil war onset, we demonstrate that a dangerous conflict environment consistently elevates the risk of civil war, outperforming traditional measures of nearby violence, even when domestic factors are taken into account.

Abstract
Every night, we pass through a transitory zone at the borderland between wakefulness and sleep, named the first stage of nonrapid eye movement sleep (N1). N1 sleep is associated with increased hippocampal activity and dream-like experiences that incorporate recent wake materials, suggesting that it may be associated with memory processing. Here, we investigated the specific contribution of N1 sleep in the processing of memory traces. Participants were asked to learn the precise locations of 48 objects on a grid and were then tested on their memory for these items before and after a 30-min rest during which participants either stayed fully awake or transitioned toward N1 or deeper (N2) sleep. We showed that memory recall was lower (10% forgetting) after a resting period, including only N1 sleep compared to N2 sleep. Furthermore, the ratio of alpha/theta power (an electroencephalography marker of the transition toward sleep) correlated negatively with the forgetting rate when taking into account all sleepers (N1 and N2 groups combined), suggesting a physiological index for memory loss that transcends sleep stages. Our findings suggest that interrupting sleep onset at N1 may alter sleep-dependent memory consolidation and promote forgetting.